Steven Aitchison v. Mid Canada Fiberglass, 2010 HRTO 262

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Steven Aitchison

Applicant

-and-

Mid Canada Fiberglass

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend

Date: February 4, 2010

Citation: 2010 HRTO 262

Indexed as: Aitchison v. Mid Canada Fiberglass

1The Application made under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of “record of offences.” This Decision addresses whether the Application is within the Tribunal’s power to decide.

2A Notice of Intent to Dismiss was sent to the applicant on November 18, 2009, asking the applicant to provide submissions on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear this Application by December 18, 2009. To date no submissions have been received, nor has the Applicant requested an extension of time to make his submissions.

3The Application indicates that the applicant was an employee of Mid Canada Fiberglass for approximately eight years. He alleges that he was fired shortly after he was arrested and charged with matters unrelated to his employment. He also alleges that there was poor air circulation at the plant in the summers, but fails in any way to link this allegation to any ground under the Code.

4The term “record of offences” is defined in section 10(1) of the Code as follows:

“record of offences” means a conviction for,

(a) an offence in respect of which a pardon has been granted under the Criminal Records Act (Canada) and has not been revoked; or

(b) an offence in respect of any provincial enactment.

5In a recent decision, de Pelham v. Mytrak Health Systems, 2009 HRTO 172, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether the ground “record of offences” applies to someone who has merely been charged with a criminal offence (paras. 6 and 9):

Mr. de Pelham argues that notwithstanding the definition provided in the Code, I should give “record of offences” a broader meaning, to include situations in which an individual has been charged with a criminal offence.

…

Although I appreciate the applicant’s arguments in this case, his position cannot succeed. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and provides that “record of offences” covers only persons convicted of an offence. It is true that the Code is an important public policy statute and must be given a large, liberal and purposive interpretation, but this does not mean that the Tribunal can depart from the express provisions of the legislation.

6The applicant does not allege in his Application that he was discriminated against by either respondent because he had been convicted of an offence for which he had been pardoned, or an offence under any provincial enactment. Instead, what he alleges is that the respondents improperly fired him immediately after he was charged. The definition of “record of offences” does not apply to the facts of this Application.

7The Tribunal does not have a general power to evaluate employment relationships or dismissals, but hears only applications that allege violations of the Code. Accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over this Application.

8The Application is dismissed.