HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Heather LeBlanc
Applicant
-and-
Syncreon
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Kathleen Martin Date: November 24, 2010 Citation: 2010 HRTO 2336 Indexed as: LeBlanc v. Syncreon
APPEARANCES
Heather LeBlanc, Applicant ) Self-represented Syncreon, Respondent ) Ada Gatfield, Counsel
1This is an Application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) filed on February 4, 2009. The applicant alleges that she was discriminated against in her former employment on the basis of family status and disability. Among other things, she alleges that she was subjected to inappropriate comments while off on sick leave and following her return to work, was not provided a rotating shift which made her asthma worse, was terminated from her employment while she was off on sick leave, and was given a reference which referred to her having “medical issues”.
2The respondent denies any violation of the Code. The respondent denies the alleged comments were made. The respondent states that the applicant’s supervisors and its management were unaware of the applicant having asthma or requesting different working conditions because of it. As for the applicant’s termination, the respondent states that she was only terminated when she failed to cooperate by providing documentation to substantiate her absence from work. The respondent states that it does not give out references which include any information beyond confirmation of employment.
3After hearing the applicant’s evidence in chief, the respondent made the request that the Application be dismissed for failure to make a prima facie case. While I heard submissions, I ruled orally that I would reserve on the request and address it in the context of the final decision. However, I stated that it was unnecessary to hear evidence in response to the allegation that the applicant was treated poorly by a fellow employee because of family status (namely because her mother was the former human resources manager).
4The hearing proceeded and I heard from three witnesses for the respondent: Ken Addis, Jana Drexler and Michelle Young. The former two witnesses addressed the applicant’s allegations relating to the period that she was actively working at the plant, and Ms. Young addressed the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s termination and the allegation about an inappropriate reference.
5For reasons that follow, the Application is allowed in part. I find the termination was contrary to the Code and that the applicant was discriminated against based on disability; the remaining allegations were either not proven or fail to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability or family status.
Background
6The applicant was employed by TDS Automotive (now Syncreon) from February 27, 2006 to December 14, 2007. The applicant was hired as a logistics clerk and was subsequently promoted to a materials planning and logistics technician in May 2007. Most of the applicant’s allegations relate to the period after she was promoted into the technician position.
7The respondent provides an integrated logistics service for various businesses. In the Windsor plant where the applicant was employed, logistics service was provided for the Chrysler minivan plant. Vehicle parts came into the plant, were kept as inventory, and then dispensed as needed to Chrysler.
8In June 2007, shortly after the applicant’s promotion, she was hospitalized. After the applicant was released from hospital, she was provided with a doctor’s note indicating that she should be off work for two weeks. However, the applicant only stayed home for the first week. The applicant returned to work in the second week and started training in her new position as technician, where she continued working until she went off work on sick leave.
9On August 23, 2007, the applicant left work because of health concerns and did not return again. For a period of this time, September 17, 2007 to October 31, 2007, the applicant received sick benefits. In the period after October 31, 2007, the applicant was asked to provide information to Sun Life Financial so they, in turn, could provide recommendations to the respondent about her current absence. The respondent is self insured but retains Sun Life Financial for the purpose of assessing medical claims and making recommendations to the respondent.
10After October 31, 2007, there is a dispute between the parties as to what information, if any, was provided to the respondent (or Sun Life) about the applicant’s medical condition. The applicant’s employment was terminated on December 14, 2007 for the stated reason that she had not provided medical documentation to support her absence from work. The applicant disputes this reason stating that she was legitimately absent for medical reasons and that it terminated her employment because of her family status and disability.
Analysis and findings
11Under section 5(1) of the Code every person has the right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination on the basis of the prohibited grounds identified which including disability and family status. Disability and family status are defined in section 10(1). Disability is broadly described and includes both physical and mental conditions. Family status means the status of being in a parent and child relationship.
12It is well established in human rights law that the onus is on an applicant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court described a prima facie case as one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a finding in the applicant’s favour in the absence of an answer from the respondent.
13Apart from the termination, I am not satisfied that the applicant has met her burden of proving that she was discriminated against as alleged.
The applicant’s allegations
14The applicant makes a number of allegations about her treatment by various persons in the workplace during the period of her employment and following her termination. For purposes of this Decision, I have addressed the allegations as they relate to three distinct time periods: while the applicant was still in the workplace; the circumstances leading up to and including the applicant’s termination; and following the applicant’s termination.
