HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Jennifer Buckingham-Vanderlei
Applicant
-and-
Janet Walker o/a Molly Maid
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mary Anne McKellar
Indexed as: Buckingham-Vanderlei v. Walker
APPEARANCES
Jennifer Buckingham-Vanderlei, Applicant ) Carmen D. Titus, Counsel
Janet Walker o/a Molly Maid, Respondent ) Stanley Mayes, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed under s.53(5) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (“the Code”). It was filed with the Tribunal on June 2, 2009. The underlying complaint to the Commission was filed on June 10, 2005. The Application alleges discrimination in employment based on disability.
2The Application was heard in Windsor on April 8, 2010.
The Evidence
3With the consent of the parties, I questioned all of the witnesses first and opportunity was then provided to the parties to pose additional questions. With the exception of the two individuals who are the parties to this proceeding, none of the witnesses were present during the testimony of any other witnesses.
4The following individuals testified: Jennifer Buckingham-Vanderlei; Tony Vanderlei; Janice Buckingham; Janet Walker; Teryn Weaver; Jennifer Willamot; and Carol Hooper.
5All of the evidence was concluded on April 8, 2010, and the parties agreed to a timetable ending May 14, 2010, for the exchange and filing of final submissions.
The Facts
6The following findings of fact are based on the testimony of the witnesses and the documents adduced through them.
7The respondent Janet Walker (“Walker”) is a franchisee of Molly Maid Inc. She offers cleaning services under the Molly Maid brand and using its “system” of cleaning. She administers the business out of her home. Her territory encompasses Chatham and environs in southwestern Ontario. She employs various individuals who operate generally in teams of two, one of whom is designated the head maid. They primarily clean private residences between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., but may less frequently clean some commercial facilities in the evening.
8In May 2005, the applicant applied for a job with Molly Maid. The applicant completed an application form, furnished a resume, and was interviewed by Walker on May 25, 2005. During the course of the interview, Walker made some notes on the application form. These notes reveal that she was enthusiastic about the prospect of employing the candidate, and Walker confirmed this in her testimony.
9The notes also record information that the applicant provided to Walker about her current employment situation. Specifically the applicant held two part-time jobs: one providing private home care for an elderly gentleman, and a second working in the kitchen of a local golf course. The notes further reflect that the applicant told Walker that she would work her private home care hours around the Molly Maid hours and that she would quit the golf course job for full-time work. The applicant left the interview thinking she had secured the job, although no formal offer was made at that time. The applicant testified that she understood Walker would be checking her references.
10On May 27, 2005, Walker called the applicant and offered her the position. Arrangements were made for the applicant to be trained on three consecutive days the following week – May 31, and June 1 and 2, 2005 – by working on each day with a different team of two cleaners. In addition, either at this point, or at the interview itself, the applicant had advised Walker that she had a doctor’s appointment scheduled for June 6, 2005, and the latter had agreed that she would not be required to work that day. There was no suggestion in the evidence that the purpose of the doctor’s appointment was discussed between the applicant and Walker.
11The applicant stated that Walker never discussed the remuneration of the position with her, while Walker recalled that she would have described the commission structure of payment. It seems to me more likely than not that there must have been some discussion of remuneration, and indeed the applicant’s husband, Tony Vanderlei (“Vanderlei”), testified that she told him about the income potential of the position at some point prior to commencing her training.
12On May 31, 2005, the applicant worked with Teryn Weaver (“Weaver”). The focus of the training was “wet cleaning” kitchens and bathrooms. At the conclusion of the day, Walker called Weaver and asked her how the applicant had performed. Both Weaver and Walker testified that the report was that the applicant seemed slow to pick up the “Molly Maid way” of doing things, and had had to be reminded to do certain things. Both participants in the telephone call also agreed that Walker had not seemed concerned about this development, but had simply said something to the effect that “it is the first day, I am sure she will pick it up”.
13Weaver also mentioned to Walker that the applicant had not felt well during the workday. At this point, the applicant had told Weaver about her medical appointment scheduled for the following week and had added the further information that she had been diagnosed with endometriosis and might need surgery. Weaver testified that she could not recall if she conveyed this information to Walker.
