HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Brad Wilson
Applicant
-and-
District School Board of Niagara
Respondent
Decision
Adjudicator: David A. Wright
Date: February 17, 2011
Citation: 2011 HRTO 350
Indexed as: Wilson v. District School Board of Niagara
[1] This is an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), filed on August 25, 2008. The applicant alleges that the respondent discriminated against him when it terminated his employment. It is not clear when the termination was, but it was clearly in 2004 or earlier.
[2] As a result of attempts to have the applicant complete the Application, which was incomplete, and administrative errors by the Tribunal, this Application was not delivered to the respondent, nor was a Notice of Intent to Dismiss issued, until December 15, 2010. The Tribunal apologizes to the parties for its role in this delay.
[3] The Tribunal’s December 15, 2010 letter to the applicant identified that the Application was incomplete because the applicant had not provided a copy of the union grievance or the arbitration award referenced in the Application. It also asked the applicant to make submissions on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in various respects.
[4] The applicant states that he cannot obtain a copy of the grievance or arbitration award from his union. In the circumstances, although it remains incomplete, the Tribunal will consider whether the Application falls within its jurisdiction.
[5] The applicant acknowledges in his Application that he previously filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission based on the same facts as this Application. Section 53 (8) of the Code reads as follows:
No application, other than an application under subsection (3) or (5), may be made to the Tribunal if the subject-matter of the application is the same or substantially the same as the subject-matter of a complaint that was filed with the Commission under the old Part IV.
[6] Accordingly, based on the applicant’s acknowledgement that the facts were previously dealt with by the Commission, it appears that this Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because of s. 53(8).
[7] Even if s. 53(8) does not apply, the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because the events to which it relates occurred more than one year before the filing of the Application and the applicant has not shown good faith within the meaning of the Tribunal’s case law. Section 34 of the Code provides that an application must not be filed more than one year after the incident or last incident in a series to which it relates. A late application is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction only if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by it. Sections 34 (1) and (2) read as follows:
- (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
[8] In [Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2009/1241), at paras. [24-25](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2009/1241), the Tribunal made the following general comments about untimely applications:
In my view, where an applicant seeks to establish that a delay in filing an application was “incurred” in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith. Otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period. The Code requires a person who wishes to pursue a claim of discrimination to bring the claim forward by filing an Application within one year of the alleged incident, or where there is a series of incidents, within one year of the date of the last incident. This is a mandatory provision, subject only to section 34(2). The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.
In dealing with requests that applications be considered outside the one-year limitation period, the Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances, often related to the human rights claim itself, that justifies exercising the discretion under section 34(2).
[9] The applicant argues that the events are ongoing. However, it appears that the applicant has no ongoing relationship with the respondent and it is only the effects of what he says was discrimination that continue. These effects are not an “incident” of discrimination within the meaning of s. 34: [Mafinezam v. University of Toronto, 2010 HRTO 1495](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2010/1495). He also argues that he went to the Ombudsman. Pursuing other remedies has not been considered good faith explaining delays in filing a Tribunal Application. Accordingly, the Application is also outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because of delay.
[10] The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 17th day of February, 2011.
“Signed by”
David A. Wright
Interim Chair

