Christianson v. Windsor Police Service, 2011 HRTO 168

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Michael Christianson Applicant

-and-

Windsor Police Service and Charles Sasso Respondents

decision

Adjudicator: Ena Chadha Date: January 24, 2011 Citation: 2011 HRTO 168 Indexed as: Christianson v. Windsor Police Service

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Michael Christianson, Applicant ) Self-represented Windsor Police Service ) and Charles Sasso, Respondents ) Patrick Brode, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

1The applicant filed an Application on December 23, 2008, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination and reprisal in the area of services, goods and facilities on the basis of disability and association with a person identified by a Code protected ground.

2In an earlier Interim Decision, 2009 HRTO 1438, the Tribunal determined that it was appropriate to consider whether or not the current Application was barred by virtue of section 53(8) of the Code and invited the parties to file submissions with respect to this issue.

3Section 53(8) of the Code states that no application, other than an application under subsection (3) or (5), may be made to the Tribunal if the subject-matter of the application is the same or substantially the same as the subject-matter of a complaint that was filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (“Commission”) under the old Part IV of the Code. As such, under section 53(8) of the Code, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to accept a section 34 application in circumstances where the allegations contained in the section 34 application constituted the subject-matter, or substantially the same subject-matter, of a complaint previously filed with the Commission under the old Code.

BACKGROUND

4In December 2007, the applicant filed a human rights complaint with the Commission against the same organizational respondent as named in the current Application and Michael Longlois, as an individual respondent. In sum, the applicant alleged that these respondents discriminatorily denied him police services because of perceived disability. In December 2008, the applicant abandoned his Commission complaint in order to make a Transition Application (T-0864-08) under section 53(3) of the Code. The substance of the Transition Application is described in Christianson v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 229. In that Decision, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had a number of dealings with various members of the Windsor Police Service involving the applicant’s numerous requests that the police initiate investigations and/or lay criminal charges regarding events that arise from circumstances in 1991 and thereafter. The Tribunal dismissed the Transition Application and concluded as follows:

While I understand how the applicant believes that he was denied service based on the respondents’ perception of him. However, having heard all of the evidence both on this incident and about the greater context of the parties’ lengthy relationship, I do not find that the applicant was denied services by the respondents for reasons of either disability or a perceived disability. Instead, I find that the respondents decided, for reasons that do not engage Code-protections, to refuse to investigate the applicant’s 16-year old, undocumented and unsupported allegation. This was an appropriate and reasonable response in all the circumstances.

5In his current Application, the applicant alleges that individual respondent Charles Sasso, a Windsor police officer, discriminated against him in refusing to accept his complaints of alleged perjury. The narrative in this Application consists of one lengthy paragraph made up of 26 single spaced lines in which the individual respondent is referred to three times. In contrast, the applicant references his concerns regarding Michael Longlois, the individual respondent in the Transition Application, ten times. The applicant details at length his complaints about Michael Longlois’ alleged dishonesty, circular reasoning, absurd assertions, etc., in refusing to accept the applicant’s concerns regarding the organizational respondent.

SECTION 53(8)

6In considering whether the statutory bar in section 53(8) applies, it is not for the Tribunal to decide whether the allegations, facts and parties in the new application and old complaint are identical. The intention and effect of section 53(8) is to preclude a new application based on the same or substantially the same subject-matter of the old Commission complaint.

7There is no doubt that the current Application and the previous complaint are interrelated and address substantially the same subject matter. In fact, in his Request to Expedite this Application, see 2009 HRTO 191, the applicant noted that this Application and his Transitional Application were “closely related”. The applicant’s chief complaint is that the organizational respondent has refused to investigate his concerns and labeled him mentally disabled. There is nothing in this Application that is new, separate or distinct from the previous allegations, except for the identity of the individual respondent. It is apparent from the Tribunal’s findings of facts in dismissing the Transitional Application that the applicant has made a number of requests for investigations with various officers of the organizational respondent, which in turn have given rise to his complaints of perceived discrimination by said officers.

8I am satisfied that this Application is barred by virtue of section 53(8) of the Code because this Application arises out of the same factual history and overlapping circumstances, deals with the same issues and asserts the same type of allegations, names the same organizational respondent, and refers to the same individual respondent as named in the previous complaint and Transition Application.

9Accordingly, this Application is dismissed.