Longtin v. The Great-West Life Assurance Company, 2011 HRTO 1055

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

BETWEEN:

Christine Longtin Applicant

-and-

The Great-West Life Assurance Company, Anne-Marie Peluso, Cathy Weaver, Dale McRae and Karen Strothard Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend Date: June 2, 2011 Citation: 2011 HRTO 1055 Indexed as: Longtin v. Great-West Life Assurance Company

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Christine Longtin, Applicant ) Self-represented

Reasons for Decision

1The applicant seeks reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision, 2011 HRTO 244, dismissing this Application on the basis that it was outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was untimely. The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.

2Rule 26.5 sets out the limited circumstances in which reconsideration may be granted:

A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:

(a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

(b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

(c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

(d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

3The applicant relies upon Rule 26.5 (a), (b), (c) and (d). With respect to Rule 26.5 (a), the applicant has cited no new facts or evidence that “could not reasonably have been obtained earlier”. There is no issue that the applicant did not receive notice of the proceeding or hearing and so Rule 26.5 (b) is inapplicable.

4Likewise, the applicant does not argue that the Decision is in conflict with established jurisprudence. Instead, the applicant makes arguments about why, in her view, the Decision is incorrect. She focuses on what she says are errors in the Decision or interpretations with which she disagrees. However, reconsideration under Rule 26.5 (c) is not an appeal or an evaluation of alleged errors in the Decision and the applicant’s arguments do not establish grounds for reconsideration.

5Finally, there are no circumstances in the instant case that outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions, and, as such, Rule 26.5(d) is inapplicable.

6While this is sufficient to dispose of the applicant’s Request for Reconsideration, I will address what appear to be the applicant’s two main arguments in the paragraphs that follow.

7The applicant submits that the Tribunal found that there was ongoing discrimination and yet disregarded this when it came time to assess whether her Application was untimely. In fact, I found that there were no further alleged acts of discrimination following the applicant’s termination; that what the applicant was complaining about was the “continuing effects of an act of alleged discrimination.” The fact that an applicant continues to feel the effects of act of alleged discrimination is not the same as experiencing ongoing discrimination.

8The applicant further submits that the Tribunal disregarded the fact that she made several requests for information that was in “the possession of the Employer/Respondents.” These requests for information would only be relevant to the issue of delay if the applicant was unaware that she had a case of discrimination prior to receipt this information. At paragraph 23 of Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241, the Tribunal notes:

What the applicant later uncovered was not information that assisted her in discovering her potential case under the Code, but rather evidence that would support her allegations. The discoverability doctrine may provide an exception to a statutory limitation period in order to ensure fairness to parties who simply cannot know within the stipulated timeframe that they have a case. It does not exist to allow aggrieved persons to delay making a claim in order to gather evidence that confirms their suspicions or buttresses their case.

9It is clear that the applicant believed from the outset that the termination of her employment was discriminatory, and so the “discoverability doctrine” does not apply to the facts of this instant case.

10In conclusion, the applicant has not established that the Decision should be reconsidered. The Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.