Ramnath v. Peel Regional Police, 2010 HRTO 548

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Gloria Ramnath Applicant

-and-

Peel Regional Police, S. Roberts, D. Elson and L. Burns Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Sherry Liang Date: March 12, 2010 Citation: 2010 HRTO 548 Indexed as: Ramnath v. Peel Regional Police

1This is an Application received by the Tribunal on December 18, 2009, made under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2On February 5, 2010, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, directing the applicant to file submissions on the issue of delay in filing the Application. The Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application.

3The Application arises out of the applicant’s arrest on April 28, 2009, in response to what she describes as false accusations of harassment by her sister. She was detained, and then granted bail. She states that she then spent months and thousands of dollars to prove her innocence and have charges dropped. The applicant alleges that the respondents discriminated against her on the grounds of race, colour, ancestry, place or origin, ethnic origin, creed and sex, in arresting and jailing her based on lies from her sister. She describes herself as East Indian in origin.

4The applicant made a complaint to the Public Complaints Bureau of the Peel Police. She was dissatisfied with the response and has asked for a review of the matter by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services. She states that she has also raised her issues with the Ministry of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Correctional Services and Community Safety. She has also contacted the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Canadian Bar Association.

5The applicant states that she did not know that she could try to get help from the Tribunal until she saw an article in the Toronto Star on November 18, 2009, about a decision of the Tribunal involving a police service. She states that she saw then how her race and gender clearly fit into the way the police mistreated her the night of her arrest.

6The applicant also submits that she thought she would have to wait for the outcome of the other processes before bringing her complaint to the Tribunal.

7In addition to the above, the applicant refers to other factors such as the death of her parents in September 2005 and January 2008, the loss of two jobs (she does not specify when this occurred), and her emotional state.

DECISION

8Section 34 of the Code allows applications alleging infringements of rights under the Code to be made within a one-year time limit. It also gives the Tribunal discretion to accept late applications in certain circumstances:

34. (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

9Under section 34, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with a complaint filed more than a year after the incident, or the last incident in a series, unless it is satisfied that the circumstances in subsection 34(2) exist.

10An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This includes a decision to dismiss for delay: Battaglia v. Maplehurst Correctional Complex, 2009 HRTO 1167.

11In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide the Tribunal with a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner: Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424; Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670.

12The Tribunal has stated that waiting for other legal proceedings to conclude before pursuing one’s rights under the Code will generally not constitute a valid explanation for delay in filing an Application. Further, although ignorance of one’s rights may in some circumstances amount to good faith, the applicant must also establish that he or she had no reason to make inquiries about his or her rights.

13In the circumstances of this Application, the applicant believed that she had been mistreated by the respondents in April 2008. She had the personal resources to take her complaints of unfair treatment to many different authorities over the course of many months leading up to the filing of this Application. Even acknowledging that the applicant required some time to investigate her options and to come to terms with her personal circumstances, she was able to commence other processes during this period. Although she states that she was ignorant of her right to bring an application under the Code, in the circumstances, she had an obligation to make inquiries about her rights. This includes an obligation to consider whether the events in April 2008 may have been connected to discrimination, and in this regard, I do not accept that the applicant can rely on the newspaper article of November 2009 as providing her with new insight that justifies the delay.

14Further, there is no necessity to exhaust other avenues before making an application to the Tribunal. Although it may be reasonable in some circumstances for an applicant to wish to pursue other avenues before resorting to an application under the Code, it is not reasonable for an applicant to delay making inquiries about the availability of a remedy under the Code or the existence of time lines to file an application under the Code, while awaiting the outcome of other processes.

15The personal circumstances the applicant refers to may provide a reasonable explanation for some delay, but I am not satisfied that they excuse the entirety of the delay in filing this Application. In addition, some of those circumstances arose out of events before those giving rise to the Application, such as the death of the applicant’s mother and father, and do not adequately explain her actions between April 2008 and December 2009.

16In the circumstances, I am not convinced that the applicant has provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing the Application. I find that the delay was not incurred in good faith and it is therefore plain and obvious that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It is not necessary to address the question of prejudice.

17The Application is accordingly dismissed.