HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Thomas Jakobek
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1626 and Deaconwood Property Management Inc.
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Alison Renton
Indexed as: Jakobek v. Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1626
APPEARANCES
Thomas Jakobek, Applicant ) Melissa Mark, Counsel )
Toronto Standard Condominium )
Corporation No. 1626 and Deaconwood ) No one appearing
Property Management Inc., Respondents )
1The applicant filed an Application on June 3, 2009 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in housing.
Background
2On August 14, 2009, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Application and delivered the Application to the respondents by regular mail at the address provided by the applicant. The Notice directed the respondents to file a Response with the Tribunal no later than thirty-five (35) days from the date of the Notice. The Notice also warned about the consequences of failing to file a Response, including the Tribunal deeming the respondents to have waived all rights with respect to further notice or participation.
3The respondents did not file a Response. An Interim Decision dated December 8, 2009 (2009 HRTO 2105) (“the December 2009 Interim Decision”) was issued directing the respondents to file a Response within 10 days and warning of the consequences for failing to do so. The Interim Decision also stated:
If the respondents wish to participate in this proceeding, they must file a Response by December 18, 2009, together with an explanation of why the Response was not filed in accordance with the August 14, 2009 Notice. If a Response is not received, the Tribunal may proceed without further notice to the respondents … and may take any or all of the steps set out in Rule 5.5.
4On December 8, 2009, Tim Toole, a representative of the respondent Deaconwood Property Management Inc. (“Deaconwood”) sent an email to the Tribunal advising that a joint Response had been filed for both respondents. In response to a December 9, 2009 email from the Tribunal, Mr. Toole advised that the Response was sent by mail.
5On February 1, 2010, the Tribunal emailed Mr. Toole and advised that the Tribunal had not received the Response and requested that it be resent by email by February 3, 2010.
6When no response to the Tribunal’s February 1, 2010 email was received, a further Interim Decision was issued dated March 29, 2010 (2010 HRTO 684) (“the March 2010 Interim Decision”) again directing the respondents to file their joint or separate Responses within five days along with an explanation for their failure to file a Response and failure to respond to the Tribunal’s February 1, 2010 email. The respondents were warned that, if they failed to respond as directed, the Tribunal would deem the respondents to have accepted all of the allegations in the Application and to have waived their right to further notice or participation in the proceeding.
7Mr. Toole responded by email dated March 29, 2010 stating, “I am uncertain why you are not receiving my mail, or email with attachments, which is why I am not attaching anything to this one” and stated that at the March 17, 2010 meeting, the board had approved the installation of an automatic door opener. The Tribunal still had not received Responses filed by the respondents.
8Subsequent to the receipt of that email, another individual, Robin Panchan, wrote to the Tribunal on behalf of a “new property manager”, Larlyn Property Management (“Larlyn”). Larlyn requested an update on the status of the Application and asked for “forgiveness” from the Tribunal for a lack of Response from Deaconwood.
9By Interim Decision dated May 26, 2010 (2010 HRTO 1180) (“the May 2010 Interim Decision”), the Tribunal directed the respondents to clarify the relationship between the respondent Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation (“TSCC”) and Deaconwood, whether Panchan was now the contact person for TSCC, and to identify a contact person for Deaconwood. The Tribunal stated that if a Response had been previously prepared on behalf of both respondents, it must be sent to the Tribunal immediately together with any documentation to show whether and when that Response was originally sent to the Tribunal. The respondents were directed to advise the Tribunal if a Response could not be located and describe the respondents’ efforts to locate the Response. The respondents were given a specified period of time to respond to the May 2010 Interim Decision.
10Larlyn sent a letter to the Tribunal dated May 27, 2010 in which it stated:
Robin Panchan is an employee of Larlyn Property Management Ltd. who has been retained to act on behalf of the Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1626 effective May 1, 2010.
Neither Robin Panchan nor Larlyn Property Management are affiliated and/or act on behalf of Deacon Wood Property Management Inc. Deacon Wood was the former management company who acted on behalf of the Condominium Corporation. This agreement was terminated April 30, 2010. You may contact Deacon Wood directly at [address].
As per my email dated May 13, 2010 the condominium corporation has issued a purchase order to Patriot Lock & Door to install handicap automatic door operators at the resident entrance doors. The parts are on order and once received the work will be completed.
Larlyn did not file a Response.