14Walker agreed that Weaver had told her the applicant was not feeling well at work. Her testimony was that she told Weaver the applicant was probably just “nervous”, and Weaver also recalled that Walker made this comment. Walker stated that there was no further discussion of any particulars of the applicant’s medical condition at this time and that the first occasion on which she heard the term “endometriosis” in connection with the applicant was two days later after she had terminated her employment.
15After speaking to Weaver, Walker called the applicant to “see how the day went”. Both Walker and the applicant recalled that the latter indicated that things had gone well. Walker did not mention Weaver’s concerns about the applicant’s quality of work and she did not indicate that she understood the applicant was not feeling well, nor did she ask her how she was feeling.
16The failure to mention the applicant’s health is somewhat curious, given that Walker indicated at several points in her testimony that one purpose of her call to the applicant was to provide the latter with an opportunity to be “truthful” or “honest” with her, by revealing that she was not well. If Walker sincerely believed, as she asserted, that the applicant was suffering from a bout of nerves, I do not understand her insistence that it was dishonest for this fact not to have been mentioned. Even if she understood the applicant to be suffering from a temporary illness such as the flu (which the applicant claimed was what was actually afflicting her), it seems somewhat extreme to characterize a failure to mention it as dishonest. Furthermore, if the matter was so important to Walker, I do not see why she did not ask the applicant about it directly. I will return to these points later.
17The applicant worked with Jennifer Willamot on June 1, 2005. This time they concentrated on “dry cleaning” – dusting and vacuuming. Willamot had concerns about the applicant’s performance because she had had to redo some of her work and thought that she was working too quickly to do a thorough job. Willamot talked to Walker by telephone at the end of the day and reported her observations.
18Both participants in the telephone conversation agreed that Walker had again not expressed any concern about the applicant’s performance and had expressed some confidence that her performance would improve on her third day of training. Willamot does not recall the terms “endometriosis” or “surgery” coming up in her conversation with the applicant during the workday. She did agree that she had asked the applicant if she might be pregnant when she observed her experiencing nausea, but was quite sure that this did not prompt the applicant to say anything further to her about her medical condition. Willamot did subsequently hear that applicant had been diagnosed with endometriosis, but her recollection was that Weaver provided her with that information. Willamot also recalled that her conversation with Walker touched on the fact that the applicant had not been feeling well during the course of the day.
19Walker and Willamot discussed one additional matter in their conversation, and that was the fact that a client had called to complain that his dining room had not been properly cleaned. Willamot agreed to go back and rectify that problem the next day. She also advised Walker that the applicant had been responsible for cleaning the dining room. Walker did not call the applicant to discuss Willamot’s concerns or the client’s complaint.
20The applicant was scheduled to work with Weaver again on June 2, 2005. When Weaver arrived at the applicant’s home to pick her up that morning, Vanderlei advised her that the applicant was too ill to work. Weaver told Vanderlei that Walker should be informed. There is no dispute that Vanderlei called the Molly Maid phone line and left a message for Walker. In the meantime, Weaver had stopped at the closest payphone and called Walker herself to advise of the applicant’s illness. Weaver had a conversation with Walker and she testified that, while the latter was “aggravated”, she simply indicated that the schedule might have to be adjusted to accommodate the fact that there was one less person involved in the cleaning.
21After she had spoken to Weaver, Walker called the applicant’s home. No one answered the phone and she left a message indicating that the applicant was fired. According to Walker, she indicated that “things were not working out”. The applicant, Vanderlei, and the applicant’s mother, Janice Buckingham, all testified that they had listened to the message and that Walker had not only said things “were not working out”, she had also accused the Applicant of dishonesty because she had failed to reveal that she was sick and would need surgery and that Walker needed someone she could “rely on”.
22What purports to be a verbatim transcription of the message is set out in the complaint to the Commission, which I note was filed in the week after the message was left. Vanderlei testified that he is the one who made the transcription. He also testified that he had attempted to make a tape recording of the message but that it was inaudible due to feedback. Vanderlei also testified that no recording of the message existed anymore because he and his wife had cancelled (or had had cancelled) their Bell voice mail. They had forwarded the message to Buckingham in order to preserve it, but it had somehow been erased from her voice mail as well. This account was consistent with that offered by both Buckingham and the applicant.
