HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Monojit Datta
Applicant
-and-
Chief of Police of the Toronto Police Service, Robert Ermacora, Nilo Espino, Thomas Leney, Nick Janjanin
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mary Truemner
Indexed as: Datta v. Chief of Police of the Toronto Police Service
APPEARANCES
Monojit Datta, Applicant ) Self-represented
Chief of Police of the Toronto ) Counsel, Andrea Denovan
Police Service, Robert Ermacora, )
Nilo Espino, Thomas Leney, )
Nick Janjanin, Respondent )
INTRODUCTION
1This Decision is in respect of an Application filed under s. 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”), following a summary hearing.
2The applicant alleges discrimination in services on the basis of race, colour, place of origin, citizenship and ethnic origin when various police officers and “jail wardens” treated him unjustly after his wife reported that he had assaulted her.
3In a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated May 9, 2011, the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held at which the applicant must make argument about why the Application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success. It directed the applicant to point to the evidence on which the applicant will prove a link between the respondents’ actions and the grounds cited.
4The CAD also referred to Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, which state as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
SUMMARY HEARING
5The summary hearing was held on October 13, 2011. The applicant argued that the police did not professionally and diligently investigate the report by his then wife that he had assaulted her. He said that the police should not have believed her over him, although he admitted that her race, colour, place of origin, citizenship and ethnic origin are the same as his. The applicant explained that he decided that his treatment was discriminatory because he was treated very badly by the respondents, without any deference to his respectable position at his workplace. Further, when he received a copy of two pages of the notebook of the police officer who responded to his wife’s call, he was suspicious of a reference in the notes to the ethnic background and place of origin of suspects in an unrelated case investigated by the police officer who immediately after investigated the applicant’s ex-wife’s call. On the first page of the notes, before the description of the incident involving the applicant and his ex-wife, the police officer described suspicious behaviour of some “kids” in a playground who had jumped a fence. The notes are not clear as to whether the description is the police officer’s or someone who had reported the suspicious behaviour to the police. The notes indicate that the officer checked the playground area and there was nothing out of order. The applicant explained that in noting the first incident, the police officer described the kids as “short” and “pakistani/indian”. The applicant argued that identifying the suspects in this manner showed that the police officer could be racist. The applicant did not cite anything elsewhere in the notes which made reference to the applicant’s race.
6The applicant said that the police officer’s notes describing the other suspects in the matter unrelated to the applicant were the only evidence to link any of the respondents’ actions and the grounds cited in the Application. He had no evidence related to the alleged grounds of discrimination in relation to his treatment by “jail wardens”.
ANALYSIS
7In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, the Tribunal made the following comments about summary hearings, at paras. 7-10:
A summary hearing is generally ordered at an early stage in the process. In some cases, the respondent may not have been required to provide a response. In others, the respondent may have responded but disclosure of all arguably relevant documents and the preparation of witness statements, which generally occur following the Notice of Hearing, will not yet have happened.
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
8In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed.
9The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code. See Forde v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389, at para. 17.
10In the circumstances, where the police arrested the applicant in response to his ex-wife’s report that he had assaulted her, I find that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application will succeed. In my view, there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his Code rights were violated by the respondents. The mere physical description by the police officer that includes a reference to the apparent ethnic origin of the suspects in another case, suspects who appeared to be South Asian like the applicant, is not sufficient to link the respondents’ actions to the alleged grounds in this Application, particularly without any evidence to suggest differential treatment of those suspects.
11The applicant’s Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 24^th^ day of October, 2011.
“signed by”
Mary Truemner
Vice-chair

