Shaw v. Phipps (No. 5)
T-0475-08
2009-10-06
2009 HRTO 1604
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal
CHRR Doc. 09-2140
Ronald Phipps
Complainant
v.
Toronto Police Services Board, Michael Shaw and William Blair
Respondents
v.
Ontario Human Rights Commission
Intervener
Before: Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Kaye Joachim
Appearances by:
Ronald Phipps, on his own behalf
Antonella Ceddia, Counsel for the Respondent Toronto Police Services Board
Kevin McGivney and Lisa Cabel, Counsel for the Respondents M. Shaw and W. Blair
Prabhu Rajan, Counsel for the Intervener
LIABILITY — employer liability for employee — joint liability — EMPLOYMENT — definition of employee includes police officer — DAMAGES — damages assessed for injury to dignity and self-respect and racial harassment
Summary: The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario awarded Ronald Phipps, a Black resident of Toronto, $10,000 as compensation for racial discrimination he experienced at the hands of a Toronto police officer, Michael Shaw.
This is a decision on remedy, following a decision on the merits of the case. The Tribunal found that Michael Shaw discriminated against Ronald Phipps by stopping him, questioning him, asking for identification, and treating him as though his behaviour was suspicious while he was on duty as a mail delivery person for Canada Post.
The primary issue in this decision is whether the Toronto Police Services Board ("Police Board") is jointly liable with the Chief of Police, William Blair, for the discrimination.
The Police Board argued that it was not liable for the discrimination because it is not a corporation, trade union, occupational association, unincorporated association or employers' association within the meaning of s. 46(3) of the Code. Section 46(3) names the entities that can be "deemed" liable for the discriminatory acts of employees or agents. The Police Board also argued that the Police Services Act intends that the Chief of Police alone will have operational authority over the conduct of police officers, while the Board has a policy function.
The Tribunal accepted that there is a division of responsibility between the Police Board and the Chief of Police. But, in its view, that division reinforces the notion that both parties are responsible for ensuring compliance with the Code and both are liable for the discriminatory actions of police officers. The ability to set anti-discrimination policy and the role of both parties in determining objectives and priorities for the Toronto Police Service indicate joint responsibility. Further, the fact that the Police Board has the authority to hire and fire members of the Toronto Police Service indicates that the Board plays a strong role in furthering the goal of non-discriminatory policing. The Tribunal ruled that the Police Board was liable for the discrimination.
Having found that the Chief of Police and the Police Board were jointly liable for the discrimination, the Tribunal ordered them to pay Ronald Phipps $10,000 as compensation for the injury caused to him by the discrimination.
See also (No. 1) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-0993, 2009 HRTO 733), (No. 3) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-1637, 2009 HRTO 1194 and (No. 4) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-1678, 2009 HRTO 1232.
CASES CITED
Ahluwalia v. Toronto (Metro) Commissioners of Police (1983), 1983 CanLII 4719 (ON HRT), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1757 (Ont. Bd.Inq.): 35
Burrell v. Peel Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 5009 (QL) (Div.Ct.): 30, 39
King v. Toronto Police Services Board (No. 5) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-0876, 2009 HRTO 644: 32
Miguna v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2008 ONCA 799: 25
Nassiah v. Peel (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board (No. 2) (2007), 61 C.H.R.R. D/88, 2007 HRTO 14: 57
New South Wales (Attorney General) v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1955] A.C. 457 (P.C.): 16
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69: 31
Pannu v. Prestige Cab Ltd. (1986), 1986 CanLII 6476 (AB CA), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3911, [1986] A.J. No. 1717 (QL) (C.A.): 35
Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board (No. 2) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-1250, 2009 HRTO 877: 1
Prue v. Edmonton (City) (1984), 1984 CanLII 1237 (AB QB), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 700, 6 C.H.R.R. D/2544 (Alta. Q.B.): 35
Reference re Power of a Municipal Council to Dismiss a Chief Constable or Other Police Officer Without a Hearing (1957), 1957 CanLII 110 (ON CA), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 222 (Ont. C.A.): 16
R. v. Campbell, 1999 CanLII 676 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565: 16
Washington v. Toronto Police Services Board (No. 3) (2009), CHRR Doc. 09-0324, 2009 HRTO 217: 32
LEGISLATION CITED
Ontario
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19
s. 45.2: 41
s. 46.3: 9
s. 46.3(1): 13
s. 53(3) : 1
Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F: 15
Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15
s. 31: 7
s. 31(1)(b): 18
s. 31(1)(c): 23
s. 31(3): 18
s. 31(4): 18
s. 41(1): 6
s. 41(1)(a): 19
s. 41(1)(b): 19
s. 42(1)(g): 21
s. 50: 30, 39
s. 50(1): 24
s. 64: 22
s. 68: 22
O.Reg. 123/98: 20
AUTHORITIES CITED
Sullivan, Ruth A., Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994): 28
INTRODUCTION
1This is the decision determining the remedy in respect of an application filed under s. 53(3) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"). On June 18, 2009, I issued a Case Resolution Conference decision, 2009 HRTO 877 [CHRR Doc. 09-1250], finding that Michael Shaw, a police officer with the Toronto Police Service, had discriminated against the applicant on the basis of race in the provision of police services on March 9, 2005.
