Chiarina Hobart v. Renfrew County Housing Corporation, 2010 HRTO 674

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Chiarina Hobart

Applicant

-and-

Renfrew County Housing Corporation

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Mary Truemner

Date: March 26, 2010

Citation: 2010 HRTO 674

Indexed as: Hobart v. Renfrew County Housing

1The applicant has filed an Application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”). This Interim Decision determines whether to remove three personal respondents that were added after the Application was filed.

BACKGROUND

2The applicant filed Application 2009-02046-I on April 24, 2009, alleging that the corporate respondent, a social housing provider, discriminated against her in housing on the basis of citizenship and receipt of public assistance. The applicant named only the corporate respondent in her Application but listed its employee, Anne Smith, as the contact person for the organization. The applicant dealt mainly with Ms. Smith, a tenancy placement officer, in her application for housing with the corporate respondent. In its Response, the corporate respondent added Anne Smith and Carole Neill, the general manager for the corporate respondent, as personal respondents. David Anderson, who is the director of social services and responsible for the corporate respondent, is listed in the Response as the person in the organization who is authorized to negotiate and bind the organization.

3After the corporate respondent filed its Response, the Tribunal adjusted the style of cause to include Anne Smith and Carol Neill as personal respondents given that the corporate respondent had named them as parties. In addition, despite the fact that neither the Application nor Response had named Mr. Anderson as a party, the Tribunal inadvertently added Mr. Anderson as a party.

4On December 8, 2009, the respondents filed a Request for Order During Proceedings to remove the individually named personal respondents (the “Request”).

5The corporate respondent argues that at all material times, David Anderson, Carol Neill and Anne Smith acted within the scope of their duties with the corporate respondent and that nothing in the Application alleges that they personally violated any provisions under the Code. It argues that the three individuals were acting in the name of the corporate respondent and there would be no prejudice to the applicant in removing them as personal respondents.

6On January 7, 2010, the applicant filed a Response to the Request. She agrees to the removal of Mr. Anderson as a personal respondent but opposes the removal of Ms. Neill and Ms. Smith. She argues that both women failed to follow the corporate respondent's policies and regulations in making decisions about her. In particular, she argues that Ms. Smith misled her about the steps she was required to take in her application for housing and that Ms. Smith acted outside the scope of her duties. With respect to Ms. Neill, the applicant alleges that this personal respondent should have been aware that a policy of the corporate respondent violates the Code, and that Ms. Neill made a personal decision to use that discriminatory policy with respect to the processing of the applicant's application for housing.

DECISION

7Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules affirms the Tribunal’s power to “add or remove a party”. The question of whether an individual is properly named as a personal respondent in a human rights application has been considered in a number of Tribunal decisions, including Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 14 and Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31. In Sigrist the Tribunal makes clear that the unnecessary naming of personal respondents is a practice to be discouraged, as this serves to unnecessarily add to the complexity of proceedings and can often operate as a roadblock to resolution. In Persaud, the Tribunal identified a list of factors to consider when determining whether a personal respondent should be removed (para. 5):

1. Is there a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?

2. Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who is sought to be removed?

3. Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?

4. Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?

5. Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?

8Having considered the respondents’ Request in light of these factors, I order that Anne Smith, Carol Neill, and David Anderson be removed as personal respondents to the Application. I am satisfied that Mr. Anderson was never intended by any party to be a personal respondent, and was inadvertently added only by the Tribunal.

9With respect to Ms. Neill and Ms. Smith, I see no compelling reason to continue the proceeding against them. In examining their actions as described in the Application, it is apparent that their alleged conduct was in the context of them performing their employment duties. I am satisfied that the applicant’s complaint, as articulated in her Application, focuses on the conduct of the corporate respondent throughout the processing of her application for housing. The corporate respondent has acknowledged that these individuals were acting in its name. If the applicant's rights under the Code are found to have been infringed by virtue of their actions, then the corporate respondent is able to provide a complete remedy, and no prejudice would be caused to the applicant as a result of removing the personal respondents.

10I am not seized of this matter.