11The Tribunal sent the respondents and Larlyn the May 2010 Interim Decision and Larlyn’s May 27, 2010 letter and directed Deaconwood to make submissions. Deaconwood did not file any submissions. Neither respondent filed a Response.
12An Interim Decision dated October 4, 2010 (“the October 2010 Interim Decision”) was issued in which the Tribunal found that the respondents received notice of the Application but, even with Larlyn’s May 27, 2010 letter, were refusing or choosing not to participate in the human rights proceeding. Accordingly, in the October 2010 Interim Decision, as a consequence of the respondents’ failure to file a Response and comply with the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and directions, the Tribunal deemed the respondents to have accepted all the allegations in the Application and to have waived all rights with respect to further notice or participation in the proceeding.
13The October 2010 Interim Decision was issued to the respondents and Larlyn by courier and regular mail. Deaconwood’s couriered copy was returned by the courier company having been “refused” by Janice Sweeney, “not for them”. The copy sent by regular mail was also returned, with a line through Deaconwood’s address and an illegible word written across it. The Tribunal then faxed and emailed the October 2010 Interim Decision to Deaconwood. These were not returned. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that the respondents received copies of the Interim Decisions.
14Larlyn sent a letter dated December 2, 2010 to the Tribunal. The letter only states that an invoice is attached, and describes the invoice. The letter does not state that the service was actually performed. The letter contains a post script which says, “Please be advised that Deaconwood Property Management Inc. is no longer the management company for T.S.C.C. No. 1626”.
15The invoice, billed to TSCC, from Patriot Lock & Door Services Ltd., is dated June 30, 2010, stamped “paid” in the amount of $5,197.50, and states:
To provide materials and labour required to supply and install heavy duty Hunter HA8 automatic operators, 24vdc electric strike, and stainless steel pushbutton actuators on parking level west elevator lobby doors….
16It does not appear that Larlyn sent the December 2, 2010 letter to the applicant or his counsel. Further, it was filed after four interim decisions were issued, in which the Tribunal directed the respondents to file Responses, explain their relationship with each other, and explain why Responses were not previously filed. More importantly, it was sent after the October 2010 Interim Decision in which the Tribunal deemed the respondents to have accepted all the allegations in the Application and to have waived all rights with respect to further notice or participation in the proceeding. Accordingly, the Tribunal does not accept this letter and gives it no weight.
17Subsequent to the issuance of the October 2010 Interim Decision, the applicant advised that he did not require an oral hearing. He filed an affidavit, to which exhibits were attached, as well as legal submissions in support of his position that the respondents violated the Code.
The Applicant’s Evidence
18In his Application, the applicant asserts that the respondents have discriminated against him on the ground of disability in housing by refusing to allow him to park his scooter in one of the parking spots that he owns in the residential parking lot of the building. He also alleges that the respondents have failed to accommodate his disability by refusing to honour his request for building modification, and specifically the installation of an automatic door opener on the doors located between the parking garage and the elevators.
19The applicant and his wife have lived in their condominium unit since September 2006. The unit is owned by the applicant’s son, Tom Jakobek, and daughter-in-law, Deborah Morrish.
20The condominium building is run by TSCC and the property management company used to be Deaconwood. The property manager for the building was Janice Sweeney. The applicant understands that as of May 2010 Larlyn took over as the new property management company acting on behalf of TSCC.
21At the time of filing his Application, the applicant was 88 years old. He has difficulty walking distances and attached to his affidavit was a letter from his doctor, Dr. Kuutan, confirming that his medical condition makes it difficult for him to walk more than 300 feet without resting. This, he asserts, constitutes a disability under the Code. The applicant provided a copy of his Accessible Parking Permit which allows him to use disabled parking spots.
22To assist him in remaining mobile, the applicant’s children arranged for him to have a motorized scooter. The applicant wanted to park his scooter in one of the two parking spots in the underground parking lot that are designated to the applicant’s unit, instead of parking the scooter in his unit. The scooter is large, takes up a great deal of space in the unit, and is a potential safety risk for the applicant and his wife. The applicant submitted pictures of the scooter in his unit to show the amount of space that it takes within the unit. Parking the scooter in the garage would make it easier for the applicant to enter and exit the building, and would allow him to travel independently.
