Sood v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 275

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Vishvander Sood

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Gregory Hutton, Ron Hayes and Mike Vorshuk

Respondents

AND BETWEEN:

Vishvander Sood

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services

Respondent

Interim decisiON

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: February 9, 2011

Citation: 2011 HRTO 275

Indexed as: Sood v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services)

1These are two Applications filed June 25, 2009 under section 53(5) of Part VI of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”). This Interim Decision deals with a Request made by the respondents that these Applications be deferred pending the conclusion of related civil proceedings.

2This Request was initially made in July 2009 and, on consent of the all parties, was granted October 15, 2009.

3The Tribunal requested a status update on November 18, 2010. In response, the applicant requested that these Applications be processed for hearing. The Tribunal requested the parties’ submissions on whether or not it was appropriate that these Applications continue to be deferred.

4I have reviewed the submissions of the parties and have concluded that it is appropriate that these Applications continue to be deferred pending the conclusion of the related civil proceedings.

5The issues raised in these Applications and the two civil proceedings are largely indistinguishable. The claim advanced in these Applications are essentially that two separate interactions with the Ontario Provincial Police and various of its officers in January and May 2006 were reprisals for an earlier human rights complaint which the applicant had filed. Although not framed explicitly as reprisals, the two civil claims relate to the same underlying facts. The first civil claim commenced in June 2006 alleges malicious prosecution by the respondent Her Majesty the Queen and Greg Hutton in relation to the same two incidents. The second claim begun in May 2007 alleges a breach of the Charter by various individual police officers and others including the respondents in these matters. Although broader than the two Applications here, this claim includes the allegations underlying these Applications.

6The applicant does not dispute this characterization of the related proceedings but states that when he consented he believed that the civil proceedings would have concluded more quickly than they have. The applicant asserts that the respondents are responsible for the delay. The respondents state that they are not responsible for the delay in the related civil proceedings which have been consolidated by the court and will be heard together. The respondents state that examinations for discovery have been completed and documentary disclosure has occurred. The respondents state that a pre-trial conference is to occur on February 28, 2011.

7As the Tribunal has concluded on many prior occasions, deferral of an Application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. The Tribunal will generally defer an Application where there is ongoing litigation on the same facts and issues, whether or not express human rights claims are made in the other proceeding. On the other hand the Tribunal has also held that it must consider on a case by case basis whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding.

8Amongst the factors that the Tribunal has considered in determining whether deferral is appropriate are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.

9In these circumstances the factual underpinnings of the two sets of claims are indistinguishable. The civil claims are proceeding before the Superior Court of Justice and involve claims for damages far beyond what might be considered likely in an application before the Tribunal. The civil proceedings are well on their way to a conclusion. It makes no practical sense nor is it fair, just or expeditious at this stage to process these Applications to a hearing with the result that these two sets of proceedings raising identical issues will run concurrently.

10For all of these reasons I find that it is appropriate to continue to defer these Applications pending the conclusion of the civil proceedings. The parties are referred to Rule 16 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure for Transitional Applications in the event that any party wishes to request that these matters be processed further after the civil matters have concluded.

11I am not seized.