HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Dudley Wright
Applicant
-and-
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Canada Local 873,
Robert DaPrato and Robert Hall
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Kaye Joachim
Date: December 18, 2009
Citation: 2009 HRTO 2229
Indexed as: Wright v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees & Canada Local 873,
[1] This Interim Decision deals with a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking the removal of three personal respondents and clarification of the scope of the Application.
SCOPE OF THE APPLICATION
[2] The applicant filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on July 31, 2007 alleging discrimination with respect to membership in a vocational association because of ancestry, colour, and place of origin. The allegations relate to events which occurred from September 2006 and ongoing.
[3] When the applicant filed the transition application on January 5, 2009 he added allegations relating to the period 1999 to September 2006. The transitional provisions of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the Code), provide that the application must be with respect to the original complaint. Accordingly, these additional allegations do not form part of the subject matter of the present Application and will not be considered by the Tribunal.
REMOVAL OF PERSONAL RESPONDENTS
[4] The applicable principles for removing parties were enunciated in [Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2008/31), at paras [4-5](https://www.minicounsel.ca/hrto/2008/31):
Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?
Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who [is] sought to be removed?
Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?
Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?
Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?
In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.
[5] The personal respondent DaPrato is alleged to have operated on a stereotypical assumption about the use of drugs by Black men and to have personally threatened the applicant. Mr. DaPrato and Mr. Hall are both alleged to have deliberately taken action in reprisal to the applicant raising allegations of discrimination. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate to remove these personal respondents.
[6] With respect to the personal respondent Wolch, the union’s business agent, the only allegation against her is that the applicant wrote to her asking her to withdraw the charge against him as it was contrary to the union’s Constitution and By-laws. I do not see a compelling reason to continue this Application against her, as the union would be vicariously liable for her actions and the allegations against her would not provide a basis for a personal order against her.
[7] The personal respondent Mimi Wolch is removed as a personal respondent and the style of cause is amended accordingly.
Dated at Toronto, this 18^th^ day of December, 2009.
“signed by”
Kaye Joachim
Alternate Chair