23He asserts that TSCC’s by-laws allow residents to park licensed motorized vehicles, bicycles and shopping carts in their parking spots, but are silent as to whether or not scooters are allowed. The applicant testified that there are heavy metal doors between the elevator to the parking garage and the garage itself. The doors were too heavy for him to open on his own, and until September 2010 when they became automated, they could only be opened manually.
24Ms. Morrish, on behalf of the applicant, wrote to Ms. Sweeney on June 11, 2008 seeking clarification of TSCC’s by-laws pertaining to parking spaces. Ms. Morrish asked that the applicant be allowed to park his scooter in one of the two parking spots that they owned and offered to compensate TSCC for the electricity required to charge the scooter. Ms. Morrish also inquired about modifying the doors between the elevator and the garage with a door opener that would automatically open when swiped with a passcard and offered to either defray the costs of this modification or pay the full amount outright, notwithstanding that the modification could benefit other residents with mobility problems.
25The applicant testified that, on behalf of TSCC’s board of directors, Ms. Sweeney responded by letter dated August 18, 2008 stating that the applicant’s request had been denied by the Board at its June 25, 2008 meeting. The letter did not provide a reason for the denial, did not reference any policy or by-law, and did not address the request about modifying the doors in the garage. The letter was attached as an exhibit to the applicant’s affidavit.
26The applicant’s son contacted the Human Rights Legal Support Centre (“HRLSC”) with respect to the applicant’s issues. On the applicant’s behalf, the HRLSC wrote to Ms. Sweeney on November 3, 2008 with a copy to Pauline Quinten, president of TSCC’s board of directors. The letter, a redacted copy of which was attached as an exhibit to the applicant’s affidavit, repeated the applicant’s request to park his scooter in the parking lot, requested that the doors between the elevators and the parking garage be modified, and noted the applicant’s family’s previous offer to defray the costs of the modifications.
27The applicant received a letter dated December 18, 2008 from Mr. Toole, identified as being the president of Deaconwood, on behalf of both respondents, giving the applicant permission to park his scooter in one of his parking spots. The letter stated that the respondents were “currently investigating” modifying the doors between the elevator and the garage.
28The applicant testified that while he received permission to park his scooter in the parking garage, he was still denied accommodation because the doors between the parking garage and the elevators were still too heavy for him to open and were not modified. He continued to park his scooter in his unit while he waited for the doors to be modified.
29On April 7, 2009, the HRLSC sent a letter to Mr. Toole advising that the applicant was not able to park his scooter in the parking garage until the doors were modified and requested an update as to when the door modifications would be completed. The letter also expressed concern that the by-laws still prohibited scooters to be parked in the garage, which could result in permission to park the scooter in the garage being rescinded and denied to other residents. In the letter, the HRLSC requested that the by-law be amended to allow for motorized mobility devices to be parked in the garage. There was no response to the letter and the applicant testified that he has never been contacted by the respondents since Mr. Toole’s December 2008 letter.
30The applicant asserts that to his knowledge, the by-law has not been amended. In TSCC’s April 2009 newsletter, at point 3, which the applicant introduced as an exhibit, the board writes:
Please remember that only cars, grocery buggies and bicycles on an approved bicycle rack can be stored in the parking spaces in the underground garage. The Board has received several complaints about boxes, planters, and other objects located in some of the parking spaces. These items must be removed immediately.
31The doors between the elevator and the parking garage were modified, the applicant submits, in or around September 2010 and are now automated. The applicant testified that TSCC did not contact him, either directly or indirectly through the new property management company, to advise that the modifications had taken place.
32The applicant asserts that as a result of the respondents denying his request for accommodation, he was forced to park his scooter in the living room of his unit for over two years. Not only did it take up valuable space in the unit, it also created a safety hazard for he and his wife as both tripped on it several times. Luckily they did not injure themselves seriously, but, the applicant testified, the potential for great physical harm was present.
33The applicant and his family were very hurt and angered that it took over two years from their initial request for accommodation for the doors to be modified. The request was very modest and the family offered to reimburse TSCC for any expenses resulting from the request. Initially the requests were denied without any explanation or justification. When the applicant was granted permission to park his scooter in the parking garage, he was still unable to do so because the respondents failed to modify the doors between the elevator and the parking lot. The respondents have not contacted the applicant about these issues or responded to his requests for information about modifying the doors and amending the by-law to allow for motorized mobility devices to be parked in the garage.
