Danny Labruzzo v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 2009 HRTO 809

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Between:

Danny Labruzzo Applicant

-and-

Chrysler Canada Ltd., C.A.W. Local 444, Rachel Coffey, Mike Kapasi, Dino Chiodo and Dave Larue Respondents

Interim Decision

Adjudicator: Alan Whyte Date: June 12, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 809 Indexed as: Labruzzo v. Chrysler Canada

Interim Decision

1This is an Application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the "Code") which alleges discrimination on the basis of perceived disability. The purpose of this Interim Decision is to decide whether the Tribunal should defer consideration of this Application pending the conclusion of a grievance proceeding initiated by C.A.W. Local 444 ("the union") on behalf of the applicant.

2All respondents submitted that the Application should be deferred pending the outcome of the applicant's grievance dated August 12, 2008 which challenges his termination and which appears to be based on the same facts and to raise the same issues as the Application.

3The applicant submitted in his Reply that the Application should proceed, on the basis that the disciplinary and other incidents relied on by Chrysler Canada Ltd. ("the company") to substantiate the applicant's termination for cause were either fabricated or otherwise without foundation.

4By letter dated May, 29, 2009, counsel for the company advised that a grievance meeting pertaining to the applicant's grievance was held on May 26, 2009, that the grievance was not resolved and is expected to proceed to the fourth step of the grievance procedure within the next four to eight weeks.

5Section 45 of the Code confirms the Tribunal's authority to defer consideration of an application. Under Rule 14 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, defer consideration of an application.

6Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. Deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings.

7Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.

8In my view, the facts and issues raised by the Application are part of a grievance process that is still in progress. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement (Parry Sound Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 342, 2003 SCC 42).

9The fact that the applicant does not agree with the facts alleged by the company is not sufficient reason to not defer the hearing of this Application. Those facts will be addressed in the grievance/arbitration forum and the applicant will no doubt be entitled to challenge the company's version of the facts there (with the assistance of the union).

10In these circumstances the Tribunal finds it appropriate to defer consideration of this Application pending the conclusion of the grievance/arbitration proceeding related to the applicant's grievance dated August 12, 2008.

2The Tribunal directs the parties' attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the process by which the Application may be brought back on after the grievance/arbitration process has been concluded.