2On September 14, 2009, the hearing resumed to hear the evidence and argument on remedy and the liability of the respondent Toronto Police Services Board ("TPSB") and the Chief of Police William Blair (the "Chief of Police" or the "Chief") for the conduct of Michael Shaw.
Liability of the Chief of Police
3The Chief of Police acknowledged that there must be institutional responsibility when police officers are found to have discriminated in the manner in which they deliver police services. The Chief of Police accepted responsibility and liability for the actions of Michael Shaw in this case.
4The basis for the Chief's institutional liability is found in the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended (the "PSA").
5By virtue of the PSA, responsibility for the administration and day-to-day operations of the Police Service rests with the Chief of Police.
6Section 41(1) of the PSA provides as follows:
41(1) The duties of a Chief of Police include,
(a) in the case of a municipal police force, administering the police force and overseeing its operation in accordance with the objectives, priorities and policies established by the board under subsection 31(1);
(b) ensuring that members of the police force carry out their duties in accordance with this Act and the regulations and in a manner that reflects the needs of the community, and that discipline is maintained in the police force;
(c) ensuring that the police force provides community-oriented police services;
(d) administering the complaints system in accordance with Part V.
7The responsibilities of Police Services Boards are set out in s. 31 of the PSA:
31(1) A board is responsible for the provision of adequate and effective police services in the municipality and shall,
(a) appoint the members of the municipal police force;
(b) generally determine, after consultation with the chief of police, objectives and priorities with respect to police services in the municipality;
(c) establish policies for the effective management of the police force;
(d) recruit and appoint the chief of police and any deputy chief of police, and annually determine their remuneration and working conditions, taking their submissions into account;
(e) direct the chief of police and monitor his or her performance;
(f) establish policies respecting the disclosure by chiefs of police of personal information about individuals;
(g) receive regular reports from the chief of police on disclosures and decisions made under section 49 (secondary activities);
(h) establish guidelines with respect to the indemnification of members of the police force for legal costs under section 50;
(i) establish guidelines for dealing with complaints made under Part V, subject to subsection (1.1);
(j) review the chief of police's administration of the complaints system under Part V and receive regular reports from the chief of police on his or her administration of the complaints system.
8In the Chief's view, a Police Services Board has a general policy function, whereas it is the Chief of Police who sets and enforces police procedures.
9I accept the submissions of the Chief of Police that his Office is liable for the actions of Michael Shaw, under s. 46.3 of the Code.
Submissions of the TPSB
10The TPSB submits that it is not liable for discrimination found in this application.
11The TPSB does not deny that it may be properly named as a respondent in a human rights complaint if there are allegations that the TPSB itself did something contrary to the Code, such as passing a discriminatory policy. However, that is not the case here. It submits that there are no allegations of wrongdoing by the TPSB. It also acknowledges that it is the proper respondent to an employment discrimination complaint by a police officer.
12The TPSB submits that it is not vicariously liable for the actions of Michael Shaw. It made four arguments.