23This is Vanderlei’s transcription of the message:
This is Janet calling from Molly Maid. This isn’t going to work out. You weren’t honest with me because you didn’t tell me you were sick before I hired you. You didn’t sign any papers yet. Pay cheque next week in the mail. This is just not working out. I need someone I can rely on. You have just been too sick and that I know you are going to need surgery so like I said the honesty just isn’t there so I have to let you go.
24Vanderlei had been out of the house when Walker left her message. He testified that once had returned home and heard the message he attempted to call Walker several times and then eventually drove over to her house to speak to her. There is some difference of opinion between Vanderlei and Walker as to how heated this conversation became, and which of them was the more intemperate in speech. It is not necessary to make any finding on that issue. What is not disputed is that Vanderlei indicated to Walker his view that terminating the employment of an ill employee was unlawful and that legal action could be taken. It is also not disputed that the term “endometriosis” was uttered in this conversation. Vanderlei asserted that Walker uttered it first, while Walker asserted that Vanderlei was the one to refer to it. More significantly, she asserts that this conversation was the first inkling she had that the applicant had been diagnosed with endometriosis.
25I do not think I need to decide whether Vanderlei or Walker first said the word “endometriosis”. Indeed, I do not think I even need to decide whether the term was uttered at all in their exchange. What I do need to decide is whether, contrary to her testimony, Walker was possessed of any information about the applicant’s medical condition and the possibility that surgical intervention might be required at the time that she left the voice mail terminating her employment. I further need to decide whether that information was a factor in Walker’s decision to terminate the applicant. I make an affirmative finding in respect of both these questions for the following reasons.
26On the evening of June 1, 2005, Walker knew the following: (1) both Weaver and Willamot had concerns about the quality of the applicant’s work; (2) the applicant was not feeling well at work; and (3) there had been a customer complaint about her work. None of these matters were of sufficient concern to her to have prompted her to speak to the applicant about them. According to all accounts, she continued to express confidence that the applicant would improve. Yet, the very next morning, the situation had changed so drastically that Walker, without ever speaking to the applicant about any of her concerns, terminated her employment by leaving her a voice mail message.
27In the above circumstances, I asked Walker to explain what changed between the evening of June 1, 2005 and the morning of June 2, 2005 that prompted her to terminate the applicant’s employment. Walker said: “it was everything” – the quality of the work; the customer complaint; the failure to call ahead and report her illness; and her dishonesty. It was at this point in her testimony that Walker referred to her conversation with the Applicant on May 31, 2005, and first characterized as a want of honesty the fact that the applicant had not told her she was not feeling well.
28Walker had already testified that she intended to wait until the applicant had completed her training before making a final assessment of her performance and deciding whether to continue with her employment. She also said that the odds that her employment would continue were pretty much even as of the end of the second day of training. Walker also conceded that employees sometimes become ill suddenly and cannot give much notice of their absence from work, and that she has a roster of casual employees she usually calls on to fill in on such occasions. Further, Weaver testified that the applicant’s sudden inability to work on June 2, 2005 only “aggravated” Walker, but that she simply indicated they would shuffle things around. In short, aside from the question of “honesty”, there is nothing about the other reasons that Walker gave for the termination that would suggest it was a foregone conclusion or that explain in any way why it had to occur so immediately that the anticipated in-person meeting could not occur.
29Despite what Walker asserted, it seems to me most likely that the event that changed her mind about continuing to employ the applicant was the conversation with Weaver on the morning of June 2, 2005. Weaver is the employee who concedes that she had been told the applicant had endometriosis and might need surgery. She had just attended at the applicant’s home and been told she was too ill to work, and had immediately called Walker. Walker’s first response was to summarily fire the applicant. The inference I draw is that Weaver shared what she had been told about the applicant’s medical condition with Walker. This is what prompted Walker to describe the applicant as dishonest. This also explains why Walker did not query the applicant about her health when they spoke on May 31, 2005 – at that point she probably did think she was merely suffering from nerves.