34The manner in which the respondents treated he and his family, the applicant alleges, was absent of any respect or concern and has robbed him of his dignity. The applicant submits that both respondents have failed in the procedural and substantive components of their duty to accommodate him based upon disability and this violates the Code.
35As neither respondent has filed a Response or participated in the Tribunal’s process, the applicant submits that it is difficult to assess the level of control Deaconwood had over TSCC’s failure to accommodate his accommodation request. The applicant submits that both respondents were aware of his request for accommodation, and either failed to accommodate or permitted the other respondent to discriminate. Deaconwood, the applicant submits, indirectly discriminated against the applicant in violation of sections 2(1) and 9 of the Code.
36As a remedy, the applicant states that he is not seeking an order for monetary compensation for himself, but, instead, requests that the Tribunal order the respondents to make a donation in the amount of $5,000.00 to the March of Dimes. This order would recognize the seriousness of the infringement of his rights under the Code and knowledge of the donation would provide symbolic compensation to the application for the injury to his dignity done by the Code infringement.
37The applicant also requests that the respondent TSCC be ordered to amend its by-law to allow for mobility assistive devices to be parked in the parking garage. This would ensure that the applicant could park his scooter in the parking garage without being in violation of TSCC’s by-laws. It will also ensure that other residents in the building will not be denied the opportunity to park any mobility assistive device they may require in the garage.
38Finally, the applicant requests that the Tribunal order and direct both respondents to complete the Human Rights 101 eLearning Module prepared by the Ontario Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) and obtain and read a copy of the Commission’s “Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate”.
THE LAW
39The relevant provisions of the Code are:
2(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of …. disability …
9 No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.
10(1) “disability” means,
(a)any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes …. lack of physical co-ordination, …. or physical reliance …. on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.
17(1) A right of a person under this Act is not infringed for the reason only that the person is incapable of performing or fulfilling the essential duties or requirements attending the exercise of the right because of disability.
(2)No tribunal or court shall find a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any.
ANALYSIS
40I have determined that the respondents have violated both the procedural and substantive aspect of their duty to accommodate the applicant based upon disability. My reasons are set out below.
41The Tribunal has held that section 2(1) of the Code applies to condominiums. See DiSalvo v. Halton Condominium Corporation No. 186, 2009 HRTO 2120; York Condominium Corporation #216 v. Dudnick, (1991) 1991 CanLII 7224 (ON CTGD), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (ON Div. Ct.); and Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 946 v. J.V.M., 2008 CanLII 69581 (O.N.S.C.).
42The applicant’s doctor, Dr. Kuutan, wrote a letter stating that the applicant, “… has had pain in his legs and therefore difficulty walking…. The narrowing of his arteries makes it difficult for him to walk more than 300 ft without resting. For that reason he qualifies for disabled accommodation”. The applicant submitted a copy of an Accessible Parking Permit issued to him by the Province of Ontario. The applicant testified that he uses a motorized scooter so that he can remain mobile. Accordingly, I conclude that the applicant meets the definition of disability under section 10(1)(a) of the Code. In Austin v. Clayton Lakeside-Beaton, 2011 HRTO 311, the Tribunal found that the respondents’ obligation to accommodate on the basis of disability, albeit in the provision of services, arose with an applicant who also relied upon a scooter.
43The Supreme Court of Canada has accepted that the duty to accommodate has both a substantive and procedural component. See British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (“Meiorin”) and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 7868. The procedural component requires an individualized investigation of accommodation measures and an assessment of the applicant’s needs. The substantive component of the analysis requires a consideration of the accommodation offered or a respondent’s reasons for not providing accommodation. It is a respondent who bears the onus of demonstrating what considerations, assessments, and steps were undertaken to accommodate an individual to the point of undue hardship. See Meiorin, supra; Dixon v. 930187 Ontario, 2010 HRTO 256; and Wozenilek v. 7-Eleven Canada, 2010 HRTO 407.
44In the circumstances of this case, I find that both respondents have failed in both their procedural and substantive obligations to accommodate the applicant.
45In letters written on his behalf, initially to Deaconwood on June 11, 2008 and then to both respondents on November 3, 2008, the applicant requested accommodation on the basis of disability from the respondents. Specifically he requested authorization to park his scooter in one of his parking spots, modification of the doors between the parking garage and the elevators because they were too heavy for him to open by himself, and clarification or amendment of TSCC’s by-laws to reflect that scooters were authorized to be parked in parking spots in the garage. He further stated that he would be willing to bear electrical costs incurred with charging his scooter in the garage and pay for or share in the costs of modifying the doors.
