Chuk v. CAW Local 4003, 2010 HRTO 1682

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Paul Chuk Applicant

-and-

CAW Local 4003 Respondent

AND B E T W E E N:

Paul Chuk Applicant

-and-

CAW Council 4000 Respondent

AND B E T W E E N:

Paul Chuk Applicant

-and-

CAW-Canada Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Mark Hart Date: August 13, 2010 Citation: 2010 HRTO 1682 Indexed as: Chuk v. CAW Local 4003

APPEARANCES BY

Paul Chuk, Applicant ) On his own behalf CAW Local 4003, CAW Council 4000 ) Clarisa Waldman and and CAW-Canada, Respondents ) Niki Lunquist, Counsel

1These are three Applications, all dated June 29, 2009 and filed under section 53(5) of Part VI of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The underlying complaints in this matter were all filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) on August 8, 2007.

2The applicant alleges that he experienced discrimination because of race, colour and ethic origin in relationship to his membership in a vocational association and reprisal, contrary to ss. 6, 8 and 9 of the Code, arising out of the removal of his signing authority and suspension as financial secretary for CAW Local 4003.

3A preliminary hearing in this matter took place on August 12, 2010 to determine the issue raised by the respondents that the Application should be dismissed pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code, on the basis of the decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the “CIRB”) dated August 11, 2008.

4In keeping with the expeditious manner in which s. 53 applications are to be conducted, at the conclusion of the hearing on August 12, 2010, I issued the following oral decision.

1. This is a preliminary request by the respondents to dismiss the three Applications pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code due to the decision of the CIRB, dated August 11, 2008.

2. At the outset, I will say that there also appears to me to be a live issue as to whether or not this Tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter. The labour relations issue between the parties was adjudicated before the CIRB, which is a tribunal with jurisdiction under the federal Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. It appears strange to me, to say the least, that a federal tribunal could have jurisdiction over a matter for labour relations purposes, while a provincial tribunal would have jurisdiction over the same matter for human rights purposes. However, in light of the disposition of this matter under s. 45.1 of the Code, I do not need to address this jurisdictional issue.

3. This Tribunal’s case law has clearly determined that the issues under s. 45.1 of the Code are first, whether there was a proceeding, and second, whether that proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the applications.

4. Given the Tribunal’s case law, there can be no dispute that a proceeding before the CIRB is a proceeding within the meaning of s. 45.1 of the Code.

5. In terms of whether the CIRB appropriately dealt with the substance of the applications, the applicant acknowledged before me that the complaints that he filed with the Human Rights Commission arose out of the same factual circumstances relating to the removal of his signing authority and his suspension as financial secretary, and that the issues he raised were the same. Indeed, the record before me is clear that the applicant raised allegations of discrimination in both complaints.

6. In this regard, I note that the CIRB decision expressly dealt with a complaint under s. 95 of the Canada Labour Code, which places limits on a union’s right to discipline its members, including that any such discipline cannot be imposed in a discriminatory manner. In interpreting the term “discrimination” as it appears in the Canada Labour Code, the CIRB takes an even broader approach than is taken by this and other human rights tribunals, in that “discrimination” under the Canada Labour Code is interpreted to include illegal discrimination contrary to human rights legislation but also to include arbitrary or unreasonable acts even in the absence of any link or connection to a prohibited ground of discrimination protected under human rights legislation.

7. In its August 11, 2008 decision, the CIRB expressly adverted to the case law interpreting the term “discrimination” under the Canada Labour Code, and made an express finding that the applicant had not experienced discrimination. While the CIRB did not expressly address the applicant’s allegation before this Tribunal that he experienced racial discrimination, the CIRB’s finding that he did not experience discrimination in an even broader sense is inclusive of the applicant’s allegation of racial discrimination.

8. The applicant clearly disagrees with the CIRB’s decision. However, it is not my role under s. 45.1 of the Code to determine whether I agree or disagree with the CIRB’s decision, or to act as an appellate court. Rather, my role is merely to determine whether the substance of the application has been appropriately dealt with.

9. The applicant submits that he was not afforded an oral hearing before the Board. While it is correct that the Board’s decision was made on the basis of the written materials before it, this decision was made pursuant to the CIRB’s statutory authority under s. 16.1 of the Canada Labour Code to determine a complaint on that basis unless it considers that it has insufficient information before it without a hearing. Further, the applicant acknowledged that during the Board’s process, he did have an opportunity to meet with staff at the Board in order to provide information about his complaint. In my view, the Board was entitled pursuant to its express statutory authority to decide that an oral hearing was not required, and its failure to hold an oral hearing is not a sufficient basis to find that the CIRB failed to appropriately deal with the issues before it.

10. The applicant also notes that he is not a lawyer, and that he was not aware that pursuing a complaint before the CIRB might impair or interfere with his ability to pursue his complaints to the Human Rights Commission. While that may be true, it is the responsibility of parties to inform themselves as to the prevailing law, and ignorance of the law by one party does not provide a sufficient reason to allow that party to re-litigate the same issues a second time.

11. Finally, the applicant submits that it would be difficult for the CIRB to make a finding of discrimination against a trade union like the CAW. In fact, labour relations tribunals such as the CIRB are regularly called upon to determine if a trade union has acted in a discriminatory manner, and I have no reason or basis to believe that these tribunals fail to discharge their duties in a fair and appropriate manner.

12. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, I find that the decision of the CIRB, dated August 11, 2008 derived from a proceeding within the meaning of s. 45.1 of the Code, and that the proceeding before the CIRB appropriately dealt with the substance of the Applications before this Tribunal.

5As a result, the three Applications are dismissed.