30The content of the message that the applicant (and her husband and mother) say that Walker left on the voice mail is consistent with her having just heard that the applicant might have an ongoing health issue that could impact her employment and had failed to disclose it. The transcribed version of the message links the notions of an illness unrevealed (including the possibility of surgery) and dishonesty. It is therefore consistent with how Walker framed these matters in her testimony.
31Another aspect of the message’s content is also consistent with how Walker characterized matters in her testimony – the emphasis on the fact that no written contract of employment had been executed yet. In fact, Walker had taken some steps to complete the standard form Molly Maid contract that she and the applicant would normally have executed, but the applicant would not necessarily have known that a written contract was contemplated. Walker suggested strongly that the transcription was inaccurate and that she had not mentioned illness. In my view the similarities between the positions Walker later took and the very language she used in setting out those positions are so strong that I must reject as implausible any notion that the transcription of the conversation is not accurate.
32In all the circumstances, I find it more probable than not that Walker’s perception that the applicant suffered from endometriosis and would require surgery was a factor in her decision to summarily terminate her employment after two days.
33I turn now to some of the facts pertinent to the applicant’s wage loss claim.
34The Applicant testified about her employment circumstances both before and after her involvement with Molly Maid. This evidence can be summarized briefly.
35Prior to her interview with Walker, the applicant had been employed to provide home care to an elderly gentleman on a recurring basis – two days per week and alternate Saturdays. She had also been employed from April 13, 2005 until May 26, 2005 working part-time in the kitchen at a local golf club. The applicant testified that her hours at the golf club were “close to full-time” and also asserted that Walker told her she had to quit her job at the golf course if she wanted to work for Molly Maid.
36The notes Walker made when she interviewed the applicant indicate that the applicant worked two shifts per week at the golf course. Walker testified that she had merely written down what the applicant told her about her work. Certainly at the time of the interview Walker would have had no reason to have done otherwise.
37The applicant also stated in evidence that her hourly rate at the golf course was $12.00. Carol Hooper (“Hooper”) has been the manager at the golf course for 32 years. She testified that the Applicant commenced employment as a line cook at the rate of $9.00 per hour and was demoted to a part-time prep cook at the rate of $8.00 per hour. Hooper also provided a copy of the hours worked by the applicant at the golf course over the course of her employment, and it reveals that her hours worked per week generally decreased over the course of her employment. Her employment documents in the golf course file also suggest that the applicant requested to work two evenings per week starting at 5:00 p.m. to accommodate her private home care work, which was described as occupying two full days per week, plus alternate Saturdays commencing May 14, 2005.
38There was a conflict between the applicant and Gary, the cook at the golf course. The cook was fired. Initially the applicant testified that he was fired before she quit that employment, but quickly corrected her testimony to indicate that he may have been fired after she quit. At one point in her questioning by counsel for the respondent she appeared to suggest that she did not know he had been fired until the date of the hearing in this matter.
39Hooper also addressed this issue. She overheard one half of a conversation that a manager (Barb) at the golf course had with the applicant in which the latter was told Angela (the new cook) wanted to know if she could work a Tuesday evening the following week. When Barb got off the phone she advised Hooper that the applicant had quit because she had a new job. The respondent suggests that Hooper’s evidence establishes that the applicant quit before Walker called to offer her the Molly Maid position. I do not find that the chronology of events is clear enough for me to make that finding.
40Walker denied that she demanded the applicant quit her golf course job. She does agree that she told the applicant that the Molly Maid position was full-time and that she expected her to work full-time hours. Walker also indicated that most of her other employees hold additional jobs.
41I prefer Walker’s testimony on this point. There is no doubt that she and the applicant discussed the latter’s private home care work and that that work would be scheduled so as not to interfere with the Molly Maid hours of work. Given that the golf course work had also been identified to Walker as comprising two shifts per week (less than the private care work) I see no reason why Walker would have demanded that she quit working at the golf course.
42The applicant’s last day of work with Molly Maid was June 2, 2005. She filed her complaint in this matter on June 10, 2005. She testified that the illness that prevented her from working on June 2, 2005 was the flu and that she recovered quickly from it and was able to work.