46I find that once the applicant raised these issues with the respondents, he was not required to repeatedly raise them. It was sufficient that he initially raised his request for accommodation, and this triggered the respondents’ obligation to investigate and provide a timely response to his request.
47In Austin, supra, the Tribunal stated at para. 32:
I infer from the evidence the individual respondent gave that he and the other guiding minds of the corporate respondent did not pay much attention to the applicant’s accessibility needs because he didn’t mention them on an ongoing basis. In my view, the applicant had no obligation to harp. I think the concept of … accommodation also recognizes the right of the person in need of accommodation not to have to demean himself by repeating his requests. The individual respondent and others responsible for the campground were aware of the requests from 2003 and saw him on his scooter with some frequency every summer. He had raised the issues with them.
48The respondents’ written communications responding to the applicant are not timely. The Tribunal has stated, following the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s “Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate”, that accommodation must be made in a timely manner and with “due diligence and dispatch”. See Wozenilek, supra, at paras. 33 and 34, and Turnbull v. Famous Players Inc., 2001 CanLII 26228 (ON H.R.T.) at para. 216.
49Ms. Sweeney’s letter, which she signs as the property manager of Deaconwood and “for and on behalf of” TSCC, is dated August 18, 2008: written more than two months after the applicant’s request for accommodation and almost two months after the board of director’s meeting held to discuss the issues. In the absence of an explanation from the respondents as to why she was writing almost two months after the board of directors had discussed the issue, her response is not timely.
50Mr. Toole’s letter, written on behalf of both respondents, is dated December 16, 2008, written more than a month after the November 3, 2008 letter sent by the HRLSC on behalf of the applicant, six months after the applicant’s issues were first identified in writing by Ms. Morrish to Ms. Sweeney, and almost six months after the board of director’s meeting. It too is untimely.
51The respondents failed to provide any explanation as to why the applicant’s request to park his scooter in the parking garage was initially denied and then subsequently allowed. Ms. Sweeney writes, “Unfortunately the Board, after thoroughly discussing the issue [parking the scooter in the parking garage and charging it in the parking space] and all its’ [sic] ramifications has denied your request at this time”. She does not identify what ramifications were discussed and why the request was denied. She does not address the applicant’s request to have the door in the parking garage modified, presumably because his request to park his scooter in the parking garage was denied. This violates the applicant’s procedural and substantive rights to be accommodated. The accommodation process is a shared responsibility. Everyone involved should co-operatively engage in the process, share information, and avail themselves of potential accommodation solutions. The duty to accommodate persons with disabilities means accommodation must be provided in a manner that most respects the dignity of the person, if to do so does not create undue hardship. Dignity includes consideration of how accommodation is provided and the individual’s own participation in the process.
52Mr. Toole, in his letter, writes, “Please accept the apologies of Deaconwood Property Management Inc. and Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1626 for refusing and not giving a more detailed explanation of the reasons surrounding the decision made regarding the scooter. Please feel free to start parking the scooter in either of your two parking spots immediately”. However, Mr. Toole does not provide any explanation as to why the request was initially denied and then subsequently allowed. This violates the applicant’s procedural rights to be accommodated.
53In his letter, Mr. Toole writes that the respondents are investigating to have “the hydro meter altered and the doors converted to automatic openers.” While he writes, “Once we have all the information we will certainly keep you advised of our progress,” I accept the applicant’s evidence that since receiving Mr. Toole’s letter in December 2008, he has not been contacted by the respondents with respect to the progress, if any, of these developments.
54Based upon the applicant’s evidence, the garage doors were modified by the installation of automatic doors by September 2010, some two years after the applicant first sought accommodation. Consistent with the principles stated in para. 48, above, this modification is untimely. Despite the October 2010 Interim Decision deeming the respondents to have accepted the applicant’s allegations, and despite the Tribunal’s ruling that Larlyn’s December 2010 letter would not be considered, even if it were considered, it shows that payment for the installation of automatic doors was made in June 2010, two years after the applicant first sought accommodation. The respondents failed to act with due diligence and dispatch.