13First, s. 46.3(1) of the Code is the deemed "liability" provision of the Code:
46.3(1) For the purposes of this Act, except subsection 2(2), subsection 5(2), section 7 and subsection 46.2(1) any act or thing done or omitted to be done in the course of his or her employment by an officer, official, employee or agent of a corporation, trade union, trade or occupational association, unincorporated association or employers' organization shall be deemed to be an act or thing done or omitted to be done by the corporation, trade union, trade or occupational association, unincorporated association or employers' organization. [Emphasis added.]
14The TPSB is none of the entities listed in s. 46.3(1) for which a deemed liability can arise. It is not a corporation, trade union, trade or occupational association, unincorporated association or employer's organization. Neither is the TPSB an entity analogous to any of those entities.
15This exclusion is in contrast to the Legislature's intention to include the TPSB in s. 46 of the Code, which defines "person" as including a corporation (consistent with the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F) employment agency, employer's organization, an unincorporated association, a trade union, a partnership, a municipality, a board of police commissioners and a police services board established under the PSA.
16Second, the TPSB is not the "employer" of the individual police officer and is not in an "employment" or "agency" or other type of relationship with the officer that is captured by s. 46.3(1). Police officers are not employees by virtue of their appointment as "independent officers of the Crown": Reference re Power of a Municipal Council to Dismiss a Chief Constable or Other Police Officer Without a Hearing (1957), 1957 CanLII 110 (ON CA), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 222 (Ont. C.A.); New South Wales (Attorney General) v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1955] A.C. 457 (P.C.); R. v. Campbell, 1999 CanLII 676 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565.
17Third, the TPSB is a creature of statute, created and governed by the PSA, which both establishes and limits its powers and functions.
18The PSA makes the TPSB responsible for the provision of adequate and effective police services and for generally determining, after consultation with the Chief of Police, objectives and priorities with respect to police services (s. 31(1)(b)). At the same time, the PSA restricts the TPSB from directing individual police officers (s. 31(3)) and from directing the Chief on specific operational decisions or with respect to the day-to-day operation of the police force (s. 31(4)).
19The PSA assigns to the Chief of Police — not to the TPSB — the duty to administer the police force and oversee its operation in accordance with objectives, priorities and policies established by the Board (s. 41(1)(a)) and to ensure that members of the police force carry out their duties in accordance with the PSA and regulations (s. 41(1)(b)).
20Ontario Regulation 123/98 to the PSA includes the Code of Conduct for police officers. That Code of Conduct states that an officer commits misconduct if s/he engages in discreditable conduct which includes failure to treat a person equally and discriminating because of that person's colour, or race, and other Human Rights Code protected grounds. As stated, pursuant to s. 41(1)(b) of the PSA, it is the role of the Chief of Police — not of the TPSB — to oversee operations and to ensure that a particular police officer conducts him or herself in such a way that s/he does not discriminate.
21The PSA lists as one of the duties of a police officer the performance of the lawful duties that the Chief of Police — not the TPSB — assigns (s. 42(1)(g)).
22Where complaints are made by the public about the conduct of a police officer, unless the officer is the Chief of Police or a deputy Chief of Police, such complaints are referred to and dealt with by the Chief of Police (s. 64, PSA), who has the powers set out in s. 68 of the PSA to resolve such complaints, including dismissal, suspension or demotion of the police officer.
23The TPSB performs functions of a general policy-making nature for the effective management of the police force (s. 31(1)(c)) but this is not "management" of the force in the traditional sense. The general management of the force, in that sense, is left to the Chief (s. 41(1)(a) and (b)). While the TPSB has oversight of the Chief (s. 31(3) and (4)), such oversight is not a "line of command" type of oversight because the PSA restricts the TPSB from directing the Chief on specific operational decisions and on the day-to-day operation of the police force.
24Fourth, the PSA specifically makes the TPSB vicariously liable for torts committed by a police officer (s. 50(1)). The statutory interpretation principle of implied exclusion thereby excludes a human rights application.
25Subsequent to the hearing, the TPSB submitted the following case for my consideration: Miguna v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2008 ONCA 799 (released September 21, 2009). The Ontario Court of Appeal struck parts of a statement of claim against the TPSB, "except for the vicarious liability claims". This decision is not inconsistent with my analysis, below.
