Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Indrama Ramcharran
Applicant
-and-
3PD Inc., Alan Hamill and Rory Kitchen
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Ena Chadha
Indexed as: Ramcharran v. 3PD
1The applicant filed this Application on April 20, 2010, under section 34 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination and reprisal with respect to employment on the basis of sex and sexual solicitation/advance.
2On August 31, 2010, the Tribunal mailed the Notices of Application to all respondents at the addresses provided by the applicant. On September 13, 2010, the package addressed to Rory Kitchen (“personal respondent Kitchen”) containing his copy of the Application was returned to the Tribunal.
3On October 7, 2010, a Response was received from 3PD, Inc. (“corporate respondent”) and the personal respondent Alan Hamill.
DELAY
4In the Response, the respondents argue that the Application is out of time because, given that the applicant’s employment was dismissed on April 3, 2009, the Application, being filed on April 20, 2010, was over the Code’s one year limitation period.
5Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
6The Application indicates that the last incident was April 29, 2009. The documents accompanying the Application include a letter, dated April 29, 2009, from the corporate respondent’s Director of Human Resources advising the applicant of the outcome of an investigation into her allegations of sexual harassment. This letter advises the applicant that the corporate respondent concluded that the applicant’s allegations were not substantiated and therefore the corporate respondent considered all matters relating to the applicant’s employment and its termination to be closed. In response to questions in Form1-A, the applicant indicates that she does not believe the corporate respondent’s investigation was conducted properly and refers to the April 29, 2009 letter.
7Given the allegation in relation to the April 29, 2009 correspondence, and without deciding the merits of the issue, I am not persuaded that the Application is out of time. On review of the material before me, I am satisfied that the Application comes within the timeframes required by section 34 of the Code.
PERSONAL RESPONDENT KITCHEN
8The Tribunal contacted the applicant and informed the applicant that the personal respondent Kitchen’s Notice of Application package was returned. On October 19, 2010, the applicant advised that she was unable to locate an alternate address for the personal respondent Kitchen.
9In the present circumstances, it appears that the contact information provided by the applicant for the personal respondent Kitchen is incorrect. As explained by the Tribunal in Guild v. Kyle-Jansen, 2008 HRTO 347, while the Tribunal forwards completed applications to respondents, it is the responsibility of the applicant to provide accurate contact information and the Tribunal relies on applicants to provide a correct address for respondents named in their applications.
10In the Response, the corporate respondent indicated that the personal respondent Kitchen is no longer employed by it and that it does not represent the personal respondent Kitchen.
11Rule 6.6(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides that the Tribunal will not deal with an application in respect of a respondent who cannot be contacted at the contact information provided by the applicant. Generally, in such cases, the applicant will be required to explain what efforts were undertaken to find and verify a current address for the respondent, and explain why this contact information is believed to be the “most recent address”, see Guild, supra, and Begley v. Eratostene 2009 HRTO 235.
12The Tribunal makes the following order:
(i) The corporate respondent is directed to provide the applicant and the Tribunal with the last known address of the personal respondent Kitchen within five days of the date of this Interim Decision; and
(ii) If the applicant wishes to proceed with this Application including Rory Kitchen as a personal respondent, the applicant shall, within 20 days of the date of this Interim Decision, provide a current, complete and accurate address for the personal respondent Kitchen and explain the steps taken to ensure that the address is current, complete and accurate.
13I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 13th day of January, 2011
“signed by”
Ena Chadha
Vice-chair

