Harrison v. 2020177 Ontario, 2009 HRTO 1898

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Elizabeth Harrison

Applicant

-and-

2020177 Ontario Ltd. o/a South Buxton Raceway, Scott Mihalco, Jeff Gotalear and Brian Presley

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Kaye Joachim

Date: November 6, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 1898

Indexed as: Harrison v. 2020177 Ontario

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY

Elizabeth Harrison, Applicant ) Anna M. Vanelli, Counsel

2021077 Ontario Ltd. o/a South Buxton Raceway, )

Scott Mihalco, Jeff Gotalear and Brian Presley ) Jeffrey Klein, Counsel

Respondents )

1This Interim Decision addresses whether the Application is barred or should be deferred as the applicant is plaintiff in an ongoing civil proceeding.

2The complaint filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on September 30, 2005 and abandoned upon filing the present Application, alleges that the respondents discriminated on the basis of sex in the manner they permitted other participants at the race track to harass the applicant.

3In August 2008, the applicant filed a civil action against the corporate respondent and others seeking damages for injuries sustained in an accident on the racetrack on September 3, 2006. In the civil action the applicant alleges that the corporate respondent knew of prior threats made to the applicant which justifies an award of punitive damages.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

4Section 34 (11) of the Code provides:

A person who believes that one of his or her rights under Part I has been infringed may not make an application under subsection (1) with respect to that right if,

(a) a civil proceeding has been commenced in a court in which the person is seeking an order under section 46.1 with respect to the alleged infringement and the proceeding has not been finally determined or withdrawn; or

(b) a court has finally determined the issue of whether the right has been infringed or the matter has been settled.

5Section 46.1 reads as follows:

46.1 (1) If, in a civil proceeding in a court, the court finds that a party to the proceeding has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the proceeding, the court may make either of the following orders, or both:

1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

(2) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to commence an action based solely on an infringement of a right under Part I.

ANALYSIS

6In my view, if a person raises in a civil proceeding an allegation of an infringement of a right under the Code arising out of a specific factual context, s. 34(11) bars that person from also filing an application before the Tribunal to claim a Code infringement arising out of the same factual context.

7This interpretation of s. 34(11), in my view, also corresponds to the underlying purpose and rationale for this provision. As stated in Beaver v. Dr. Hans Epp Dentistry Professional Corporation, 2008 HRTO 282 at para. 10:

Section 34(11) is intended to eliminate duplicate court and Tribunal proceedings alleging breaches of the Code. An applicant’s ability to bring an application at the Tribunal is removed where there is an ongoing court proceeding in which he or she has made a claim for remedies based upon the same alleged infringement of the Code, where a court has finally determined the issue of whether the right has been violated, or where the matter has been settled. Section 34(11) is triggered by the applicant’s decision to raise the Code and seek remedies for its violation in a court action.

8However, in this case, while there may be some overlap if the reference in the civil action to prior threats relates to the pre-September 2005 alleged harassment, the civil action makes no reference to any facts which could give rise to claim for a remedy under the Code. In these circumstances, I find that the Application is not barred by section 34(11) of the Code.

9I will now consider whether the Application should be deferred pending the outcome of the civil action.

10Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. Deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings.

11Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.

12In the circumstances of this case, I find that deferral is not appropriate. The issues raised by the applicant relate to pre-September 2005 harassment because of sex. The issues raised in the civil action, although they may touch upon the alleged harassment, focus on a September 2006 accident and the injuries sustained therein. While there will likely be some overlap in the evidence in both cases, on balance, the overlap does not justify deferring this Application.

13The Tribunal will contact the parties to schedule a date for the Case Resolution Conference.