26While the TPSB acknowledges and accepts the principle that the Code must be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner, it submits that the clear legislative intention, as set out in both the Code and the PSA indicates that the TPSB is not vicariously liable for the actions of police officers under the Code.
Submissions of the Ontario Human Rights Commission
27The intervener, Ontario Human Rights Commission (the "Commission") submits that a purposive interpretation of the Code would result in a finding that both the Chief and the TPSB are jointly liable for the discriminatory actions of a police officer.
28The implied exclusion principle may be displaced when it is rebutted by an alternative explanation. See: R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Butterworths, 1994) at 174—75.
29The Commission submits that the Legislature may have wished to emphasize the importance of the matters mentioned in s. 46.
30In the Commission's view, s. 50 of the PSA which states that a police services board is liable in respect of torts committed by members of the police force in the course of their employment is indicative of an intention to make the TPSB liable in respect of similar matters such as Code violations. The Commission noted that the TPSB has been found to be properly named in an action for a Charter violation, which is not a tort: Burrell v. Peel Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 5009 (QL).
31Similarly, in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, the Court stated (at § 66):
It is possible, I concede, that circumstances might arise in which the Board is required to address a particular problem in order to discharge its statutory obligation to provide adequate and effective police services. If there was evidence, for example, of a widespread problem in respect of the excessive use of force in the detention of visible minorities, the Board arguably is under a positive obligation to combat racism and the resultant use of excessive force. But as a general matter, courts should be loath to interfere with the Board's broad discretion to determine what objectives and priorities to pursue, or what policies to enact in pursuit of those objectives. Suffice it to say, the Board's decision not to enact additional policies or training procedures in respect of s. 113(9) does not constitute a breach of its obligation to provide "adequate and effective" police services.
32The Commission relied upon the following human rights decisions where police boards have been found vicariously liable under human rights legislation for the actions of police officers: King v. Toronto Police Services Board (No. 5), 2009 HRTO 644 [CHRR Doc. 09-0876] at § 16 and Washington v. Toronto Police Services Board (No. 3), 2009 HRTO 217 [ CHRR Doc. 09-0324] at § 29.
ANALYSIS
33In accordance with the principle that human rights legislation should be given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation, rather than the narrowest interpretation resulting from an implied exclusion rule of statutory interpretation, I find that the a police services board is an entity that can be found liable for the actions of its employees, officers, or agents. I agree with and adopt the following comments (King v. Toronto Police Services Board, supra, at § 17):
Whether the Board is a "corporation" or an "unincorporated association", the language of this provision is large enough to capture the Board as an organization. Further, in my view, a police officer clearly can be regarded as "an officer, official, employee or agent" of the Board, in light of the fact that police officers are appointed by the Board and in light of the Board's statutory responsibility to provide adequate and effective police services, notwithstanding that the Board does not have the power to specifically direct an individual police officer.
34In my view, a purposive interpretation of the deemed liability provision of human rights legislation must be cognizant of the entities or organizations that are in the best position to remedy the discriminatory action. In this case, the TPSB, along with the Chief of Police are jointly in the best position to address the type of discrimination that I have found.
35While police officers are not in a traditional employee-employer relationship, they are in a position akin to an employee for most labour relations purposes: Re Prue (1984), 1984 CanLII 1237 (AB QB), 15 D.L.R. (4th) 700 [6 C.H.R.R. D/2544] (Alta. Q.B.), quoted in Pannu v. Prestige Cab Ltd., 1986 CanLII 6476 (AB CA), [1986] A.J. No. 1717 (QL) [ 8 C.H.R.R. D/3911] (C.A.); Ahluwalia v. Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police (1983), 1983 CanLII 4719 (ON HRT), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1757 (Ont. Bd.Inq.). I agree with the following comments ( Washington v. Toronto Police Services Board, supra, at § 29):
There are unique features about the relationship between municipal police services boards ("PSBs") and uniform officers that make it different from a traditional employment relationship. These arise because of the legal status of police officers and the particular disciplinary regime in Part V of the PSA. Nevertheless, PSBs are, in very many ways, like the officers' employer. The PSA provides that members of the police force are appointed by the PSB (s. 31(1)(a)), are "under the board's jurisdiction" (s. 31(2)), the board may "terminate a police officer's employment" during their probationary period (s. 44(3)) and may discharge a member because accommodation of a disability may result in undue hardship (s. 47). Under s. 126(3), PSBs bargain with police associations to reach agreements "dealing with the remuneration, pensions, sick leave credit gratuities and grievance procedures of the members of the police force and, subject to section 126, their working conditions". They also establish guidelines for dealing with public and internal complaints against members of the force under Part V (s. 31(1)(i). The PSB is the equivalent of an employer for most purposes, and certainly has an important role in relation to the discipline and complaints process.
