HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Christopher Iyirhiaro
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Transit Commission
Respondent
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: Naomi Overend
Date: June 6, 2011
Citation: 2011 HRTO 1081
Indexed as: Iyirhiaro v. Toronto Transit Commission
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Christopher Iyirhiaro, Applicant ) Self-represented
[1] The applicant seeks reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision, [2011 HRTO 462](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2011/462), dismissing this Application on the basis that it was outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was untimely. The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.
[2] Rule 26.5 sets out the limited circumstances in which reconsideration may be granted:
A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or
(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or
(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or
(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.
[3] The applicant relies upon Rule 26.5 (c) and (d). The applicant submits that the Decision is in conflict with established jurispruduece, namely the Tribunal’s decision in Lutz v. Toronto (City), [2010 HRTO 769](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2010/769) and the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Kamloops (City) v. Nielson, [1984 CanLII 21 (SCC)](https://www.minicounsel.ca/scc/1984/21), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2.
[4] With respect to the decision in Lutz, the Tribunal held that the applicant had established that his delay was incurred in good faith because his disability prevented him from completing his Application in a timely fashion. The applicant in the instant case is not suggesting that he had a disability which prevented him from completing his Application, and so it is difficult to see how the Lutz case applies. In any event, the applicant relies on paragraphs 8 and 39 of the Lutz decision which deal with the issue of deferral, an issue not addressed in the Decision at issue.
[5] The Decision of this Tribunal relies on the discoverability principle for determining when the limitation period ought reasonably to have commenced. In reaching its determination that the applicant’s delay in filing his Application was not made in good faith, the Tribunal noted:
In his Reply, the applicant states that the respondent did not admit to the WCB that it hired this junior employee. Moreover, he argues that his knowledge in 1994 was based on hearsay, whereas his knowledge in 2010 was based on “hard fact (evidence.)” As discussed in the Klein case, however, the discoverablity principle “does not exist to allow aggrieved persons to delay making a claim in order to gather evidence that confirms their suspicions or buttresses their case.”
It is clear from the letter from the applicant’s counsel, attached to the Response, that the applicant believed in 1994 (and possibly earlier) that the junior employee had been hired in violation of the seniority provisions in place. He had reason to make inquiries and file any complaints at that time (or possibly earlier), but did not do so for another 15 ½ years. He has provided no evidence of why he did nothing in the intervening years.
[6] It is difficult to see how this reasoning is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Kamloops, supra, which addresses the principles of discoverability. The passage concerning the “substantial awareness of the harm,” which the applicant quotes in his reconsideration request, is not found in that decision. In any event, the Decision at issue is clear that the applicant had what might be characterized as a substantial awareness of the harm some 15 ½ years prior to filing his Application and failed to act on it.
[7] The applicant’s Request for Reconsideration does not establish that the Decision under review “is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance.” It fails to
set out any other basis for review. Accordingly, the applicant has not established that the Decision should be reconsidered. The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 6th day of June, 2011.
“Signed by”
Naomi Overend
Vice-chair

