Dokis v. Lambton (County), 2009 HRTO 975

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Between:

Leo Dokis, Applicant

-and-

The Corporation of the County of Lambton, Allan Vansteekiste and Terrence Cribbin, Respondents

Decision

Adjudicator: Jay Sengupta Date: July 9, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 975 Indexed as: Dokis v. Lambton (County)

1This is an Application filed on November 27, 2008 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"). The Application concerns events that occurred in 2003, and alleges that the applicant was discriminated against in his employment as a security tenant, on the basis of race.

2Pursuant to an Interim Decision in this matter, 2009 HRTO 359, a teleconference was convened to give the parties the opportunity to make oral submissions on whether the applicant could proceed with the Application in light of the delay in filing it and whether another proceeding had appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application. This Decision deals with these issues.

3At the outset of the conference call, the applicant objected to the representative for the personal respondent, Terrance Cribbin, participating in the call without first having submitted a full Response. The Interim Decision specified that the Tribunal would not require Mr. Cribbin to file a Response until the preliminary issues were dealt with. In the circumstances Mr. Cribbin's representative was permitted to participate and provide submissions on the preliminary issues on behalf of his client.

Background

4The applicant asserts that while employed as a security tenant in a housing complex operated by the respondent County he was assaulted by another tenant on the basis of his race. He alleges that the County then terminated his employment on the basis of the assault, thus condoning and supporting the actions of the tenant. The dismissal letter is dated April 16, 2003 and states that the applicant is relieved of his duties as the Security Tenant, although permitted to remain as a tenant. The applicant subsequently sent a letter to the County, dated May 8, 2003, resigning from his employment effective May 31, 2003.

5Several legal proceedings ensued from the altercation. Among them was a claim made by the applicant to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (the Board) for loss of earnings arising out of the altercation. The claim was denied by a Claims Adjudicator and then by an Appeals Resolution Officer with the Board, subsequent to which the applicant appealed to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (the WSIAT). The WSIAT issued a decision on the appeal on November 19, 2008, in which it dismissed the applicant's claim. There is some dispute between the parties as to whether the WSIAT has, subsequently, accepted a request for reconsideration filed by the applicant.

6Over the past five years, there have also been civil and criminal proceedings relating to the events that form the background to this Application.

Decision

7Section 34(1) of the Code requires that an application be brought within one year of the incident to which it relates or, if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series. Section 34(2) allows the Tribunal to accept an application made beyond this time limit if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

8Although the applicant indicates that the date of the last incident is October 9, 2008, the employment relationship that is at the root of this Application ended on either April 16, 2003 or May 31, 2003. The only event relating to the parties that took place in October, 2008 was a hearing before the WSIAT. As the Application to the Tribunal was filed on November 27, 2008, I find that there was a delay of over four years in filing.

9Having heard the submissions of the parties, I am not satisfied that the delay in filing this Application was incurred in good faith. In order to be satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith, the Tribunal would require a reasonable explanation as to why the applicant did not or could not pursue his rights under the Code in a timely manner. The applicant did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay of over four years in filing the Application. He has clearly been active in pursuing litigation involving the same parties named as respondents in this Application on a number of fronts and he has given the Tribunal no valid reasons he could not pursue his rights under the Code in a timely manner.

10In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the applicant was unable, for valid reasons, to pursue his allegations under the Code in a timely way and that the delay was incurred in good faith. Accordingly, it is not necessary to determine whether substantial prejudice would result to the respondents if the Application were to proceed. It is also not necessary for me to make a determination as to whether s.45.1 applies. This Application cannot proceed under section 34(1) of the Code and I find that the circumstances of section 34(2) do not apply. The Application is therefore dismissed.