Allegations while employed in the workplace
15The applicant testified about several instances of inappropriate comments and unjust treatment she allegedly experienced during her employment.
16The applicant states that she overheard an employee asking about what she was like and another employee, Doris, responded by belittling the applicant saying that she was “not too bright”. The applicant states that the Production Manager was present and did not advise Doris to not say anything. The applicant states that she subsequently made a complaint about this incident (which she characterizes as a complaint of harassment) to the Operations Manager. According to the applicant, she was told that the employee who had made the comment would be moved but this did not occur, although she does understand that the employee was subsequently disciplined. The applicant suggests that she was treated poorly during this incident and afterwards by Doris and the respondent because the applicant’s mother was the human resources manager (thus engaging the ground of family status). However, apart from her assertion, the applicant did not explain how or why these interactions constituted differential treatment on the basis of family status.
17I did not require that the respondent respond to this evidence. Even accepting the applicant’s sparse description of what occurred as true, I cannot conclude that there is sufficient evidence on which I can find that the applicant was treated differently based on her family status.
18The applicant also alleges that she returned to work early from sick leave in June 2007 because of a comment made by the Production Manager, Steve McCormack. According to the applicant, during the first week that she was off on sick leave she had a telephone call with Mr. McCormack in which he “strongly recommended” that she come in for training. She states he indicated that if she did not return in time for training the promotion she received may not be there. In cross-examination, the applicant acknowledged that she had previously identified that this conversation occurred in a telephone call with a different member of the management of the respondent. The clarification appears to have arisen because the manager originally identified was not at work at the time, a fact which the applicant appeared to concede. The applicant states that she now “assumes” that it was Mr. McCormack.
19The respondent did not call any evidence to challenge this allegation. Notably, until the applicant’s evidence at the hearing, there appeared to be no allegations against Mr. McCormack in the Application, so there would not have been a reason to have Mr. McCormack available.
20Even in the absence of a contradictory version, I do not find that I can reasonably rely on the applicant’s evidence regarding the reported conversation with Mr. McCormack. I have difficulty finding the applicant’s evidence credible given the inconsistencies between her evidence and her description of the incident in the Application, and the clear hesitancy in her own evidence by testifying that she now “assumes” it was Mr. McCormack. While I accept that the applicant returned early from her sick leave, I cannot find that her evidence is sufficiently reliable to allow me conclude that it is more probable than not that Mr. McCormack (or any other supervisor or manager) made the alleged statements.
21The applicant also alleges that when she returned to work, she provided a note to Ken Addis, Production Manager, about her absence, and that in the context of conversing about her condition, Mr. Addis commented “how bad can that be”. She states that she showed him her bruising and that he looked shocked and said nothing else.
22Mr. Addis recalls seeing the applicant’s bruise and saying “wow” about it, but did not recall the details of the conversation other than that they were engaging in “small talk”.
23I do not find that I need to resolve the differences between the accounts of the applicant and Mr. Addis. Even assuming the applicant’s version is true, I am not convinced that the alleged conversation engages the Code. Assuming that the applicant’s condition is a disability or a perceived disability, I am not convinced that a comment inquiring about “how bad can that be” is indicative of differential treatment based on disability.
Allegations about training and the absence of rotation
24The applicant makes a number of allegations about her working conditions while being trained in the new position, although apart from her evidence about her asthma, I have difficulty seeing any connection to the Code. The applicant describes that there were two parts to the new job – working inside an office doing analyst work and working outside near the trucks. The applicant states that she understood she would be rotating between the two functions (as were the employees performing the functions on other shifts), but found that she was consistently working outside in the receiving area and that the person performing the same function as her on her shift was working in the analyst function. She states that she felt ostracized because she was working out in the plant by herself. She states that she complained about not being rotated to her supervisor, Jana Drexler and her production manager, Ken Addis, and the reason given for scheduling was that the truck drivers were “used to her”. She also complains about the absence of breaks and the fact that she had to take her “walkie talkie” with her even when she went to the washroom.
