HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Soad Savaed
Applicant
-and-
Sandgate Women’s Shelter of York Region
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Naomi Overend
Indexed as: Savaed v. Sandgate Women’s Shelter
1The applicant filed her Application on May 31, 2010 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”), alleging discrimination in housing and the provision of services on the basis of race, ethnic origin and creed. In her Application, the applicant alleges that the last incident of discrimination took place on June 17, 2009.
2The respondent filed a Response indicating that its dealings with the applicant were limited to her stay with it from January 20, 2009 to April 1, 2009. Given that the Application was filed more than one year after the date of the most recent contact, the respondent asked in its Response for the applicant to be required to show that the delay in filing was in good faith.
3The applicant did not file a Reply to the Response, and so, on September 22, 2010, the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant specifically directing her to provide submissions on the delay issue. The applicant filed a letter on October 18, 2010. It is unclear whether she also served it on the respondent. In any event, it simply confirms that the applicant believes the last incident occurred on June 17, 2009.
4The respondent filed submissions in which it indicates that it had not seen any submissions from the applicant, but that it took the position that the allegations contained in the Application relate solely to the applicant’s stay with the shelter, which ended on April 1, 2009. It also indicates that one of its key witnesses died in August 2010 and so it would be “substantially prejudiced” by the delay.
Analysis and Decision
5Section 34 states:
(1) If a person believes that any of her or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
6As stated by the Tribunal in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, “the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.” When filing outside this one year time limit, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the Tribunal with an explanation as to why she did not pursue her rights under the Code in a timely manner.
7The applicant takes the position that her Application is timely because the last time the respondent was in contact with her was around June 17, 2009. The applicant repeats this assertion in her most recent submission to the Tribunal but does not state what the nature of this alleged communication is, or, in any way, suggest that it was a discriminatory interaction.
8The respondent states that the applicant discharged herself from the shelter on April 1, 2009, and that was the date of the last contact. It forwarded a letter to the applicant, which had been delivered to it, but addressed to the applicant, after her discharge. This letter is dated April 14, 2009, but has nothing to do with the respondent, and cannot be said to be part of the discriminatory treatment.
9The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over all interactions between the applicant and respondent, but only those which she alleges are discriminatory on the basis of one the grounds listed in the Code. Accordingly, the date of the last alleged discriminatory event is, at the latest, April 1, 2009. This means that the Application was filed outside the one year limitation period set out in the Code.
10It is, therefore, incumbent on the applicant to demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith. She has failed to do so in her response to the Tribunal’s September 22, 2010 letter, despite being specifically asked for submissions on good faith. In these circumstances there is no evidence to support finding the delay was incurred in good faith. Given the absence of good faith, it is unnecessary to discuss the prejudice to the respondent, although the death of a key witness would undoubtedly result in some prejudice to it.
11Given the absence of evidence that the more than 14 month delay was incurred in good faith, the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to deal with this Application. Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 9th day of November, 2010.
”signed by”____________
Naomi Overend
Vice-chair