43The evidence about the applicant’s efforts to mitigate her losses by seeking other employment was unsatisfactory. She did not provide any copies of advertisements or applications for which she had applied. She asserted that she applied to many restaurants but only identified one by name. When Vanderlei was asked what he knew about his wife’s job search he said she “read the paper” and “went to the job bank”. Buckingham was also asked what she knew about her daughter’s job search, and I think it is significant that her answer did not really address that question, but instead focused on what she could recall about the employment her daughter did find and when she obtained such employment. It did appear that the Applicant found work in the deli counter of a grocery store in the fall of 2005 and then found permanent employment elsewhere in early 2006.
44The applicant testified that she “loved” her work at the golf course. Despite her avowed enjoyment of that work, and despite the fact that she had been asked to work shifts there in the very week in which she trained with Molly Maid, she did not make any attempts to seek re-employment there. She attributed her failure to do so to the fact that she did not want to work with Gary. This is not a credible explanation. As I have already found, his employment had been terminated and she had been made aware of this fact.
45The number and type of jobs the applicant had previously held and listed on her resume were a variety of entry-level type positions primarily in the food service industry. In the absence of any specific evidence to the contrary, I think she might reasonably have obtained work of a similar nature (albeit possibly only part-time work) had she engaged in a serious job search.
46The applicant did continue to work providing private home care for a time. Her testimony respecting how many hours she worked and when she quit this job was not clear. On the one hand, she testified that at the time she took the Molly Maid position she was “weaning” herself off these private care hours. On the other hand, the documentation in her personnel file at the golf course demonstrates that her private care hours had just increased with the addition of a shift on alternate Saturdays. There was no cogent evidence about how much the applicant earned providing private home care. She was paid in cash and did not declare the income.
Parties’ Positions
47I set out only a summary of the parties’ positions on the applicable legal propositions. They have each made certain submissions about the evidence, but it is not necessary to address those submissions at this point. I have set out my findings of fact above, some of which differ from the findings they have encouraged me to make.
48The applicant’s position is that Walker perceived her to have a disability and this perception was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment during the training period. The applicant also asserts that Walker failed to accommodate her disability.
49On Walker’s behalf it is submitted that the applicant did not establish that she had a disability and in fact only asserted that she had the flu. It is also submitted that no legal obligations were owed to the applicant because she had not completed her training or had her full-time employment confirmed. In addition, Walker’s position is that it was incumbent on the applicant to reveal she had a disability if she wished accommodation. Finally, Walker submits that the applicant has not established any wage loss, nor has she met the obligation to mitigate any such loss. In reply, Walker submitted that the applicant could not rely on “perception of disability” as a basis for a contravention of the Code since it had not been specifically pleaded.
Analysis
50The result in this case is driven entirely by my findings of fact. The cases that the parties have relied on in their submissions with respect to the question of liability are not particularly relevant to my view of those facts, and I have not made reference to them in the analysis that follows.
51Whether or not Walker had any contractual obligations to the applicant under the common law of employment or under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, or other employment legislation is not an issue I have to determine. I would note, however, that employment contracts in this province do not need to be in writing. In any event, the presence or absence of a written employment contract is irrelevant to the question of whether there has been discrimination with respect to employment under the Code. Candidates for employment who have not been successful in securing a job for which they have applied have successfully invoked the Code and its proscriptions on discrimination in employment despite the fact that they had formed no contractual relationship with the responding party. See Crabtree v. 671632 Ontario Ltd., [1996] O.H.R.B.I.D. No. 37; Thompson v. Selective Personnel, 2009 HRTO 1224.
52I also find that the applicant is not precluded from submitting as a legal proposition that Walker contravened the Code because her perception that the applicant had a disability was a factor in the decision to terminate her. All of the facts necessary to support this legal theory are pleaded in the complaint.
53It is true that no medical evidence was adduced in this Application. I do not know whether, in fact, the applicant suffered from endometriosis, had had surgery for it in the past, or was a candidate for surgery in late May and early June 2005. Whether she actually suffered from a medical condition that could be characterized as a disability does not affect the result in this case. It also makes no difference that the applicant did not tell Walker she had a disability. It is true that to succeed in an accommodation case an applicant would have to establish that: she had a disability; the disability necessitated accommodation; the employer was made aware of the disability and the need for accommodation; and the employer failed to provide the necessary accommodation (short of undue hardship). In my view, this is not a case about accommodation.