25Later in her testimony, the applicant states that she also complained about the impact that the absence of rotation was having on her asthma. According to the applicant, it is well known that she has asthma. She states that she complained to Ms. Drexler that by not rotating “it’s affecting my asthma” and that Ms. Drexler stated that she would see what she could do. The applicant also states that she may have had a conversation with Steve McCormack about having raised it with Ms. Drexler and told John Ford, another member of management, that if she rotated like everyone else, “probably” her asthma would not be so severe (his response was that he would look into it). The applicant states that she went off work shortly after the conversation with Mr. Ford. The applicant states that her asthma did not prevent her from doing a two-week rotation in receiving, but became a problem after that so she needed to be rotated to the inside position every two weeks.
26The applicant gave somewhat inconsistent evidence about why she went off work. She initially stated that it was because one medical condition, and later in her testimony she stated that it was because of asthma and the specified medical condition.
27Jana Drexler, the Material Supervisor in the plant where the applicant was working, testified about the applicant’s position and her interaction with her. She states that there are two employees in the technician position on every shift and that eventually the objective was to cross train each employee in the position on both the inside and outside functions. However, she denies that during the training period while the applicant was there, employees were being rotated. She states that the applicant was being trained in receiving first because she had logistics experience. She denies that the applicant asked her about the absence of rotations or that working in the receiving area was aggravating her asthma. She states that if an employee had raised such an issue, she would have directed them to human resources.
28Subject to the issue related to the applicant’s asthma which I address below, I do not see any connection between the applicant’s allegations about the working conditions (absence of rotation, no scheduled breaks, etc.) and a ground under the Code. I accept that the applicant perceived that she was being treated unfairly but her evidence does not support any inference that these working conditions, assuming they are accurately described, are examples of differential treatment based on her family status or disability.
29However, there is an issue of whether or not the applicant specifically raised an issue about her asthma with her supervisors and managers and requested that she be rotated because of it. While not expressly framed as a request for “accommodation” this appeared to be the position being advanced.
30I have some difficulty accepting the applicant’s evidence that she expressly raised an issue about her asthma or did so in such a manner that it could be reasonably seen as a request for accommodation. In her testimony before me she did not even mention that she raised concerns about her asthma and the working conditions in her first description of the training period (where she focussed on other concerns of unfairness). In addition, the impression drawn from the applicant’s evidence was that her real issue was a desire to be rotated (hence she had no concerns in working a two-week period in the outside job). Further, there is an internal inconsistency between her evidence and the documentation. While the applicant states that asthma was a factor in her leaving work, the medical documentation submitted in support of her sick benefits claim (albeit dated September 2007) lists a different diagnosis. In fact, no evidence was led to support the applicant’s claim that her asthma worsened other than the applicant’s description of what she felt.
31However, even if the applicant’s evidence is accepted, I am not satisfied that her evidence supports a finding that the Code has been breached. At best, the applicant expressed to her supervisor that by not being rotated, it was “affecting” her asthma. Ms. Drexler stated that she would see what she could do. There is no evidence that the applicant ever raised it with this supervisor again or provided medical information. While she did recall one other conversation with Mr. Ford where she specifically raised it, she stated that he was going to look into it and shortly after that conversation she left the workplace. Even accepting that asthma is a disability, I do not find that these interactions are sufficient to lead to a conclusion that she has been discriminated against by not being accommodated in respect of her disability.
The circumstances leading to the termination
32I heard evidence from the applicant and Michelle Young regarding the circumstances leading up to the applicant’s termination. While there were some differences in their accounts, the basic chronology of what transpired was not disputed and was supported by documentation submitted in the hearing. I therefore accept the evidence of the witnesses on this issue unless indicated otherwise.
33On August 28, 2007, the applicant was sent a letter from Sharon Avey, the Benefits Administrator of the respondent, outlining the documentation required to substantiate an absence for pay continuance and insurance purposes. The applicant was asked to complete and return the information by September 5, 2007.
34On September 20, 2007, Ms. Avey acknowledged receipt of a faxed Attending Physician statement dated September 19, 2007 and approved short term disability from September 17, 2007 (the date of the applicant’s first visit with the doctor who completed the form). That Attending Physician statement indicates an expected return to work date of November 1, 2007. Based on this documentation, benefits were paid.
35The applicant did not return to work on November 1, 2007. According to the applicant, she spoke to Sharon Avey around this time and stated she would be continuing her absence. The applicant also states that she left a message for Ms. Young, the human resources manager, about her continuing absence, although it appears from her telephone records that she did so on November 5, 2007.
