Jallad v. Ottawa Police Services Board, 2010 HRTO 2408

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ashraf Jallad

Applicant

-and-

Ottawa Police Services Board

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Ena Chadha

Date: December 3, 2010

Citation: 2010 HRTO 2408

Indexed as: Jallad v. Ottawa Police Services Board

1This Decision deals with an Application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the “Code”) alleging discrimination with respect to services, goods and facilities on the basis of race, place of origin, citizenship, ethnic origin, sex, family status and marital status. The Application was filed on August 16, 2010. The allegations in the Application concern the arrest of the applicant on May 22, 2009.

2The respondent filed a Response on October 18, 2010, requesting the Tribunal to dismiss the Application because 1) the Application is out of time pursuant to section 34(1) of the Code and 2) another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code. The respondent submits that the applicant has also filed complaints with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director and with the Ottawa Police Service Processional Standards department.

3On October 25, 2010, the Tribunal delivered the Response to the applicant and directed the applicant to file a Reply addressing the jurisdictional issues raised by the respondent.

4The Tribunal received the applicant’s Reply on November 7, 2010. The applicant states that the delay in filing the Application was because he was intimidated by the police officer involved in his arrest and apprehensive of taking steps against that officer. The applicant further states that the other proceedings have no relation to his human rights concerns.

Decision

5Section 34(1) of the Code provides that a person may file an application alleging that his or her rights under the Code have been infringed within one year of the incident (or last incident) of alleged discrimination. Section 34(2) provides that persons may apply to the Tribunal more than one year after the incident(s) in certain circumstances. Section 34 states:

34 (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

6On review of the material before me, I am satisfied that this Application may not proceed. The applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay that leads to the conclusion that it was incurred in good faith. It is clear that the Application relates to the events that occurred on May 22, 2009, when the applicant was detained and arrested by a particular police officer who he alleges threatened him.

7The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they seek to pursue a human rights claim.

8The applicant submits that he is preoccupied with other serious concerns, including being a full time graduate student and employee with a family. Based on the information before the Tribunal, the applicant has not demonstrated why he could not meet the required deadline and that the delay in filing this Application was incurred in good faith as required under s. 34(2) of the Code. While the applicant may well have experienced personal hardships following the incident and was distracted by other matters, he has not established that he could not have pursued his rights within the timeline mandated by the Code.

9I find that the applicant’s explanation that he was apprehensive about filing an application is not satisfactory, particularly in light of the fact that the applicant also pursued other legal avenues to raise his concerns about the alleged mistreatment, including complaints under the Police Services Act. Further, the fact that a person is pursuing other avenues is not generally accepted as a valid or good faith reason for delay in filing an application. See Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670. Accordingly, the Application, filed over one year later does not meet the requirements of section 34(1).

10In sum, I am not persuaded that the delay in bringing this Application was incurred in good faith. It is not necessary for me to consider whether substantial prejudice would result from the delay. I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to process the Application because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

11Given my decision that the Application was filed beyond the one-year limitation period established under the Code, it is unnecessary for me to consider the respondent’s submissions with respect to section 45.1 of Code.

12The Application is dismissed.