HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Stanley Dwyer
Applicant
-and-
Intact Insurance Company
Respondent
decision
Adjudicator: Keith Brennenstuhl
Indexed as: Dwyer v. Intact Insurance Company
APPEARANCES
Stanley Dwyer, Applicant ) Harry Kopyto, ) Representative
Intact Insurance Company, Respondent ) Pete Volaric, Counsel )
1This is an Application under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) alleging discrimination in housing, goods, services, facilities and contracts on the basis of age, colour, disability, ethnic origin, place of origin and race.
2By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated November 16, 2010, the Tribunal directed that a Summary Hearing be held in this matter by teleconference. It stated as follows at paragraphs 5 and 6:
In my opinion, the most appropriate procedure, given the issues raised in the Application, is to hold a summary hearing on whether the Application has a reasonable prospect of success. Accordingly, the Tribunal will schedule a half day summary hearing by teleconference.
The applicant will make his argument first. He shall be prepared to explain how there is a reasonable prospect that he could prove that he experienced discrimination on the grounds of age, colour, disability, ethnic origin, place of origin and/or race under the Code, and indicate the evidence he would use to establish that. In particular, he shall be prepared to explain how he can prove that the grounds he has cited in the Application had a role in the manner in which the respondent provided or denied coverage under the insurance policy.
3The CAD also directed the parties to deliver to each other and file with the Tribunal copies of any further documents or cases they intended to rely upon no later than seven days prior to the teleconference. Neither party made any filings pursuant to this directive.
ANALYSIS
Summary Hearings
4The summary hearing process is outlined in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. In a summary hearing the issue is whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or a part thereof will succeed.
5In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8-10, the Tribunal made the following observations on the type of inquiry that may be involved in a summary hearing:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed following the summary hearing.
Application to the Facts
6The respondent is an insurance company. It issued a policy of insurance to the applicant providing specific coverage, as specified in the policy, for the applicant’s property.
7The applicant made a claim under the policy for damage to his property as a result of the escape of water from a hot water tank located at the property.
8The respondent maintains that it responded to the applicant’s claim in accordance with the policy, including commissioning quotations and estimates with respect to the remedial work required to be undertaken as a result of the damage. The respondent indicates that it retained the services of various contractors and service technicians to perform the remedial work.
9It is the position of the respondent that all of the remedial work has been performed properly, in a good and workmanlike manner and in a timely fashion, and that its obligations under the policy have been satisfied.
10The applicant claims that the remedial work was not done properly and that the respondent denied him the extent of coverage to which he was entitled under the policy of insurance. The applicant alleges that this mistreatment amounted to discrimination on the multiple grounds outlined above.
11When he was asked what evidence he had to support his allegations of discrimination, his position was that there could be no other possible explanation for the respondent’s conduct. In his view, the people he interacted with were biased and he was certain that the reason behind this conduct was discrimination. The applicant provided no evidence beyond his own certitude to support his allegations.
12Even if I accepted the applicant’s allegations, there is no evidence to connect the applicant’s treatment to the prohibited grounds of age, colour, disability, ethnic origin, place of origin or race.
13Accordingly, there is no reasonable prospect that the Application will succeed and it is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 14th day of February, 2011.
“Signed by”
Keith Brennenstuhl
Vice-chair