36On November 1, 2007, Sun Life wrote to the applicant directly confirming that it had been retained by the respondent to assist in the adjudication of her claim for short term disability benefits. The letter specifically requested that the applicant complete an enclosed Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire and also provide various information from her treating professionals: copies of clinical notes from her family physician from the date the symptoms began to present; completion of an enclosed form specific to her disability; and copies of hospital admit and discharge papers. The letter further indicated that once the information was received, Sun Life would be providing the respondent with a recommendation regarding her work absence and directed the applicant to fax the information directly to Sun Life. This letter is copied on its face to the respondent.
37The applicant’s evidence was somewhat confusing as to how she responded to this request. Initially the applicant stated that she forwarded the requested information to the respondent; she later amended her evidence to state that the doctor’s office had faxed it directly to Sun Life. This latter evidence is supported by the documentary evidence presented. On November 26, 2007, Sun Life wrote to the applicant advising that they had received a “completed Emotional Psychological Questionnaire” from her family physician. Sun Life also indicated that they were unable to make a recommendation to her employer regarding her absence as they had not received the other items identified in the earlier correspondence. Having regard to this evidence, I accept that the applicant forwarded the document indicated and that it was received by Sun Life.
38While the referenced Emotional Psychological Questionnaire was not attached to Sun Life’s letter, there did not appear to be a dispute between the parties that the referenced document was a completed questionnaire dated November 14, 2007. This document indicates the applicant’s diagnosis and describes the treatment the applicant was receiving, including two medications which were being commenced on November 14, 2007. On the question of prognosis, the questionnaire indicated that she “cannot work x 2 months” and that the targeted return to work date was January 1, 2008.
39Sun Life’s correspondence was not copied to the respondent, and Ms. Young’s evidence was that the respondent did not see this information until January 2008. According to Ms. Young, there had been several communications between herself, Ms. Avey and Sun Life, and she understood that the applicant had not contacted any of them. In the face of correspondence that clearly indicates otherwise and the absence of any testimony from a representative of Sun Life, I do not accept that there had been no communication between the applicant and Sun Life. I find that the applicant’s evidence and the letter of November 26, 2007 make it clear that medical information had been received.
40Ms. Young testified that given the respondent’s understanding that no medical information was received she wrote directly to the applicant on December 7, 2007. In the letter, Ms. Young states that the applicant had not returned to work on November 1, 2007, nor did she call the company to notify that she would not be returning. Ms. Young references the additional medical forms sent to her by Sun Life and the need to complete that medical documentation. The letter concludes as follows:
As of Friday, December 7, 2007, neither Sun Life nor Sharon Avey nor syncreon automotive has received any further medical documentation to substantiate your absence from work. You have not contacted nor retuned the phone calls from syncreon automotive, Sharon Avey or Sun Life to notify us of any additional medical documentation you have or to update your employment status.
You have one (1) business day from receipt of this letter to bring in medical documentation to substantiate your absence for the last month and documentation must be provided to show that you were unable to contact the company or Sun Life during this time. If we do not receive the appropriate medical documentation by end of day on Monday December 10, 2007, syncreon automotive has no option other than to assume that you have abandoned your job and have terminated your employment with syncreon automotive effective immediately.
41The applicant responded to the letter by telephoning Ms. Young when she received the letter on December 10, 2007. In the telephone conversation, the applicant confirmed that she had sent medical documentation in already, but was advised that the respondent had not received it, so she re-sent it. The applicant spoke again to Ms. Young on December 13, 2007 where there was a further discussion that medical documentation had not been received, following which the applicant again agreed to resend it. Initially, the applicant states that she mailed the information to the respondent. Later in her testimony, the applicant states that she had the information resent by the clinic (that retained the information) to Ms. Young in response to each call.
42Having regard to the uncertainty in the applicant’s recollection, I have difficulty accepting that the medical information was actually re-sent or received by Ms. Young. However, I am satisfied based on the evidence of both Ms. Young and the applicant that the applicant communicated that she had medical information to explain her absence and that she would be sending it in.
43On December 14, 2007, the respondent sent a letter to the applicant terminating her employment. The key part of the letter states as follows:
As of Friday December 14, 2007, neither Sun Life nor syncreon automotive has received any further medical documentation to substantiate your absence from work and documentation to prove that you were unable to contact syncreon automotive or Sun Life.
