HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Stamatios Stathis
Applicant
-and-
Thyssenkrupp Fabco
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Sheri D. Price
Indexed as: Stathis v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) on January 5, 2009, alleging that the respondent discriminated against him in respect of employment on the basis of disability. Among other things, the applicant alleges that the respondent refused to provide him with light duties following a workplace injury and terminated his employment on the basis of disability on August 4, 1986, more than 22 years before the Application was filed.
2On January 29, 2009, the Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. In that Notice, the Tribunal advised the applicant that the Application appeared to be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because of the delay in filing the Application. The Tribunal directed the applicant to provide his submissions to explain why, in all of the circumstances, the Application was within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
3The Tribunal also advised that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to s. 53(8) of the Code because the subject-matter of the Application was the same or substantially the same as the subject-matter of a complaint that was filed with the Commission and did not otherwise fall within its jurisdiction pursuant to s. 53(3) or 53(5) of the Code. This was due to the fact the applicant had checked off a box on the Application form indicating that he filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) with respect to the subject-matter of the Application. However, he did not provide a copy of the complaint to the Tribunal, nor did he provide a Commission file number, as requested. There is therefore an insufficient basis for the Tribunal to determine whether the applicant filed a complaint with the Commission with respect to the subject-matter of the Application.
4In any event, for the reasons that follow, and based on the information that the applicant has provided to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must dismiss the Application as the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the matters raised by the applicant because of the delay in filing the Application.
5The Tribunal’s power to hear and determine human rights applications is based on the Code. The Tribunal does not have a general power to inquire into claims which are not within its statutory jurisdiction under the Code.
6Section 34 of the Code provides that a person may file an application alleging that his or her rights under the Code have been infringed within one year of the incident (or last incident) to which the application relates. It also gives the Tribunal discretion to accept late applications in certain circumstances:
34 (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
7In responding to the Tribunal’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the applicant reiterates his desire to have a fair and impartial hearing before the Tribunal. However, he does not provide a good reason, or indeed any reason, which justifies the 22 year delay in commencing a human rights proceeding in respect of the alleged discrimination.
8Pursuant to s. 34 of the Code, where an application is filed more than a year after the incident to which the Application relates (or after the last incident in a series of incidents), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the Application unless it is satisfied that the delay in filing the Application was incurred in good faith. At a minimum, the applicant must provide the Tribunal with a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner. Where there is great delay in filing an application, the Tribunal will take that into account in assessing whether the reasons offered by the applicant justify the lengthy delay.
9In this case, the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation to justify the very long delay in filing the Application or to satisfy the Tribunal that the applicant was unable, for valid reasons, to pursue the allegations under the Code against the respondent in a timely manner and that the delay was incurred in good faith.
10The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the Application and the Application is therefore dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 13^th^ day of March, 2009.
“Signed by”
Sheri D. Price
Vice-chair