55Notwithstanding that the applicant was granted permission to park his scooter in the garage and that the doors from the parking garage to the elevators are now automated, there are still two issues that remain outstanding. One is about the additional costs, if any, of charging the scooter in the parking garage. The respondents have failed to respond to that part of the applicant’s request since December 2008.
56Further, and more significantly, the respondents have failed to address the applicant’s request to have TSCC’s by-laws clarified or amended to reflect that scooters are authorized to be parked in the parking garage, at least in an owner’s parking spot. The applicant raised this issue with the respondents in 2008, and the HRLSC raised the issue again with Deaconwood in April 2009.
57Despite the respondents’ representation in December 2008 that the applicant could park his scooter in the parking garage, their publication from April 2009 entitled “Boardtalk” suggests that parking the scooter in the garage could cause problems for the applicant. Point 3 of Boardtalk states:
Please remember that only cars, grocery buggies and bicycles on an approved bicycle rack can be stored in the parking spaces in the underground garage. The Board has received several complaints about boxes, planters, and other objects located in some of the parking spaces. These items must be removed immediately.
58I find that the failure to address the by-law issue, as requested by the applicant, violates the substantive components of the respondents’ obligation to accommodate.
REMEDIES
59The Tribunal’s remedial powers are set out in section 45.2 (1) of the Code, which sets out, among other things, the power to order monetary compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect; the power to order restitution; and the power to direct any party to do anything that promotes compliance with the Code.
60The applicant does not seek a monetary award for himself. Instead, he requests that the Tribunal order the respondents to make a donation in the sum of $5,000 to the March of Dimes. Further, he asks that the respondent TSCC be ordered to amend its by-laws to allow for mobility assistive devices to be parked in the parking garage, that the respondents be ordered to complete the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s (“the Commission”) eLearning training module, “Human Rights 101”, and that the respondents obtain and read the Commission’s policy entitled “Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate”.
61I accept the applicant’s evidence that the respondents did not treat him with dignity when they failed to respond to some of his accommodation requests in a timely manner, failed to respond at all to his other requests, and failed to provide any rationale for their responses.
62I accept that the applicant felt very hurt and angered because he was effectively unable to park his scooter in the parking garage, for which he had received authorization, until the doors were modified more than two years after he initially raised his issues. Further, I accept that parking his scooter in his unit was not an acceptable solution to his situation given the potential safety hazard to the applicant and his wife and based upon the pictures that he submitted as evidence showing the amount of space the scooter took up within his unit.
63In Austin, the Tribunal awarded $12,000 to the applicant as monetary compensation for injury to his dignity, feelings and self-respect when the respondent campsite failed to address an applicant’s accommodation and accessibility requests that arose because he relied upon a scooter. In the circumstances of this case, I see no reason to depart from the $5,000 amount being claimed by the applicant and his request that the respondents pay it in the form of a donation to the March of Dimes. In Giguere v. Popeye Restaurant, 2009 HRTO 2 and Quattroci v. Boz Electric Supply, 2009 HRTO 1082, the Tribunal ordered respondents to make donations to a charitable organization.
64As neither respondent has filed a Response to the Application and neither responded to the May 2010 Interim Decision in which the Tribunal directed the respondents to clarify the relationship between them, the Tribunal orders that the respondents are, jointly and severally, liable to pay the $5,000 donation to the March of Dimes.
65Further, the Tribunal orders the respondents ensure that the by-laws of the condominium, by amendment, specifically permit that mobility assistive devices can be parked in the parking garage.
66Finally, the Tribunal orders the management at each respondent complete the Commission’s eLearning training module, “Human Rights 101” which is found at www.ohrc.on.ca, as well as obtain and read the Commission’s policy entitled “Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate”.
ORDERS
67The Tribunal makes the following orders:
a) the respondents are jointly and severally liable to make a donation in the amount of $5,000 to the March of Dimes;
b) TSCC ensure that the condominium’s by-laws, by amendment, specifically permit that mobility assistive devices can be parked in the parking garage;
c) that management at each respondent:
i) complete the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s eLearning module “Human Rights 101” which is found at www.ohrc.on.ca; and
ii) obtain and read the Commission’s policy, also found on its website, entitled “Policy and Guidelines on Disability and the Duty to Accommodate”.
Dated at Toronto, this 21st day of October, 2011.
”signed by”__________
Alison Renton
Vice-chair