Syncreon automotive has given you an additional four (4) days to provide the medical documentation that we requested back on November 5, 2007 to substantiate your absence from work. As we have not received the appropriate medical documentation that was requested syncreon automotive has no option other than to terminate your employment with sycreon automotive effective immediately.
44The applicant testified about further efforts to contact the respondent and Sun Life to explain the situation. According to the applicant, she talked to the person she had been dealing with at Sun Life on December 18, 2007 and was told that her forms had been received but Sun Life was no longer involved. In addition, the applicant states that she left a message on January 4, 2008 for Dan Heath, who is in charge of human resources for North America for the respondent, but did not receive a response.
45The plant where the applicant was employed was shut down for two weeks over the holiday period and reopened in 2008.
46Ms. Young acknowledged there is a policy to accommodate employees in the workplace.
Was the applicant discriminated on the basis of disability/family status?
47The applicant argued that she was terminated because of her family status and disability. There is no evidence to support a finding that the applicant was discriminated against based on her family status beyond the applicant’s assertion that she was treated unfairly because her mother used to be the human resources manager. However, I do find that the applicant was terminated because of disability contrary to the Code.
48The applicant argued that she had a disability insofar as she had anxiety, stress and panic attacks. In addition to the applicant’s evidence about her disability, the medical report submitted by her physician to Sun Life describes her disability, treatment and prognosis including a return to work date. While the respondent denied being aware of this report at the time it made its decision, it did not appear to dispute in its concluding submissions that the applicant had a disability within the meaning of the Code. Based on the applicant’s evidence and this report, I accept that the applicant had a disability.
49The real issue between the parties is whether there is a link between the respondent’s actions and the applicant’s disability. The respondent argued that it terminated the applicant because she was absent from work and had not, in its view, provided medical documentation to substantiate her absence or reasons as to why she was unable to contact Sun Life or the respondent. The respondent argued that while its actions may appear harsh, its decision to terminate was not based on the applicant’s disability, but rather “miscommunication” and its view that the applicant was not cooperating in providing the information. The applicant takes a contrary view stating that the respondent had been provided with the relevant documentation, and that even if they did not receive the information, she advised them of the medical documentation over and over again and therefore there is no basis to claim that she abandoned her job.
50In determining whether or not the respondent’s action was discriminatory, a key question is what information the respondent had. It is clear from the evidence that the respondent’s position is that it had not received any information from the beginning of November 2007, which the applicant disputes.
51I find that the respondent either knew or ought to have known that the applicant was absent because of a disability and that a return to work date was projected for January 2008. The respondent knew directly the nature of the applicant’s disability and reason for her absence between September 17, 2007 and October 31, 2007 and had approved benefits for this period. I find that the respondent reasonably ought to have known that the applicant continued to have a disability when she did not return to work in November 2007 when Sun Life, a company it retained to advise it, became aware of the applicant’s circumstances and her revised return to work date. While Sun Life, for whatever reason, failed to communicate this information to the respondent, this does not change the fact that the applicant provided the information to Sun Life as directed. I find that notice to Sun Life was, in effect, notice to the respondent.
52While Sun Life did not receive all the information it requested, the question is whether sufficient information was provided to justify the applicant’s request for a further absence from work for medical reasons. It is discriminatory for an employer to terminate the employment of an employee with a disability if the employee’s needs could be accommodated without undue hardship. While not framed as a request for “accommodation”, I am satisfied that this claim was encompassed in the applicant’s position as reflected in her evidence and submissions. In her words, having received the completed Emotional Psychological Questionnaire, this “should have worked”, to justify her request for further time off.
53I find that the information contained in the Questionnaire was sufficient to support a further absence from work until January 2008. As noted above, it provided a diagnosis, treatment information, and a proposed return to work date. The conduct of the respondent in effectively denying such a request by terminating the applicant’s employment is a breach of the substantive obligation to accommodate an employee based on a disability when there was no evidence to support that it would be an undue hardship for the employer to grant the request.
54In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the interactions between the applicant and Ms. Young in December 2007 and the respondent’s argument that, in their view, the applicant was not cooperating. I accept that the respondent advised it had not received any information and requested that the information be submitted. However, there is no question that the applicant stated that she had medical information. Further, while it may have been preferable for the applicant to have re-delivered the material, I cannot find that her inability to do so, changes the fact that the respondent had, in effect, received information which I find was sufficient for the purpose of supporting a further absence until January 2008.
