HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Christine Chambers
Applicant
-and-
Mark Littell and David Clarke
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mary Truemner
Indexed as: Chambers v. Littell
INTRODUCTION
1This is an Application under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”), which alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of association with a person identified by a ground listed in the Code and reprisal or threat of reprisal.
BACKGROUND
2The Application contains a narrative involving the applicant's employer, the City of Brantford (the “City”), and the respondents, one of whom is a Councillor of the City and the other a City employee. The narrative describes the respondents confronting the applicant for violating the City’s Code of Conduct, and making her employment difficult for her. It appears from the applicant’s and the respondents’ documents that the applicant had e-mailed an outside party using her work e-mail address and computer. It appears that the applicant has checked the “association” and “reprisal” boxes on the Application because she felt that she was being punished for associating with the outside party described by her as a political opponent of the Councillor and by the respondents as a political activist.
3In its Interim Decision, 2010 HRTO 287, the Tribunal requested submissions from the applicant to address what appeared to be the lack of a connection between the alleged grounds of discrimination and the conduct of the respondents. Concerned about whether it has the jurisdiction to hear the Application, the Tribunal wrote:
The applicant should include the facts that she understands demonstrate discrimination related to a personal characteristic of the person to whom she e-mailed. That personal characteristic must be related to a ground listed in section 5 of the Code. The applicant’s submissions must also describe how the respondents’ conduct relates to reprisal and rights described in the Code.
4The applicant has provided submissions. Her submissions refer to definitions of harassment and poisoned environment, as well as to "Mr. Littell’s inappropriate gender-related behaviour and comments towards me as well as on the city server against another innocent female victim." In particular, she refers to an e-mail Mr. Littell wrote to a woman with whom he works. The e-mail allegedly contains the comment, "piece of f___ing work" in reference to the Councillor's political opponent to whom the applicant had e-mailed using her work e-mail address and computer. In her Application, the applicant called the Councillor’s comment “profanity, slander and hatred", but, in her recent submissions, the applicant implies that the comment constitutes sexual harassment or a poisoned environment because of sex discrimination.
5In her submissions, the applicant’s characterization of the Councillor’s behaviour makes reference to alleged "obnoxious conduct and inappropriate gender related behaviour," but she provides no facts or details of any behaviour that is related to her sex or to the sex of the person she e-mailed. She merely states that the Councillor “turned his negative bullying and emotionally harassing anger” against her. In her Application, she describes the Councillor’s contact with her on the telephone as a "verbal assault" whereby he yelled at her and repeated the words "you know that [political opponent]." The Application also states that the respondents punished the applicant for using her work e-mail in a way they deemed to be inappropriate but the applicant nowhere describes how sex is related to the respondents’ condemnation of her allegedly inappropriate use of her computer.
6The applicant in her submissions made no attempt to explain how her allegation of reprisal is linked to a ground in the Code.
DECISION
7Section 5 of the Code prohibits discrimination or harassment with respect to employment on the basis of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability
8In the applicant’s submissions responding to the Interim Decision, it appears that the applicant is alleging sexual harassment and a poisoned environment related to sex. However, the only fact that she provides as proof of sex discrimination is the e-mailed comment made by the Councillor, "piece of f___ing work." I do not agree that this comment, on its own, constitutes sexual harassment nor does it create a poisoned environment contrary to the Code. A rude or abusive comment about someone cannot be construed as discrimination because of sex simply because the object of the comment is a woman. The applicant does not provide any other particulars to substantiate an allegation of sex discrimination or discrimination because of association with a person identified by a ground listed in the Code.
9In addition, the applicant fails to explain how the alleged conduct constitutes a reprisal or threat of reprisal. Under s.8, every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under the Code, to institute and participate in proceedings under the Code and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under the Code, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing. Although the applicant describes the respondents’ reaction to her e-mail to the political activist, the applicant does not appear to be invoking any right under the Code in that e-mail. She does not explain how the alleged reprisal is linked to attempts on her part to claim or enforce rights under the Code, nor does she connect any conduct or comments of the respondents with reprisal.
10The Tribunal does not have a general power to remedy claims of unfair treatment, abuse or harassment that is not linked to a ground listed in the Code. Rather, the Tribunal bases its jurisdiction on the provisions of the Code, and specifically, the prohibited grounds of discrimination covered by the Code.
11Upon review of the applicant's submissions, I find that she has not connected the respondents’ conduct with discrimination because of sex, sexual harassment, reprisal,
or association with the person identified by a ground listed in the Code. The Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction to deal with the Application. The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 5th day of May, 2010.
“Signed By”
Mary Truemner
Vice-chair

