Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Doug Surh Applicant
-and-
City of Toronto Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mary Truemner Date: October 16, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 1700 Indexed as: Surh v. Toronto (City)
BACKGROUND
1The applicant filed an Application dated August 7, 2009 under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”). The Application alleges reprisal and discrimination in goods, services and facilities because of race, colour, and sex. The Application states that the date of the last event is October 16, 2006 when he defended an alleged traffic violation. The applicant alleges that the prosecutor and the police officer harassed and discriminated against him in court on that date. The Application did not allege discrimination against the judge or the court.
2The Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss because it appears the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in his Application, and the Tribunal is not satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith. As well, the Tribunal indicated in the Notice that it appears the Application does not allege an area of discrimination. The Notice cites cases where the term “services” was held not to include the outcome or decisions resulting from adjudications by other statutory bodies, including the Courts.
3The applicant replied to the Notice with an e-mail message which stated the following:
The appeal on this matter took a long time to be heard in January 2009. I contacted the Human Rights legal advice service and I was told my application is within the 1 year period. This complaint involves the provision of legal services.
DECISION
4Section 34 of the Code states:
34.(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the Application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
5The Application describes the behaviour of the prosecutor and the police officer. There is no indication in the applicant’s materials that the appeal he refers to in his e-mail message has anything to do with the behaviour of the prosecutor and the police officer. I therefore find that the last date of the alleged discrimination is October 16, 2006.
6The Application was not filed within one year of the date that the applicant alleges the respondent last discriminated against him, and I therefore must determine whether the delay in filing this Application was incurred in good faith. The only reason that the applicant has provided which might constitute an explanation for the delay is the fact that he appealed the decision of the court, but with no further information about why the appeal prevented him from claiming his rights under the Code, I find that the applicant has not satisfied the burden of demonstrating that the delay in filing this Application was “incurred in good faith” as required under s. 34(2) of the Code.
7I also find that the prosecutor and the police officer were not providing services when they acted for the opposing party and the opposing party’s witness in litigation against the applicant. See Cooper v. Pinkofskys, 2008 HRTO 390.
8This Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 16^th^ day of October, 2009.
“Signed by”
Mary Truemner Vice-chair```