55Further, there was no suggestion that to extend to the applicant a further medical leave of two months until January 2008 would constitute undue hardship. I also do not find that there was any evidence presented that would support undue hardship. The evidence indicated that shortly after the applicant was terminated, the plant was closed for two weeks for the holiday period and did not reopen until the new year.
Allegation of discriminatory reference
56The applicant alleges that following her termination, the respondent breached the Code by providing a prospective employer with a reference to the effect that, while a good worker, the applicant had “medical issues”. She states that the incident occurred during an interview when the prospective employer called the respondent while she was present although she acknowledges she only heard half of the conversation and that the statement was reported to her. The applicant was unable to identify who the interviewer spoke to during the conversation.
57Ms. Young testified that she only recalls receiving one reference inquiry about the applicant in a telephone call and she stated that it was against company policy to provide a reference beyond verifying the length of employment.
58I do not find that the evidence provided by the applicant is sufficient to establish a breach of the Code. In the particular circumstances of this case, given the limited evidence provided, including the partial account of the conversation and the absence of any particulars of who was involved, I do not find that the applicant has established a violation of the Code.
Remedy
59I now consider the question of remedy for the violation of the applicant’s rights.
60In this case, the applicant sought monetary compensation of $10,750.00, a letter of reference, and an order that the respondent not give out references referring to any “medical issues”. The applicant provided a breakdown of how she felt the global amount should be attributed, including an amount for embarrassment, depression and anxiety, which I consider to be a request for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect under section 45.2(1)1. of the Code.
61The respondent made nominal submissions on remedy stating that the applicant was not entitled to any of the remedies requested and had not provided medical documentation in support of her claim for damages.
62Under section 45.2(1)1 of the Code where the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right, the Tribunal may order the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation for loss including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. In Arunachalam v. Best Buy Canada, 2010 HRTO 1880, the Tribunal summarized the principles on which damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect are awarded at paragraph 52:
The Tribunal’s jurisprudence over the two years since the new damages provision took effect has primarily applied two criteria in making the global evaluation of the appropriate damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect: the objective seriousness of the conduct and the effect on the particular applicant who experienced discrimination: see, in particular, Seguin v. Great Blue Heron Charity Casino, 2009 HRTO 940, 2009 HRTO 940 at para. 16.
63Applying these principles and having regard to the evidence and submissions, I find that $10,000.00 is an appropriate amount to compensate the applicant for the injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. In arriving at this amount, I have considered that the applicant experienced loss of employment, objectively one of the more serious forms of discriminatory conduct. Further, I have considered the vulnerable state of the applicant and her evidence on the stressful impact of the termination including her needing a prolonged recovery for her condition, evidence which was unchallenged. As well, I have considered the awards given in similar cases on the basis that cases with equivalent facts should lead to an equivalent range of compensation. Finally, I have considered the specific amount requested by the applicant and her stated position of limiting the amount to $10,750.00. While the applicant allocated the global amount differently, the applicant was self-represented and qualified her request on the basis that she had only asked for the specific amount because she had been advised there was a cap of $10,000.00 on what she could claim (which is, of course, inaccurate). In these circumstances, I do not find it appropriate to consider her request as the determining factor in assessing compensation.
64I decline to order any of the other remedies requested by the applicant. While the applicant sought compensation for prescriptions, paramedical and dental coverage for expenses incurred while on a doctor-ordered sick leave, the applicant did not establish that these expenses were incurred as a result of the termination of her employment. Similarly, I do not find it appropriate to make an order for short term disability payments for either of the periods requested as the applicant did not allege, and I did not find, that the respondent’s denial of short term disability payments was discriminatory. Further, given my conclusion that the reference allegation was not established, there is no basis for ordering a remedy in this regard, including her request that the respondent be ordered not to give out references referring to her “medical issues”.
65The applicant did not request any remedies for future compliance arising from the violation that I found in this Decision and I do not find it necessary to make an order in this regard.
ORDER
66The Application is allowed in part. I order the following:
Syncreon shall pay the applicant monetary compensation in the amount of $10,000.00.
Pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest on the monetary award. Pre-judgment interest is to be calculated on the sum of $10,000.00 starting from December 14, 2007, and post-judgment interest is to run starting 30 days from the date of this Decision.
Dated at Toronto this 24th day of November, 2010.
”signed by”___________
Kathleen Martin
Vice-chair