54There were deficiencies in the applicant’s performance in the two days she did work, and her late notice of her illness on the third day caused considerable inconvenience to her employer. These facts alone might well have prompted Walker not to continue her employment, but as I have found, they were not the only considerations informing Walker’s decision. The fact is that I have found that Walker perceived the applicant to suffer from endometriosis (or some other medical condition) for which surgery was required, and that this perception was a factor in Walker’s decision to terminate her employment. This is a sufficient basis on which to find a contravention of the Code’s prohibition on discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.
Damages
55Where a contravention of the Code is found an award of compensation may be made. Section 45.2 of the Code establishes the Tribunal’s remedial authority:
45.2 (1) On an application under section 34, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following orders if the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the application:
An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act.
56The parties confined their submissions to the issue of compensation for wage loss. I agree with the submissions of Walker’s counsel that no award for wage loss is warranted in this case.
57I think both parties hoped and anticipated that the applicant would become a permanent Molly Maid employee after the training was completed. Indeed, Walker had prepared for this eventuality by completing some of the required documentation. There is no doubt, however, that Walker retained the right to terminate the applicant at any point that she was dissatisfied with her performance. It is undisputed that there were problems reported with the applicant’s performance in the first two days of her training. Further, she did fail to call in at any time in advance of the commencement of her shift on the third day. These were all events that would impact negatively on an assessment of whether her employment should be confirmed. It is not at all clear to me that the applicant would have been retained beyond the training period even had she been given an opportunity to complete a third day of training.
58The applicant’s testimony that Walker demanded that she quit her job at the golf course is not credible, for reasons I have set out above. The Applicant did not provide reliable evidence of the extent of any wage loss. She earned income from her private care work but she was either unwilling or unable to say how much that was or when she ceased earning income from that work.
59Further, the applicant did not provide reliable evidence that she took reasonable, or any, efforts to mitigate wage loss by searching for other employment, or to establish that there was a shortage of other suitable employment for someone with her skills and experience.
60Despite the fact that the Applicant has not established the existence of any wage loss established for which the respondent is responsible, I have found that a factor in Walker’s decision to terminate the applicant’s employment was the perception that she had a disability, contrary to the Code. When discrimination is found to have occurred, an award of monetary compensation under s.45.2(1) of the Code recognizes that an applicant’s right to be free from discrimination has intrinsic value and compensates the applicant for the loss of that right as well as intangible losses due to injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
61The Tribunal has broad discretion to award remedies which it considers appropriate in the circumstances and which advance the remedial purposes of the Code. See Giguere v. Popeye Restaurant, 2008 HRTO 2 at para. 80. The case law suggests that awards of monetary compensation, previously referred to as awards of general damages, should not be so low as to constitute a license to discriminate. They should also take account of the impact of the Code contravention on the applicant. See Sanford v. Koop, 2005 HRTO 53; ADGA Group Consultants Inc. v. Lane, 2008 CanLII 39605 (ON S.C.D.C.).
62This applicant had a two-day relationship with Walker and Molly Maid. She did not provide any evidence that ending this relationship had any particular emotional impact on her. The biggest disappointment to her appeared to be the loss of the opportunity to have the use of a Molly Maid car.
63Furthermore, it seems to me that the negative emotional impact of a discriminatory action premised on the existence of a disability that an applicant may not in fact have is probably not as great as it would be where the applicant actually did have that disability. There was no medical evidence in this case to establish that the applicant ever suffered from endometriosis or required surgery to treat it. The testimony of the applicant, Vanderlei and Buckingham was completely inconsistent with respect to any diagnosis of this condition or the timing of any treatment, and the Applicant subsequently gave birth to a child despite telling Weaver or Willamot that her condition precluded the possibility of pregnancy.
64Taking account of all of the above considerations, I find that an award of $3,000.00 is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
65The respondent Walker (operating as Molly Maid) is directed to pay to the applicant the amount of $3,000.00 by no later than 30 calendar days from the date of this Decision, failing which the award will attract post-judgment interest calculated from the date of this Decision in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.
Dated at Toronto this 15th day of June, 2010.
“Signed by”
Mary Anne McKellar
Vice-chair