36The institutional respondents argue that the structure of the PSA intends the Chief of Police to have sole operational authority over the conduct of police officers in the provision of policing services, while the TPSB has merely a policy-making function in that area. At the same time, they acknowledge that the TPSB does play a more direct role vis-à-vis officers as "employees" since they acknowledge that the TPSB is the proper respondent to a complaint of employment discrimination by an officer.
37I accept that there is a division of responsibility over the Toronto Police Service ("TPS") between the Chief of Police and the TPSB, but that division, in my view, reinforces the notion that both parties are jointly responsible for ensuring compliance with the Code and are jointly liable for the discriminatory actions of police officers. The ability to set anti-discrimination policy and the joint discretion to determine objectives and priorities of the TPS indicate strongly a joint responsibility for compliance with the Code. Further, that the TPSB has authority to appoint members of the TPS plays a strong role in the furtherance of the goal of non-discriminatory policing, as does its authority to terminate employees during the probationary period.
38This joint responsibility appears to have been acknowledged by the institutional respondents who both partnered with the Ontario Human Rights Commission in response to a Commission-initiated complaint to form a joint working group referred to as the Human Rights Project Charter. One of its main objectives is the elimination of any discrimination that may exist in the provision of policing services by the TPS.
39I also note that s. 50 of the PSA, which imposes liability on the TPSB for torts, has not prevented parties in civil actions from naming TPSB for non-torts, such as Charter breaches: Burrell v. Peel Police Services Board, supra, at § 15:
I am not aware of any provision of the statute that prohibits an action against the Board if it carries out its duties in a manner that breaches the charter rights of members of the community or that restricts claims against the Board to its vicarious liability for torts of police officers.
40I conclude that the TPSB is jointly liable with the Chief of Police for the discriminatory actions of Michael Shaw.
Remedy
41The applicant sought financial compensation for specific economic losses arising from the discrimination and damages for the injury to dignity and impact upon him of the discrimination, as well as the removal of a "caution" preventing him from approaching HK, an individual in the neighbourhood where the events giving rise to the application took place.
The Statutory Authority to Make Orders
45.2(1) On an application under section 34, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following orders if the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the application:
An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act.
(2) For greater certainty, an order under paragraph 3 of subsection (1),
(a) may direct a person to do anything with respect to future practices; and
(b) may be made even if no order under that paragraph was requested.
The Caution
42The applicant testified that he was told by a police officer to stay away from HK who called the police after receiving a letter from the applicant asking to speak about the incidents of March 2005. HK did not want to become involved and called the police for assistance. As a result, a police officer communicated this to the applicant and warned him or cautioned him to stay away from HK.
43The applicant interpreted this as a prohibition against him speaking to HK and being in HK's neighbourhood.
44The TPSB stated, and the statement was not challenged by the applicant, that there is no "caution" or any legal impediment to the applicant being anywhere in HK's neighbourhood. In the TPSB view, the police officer who spoke to the applicant was merely conveying HK's desire not to communicate with the applicant.
In my view, in these circumstances there is no need for any remedy in respect of the "caution".
Economic Losses
45The applicant asserted that he experienced economic loss because he was not able to exercise his seniority rights to bid to deliver mail on his preferred route in HK's neighbourhood, in light of the caution, and that this resulted in lost wages and overtime.
46In my view, there was never any restriction on the applicant's ability to bid to work where he wanted and therefore the claimed losses are not related to the discrimination.
47The applicant also submitted that his fear of delivering mail outdoors led him to choose to work indoors at apartment buildings and offices, which resulted in a heavier workload and less opportunity for overtime. I am not satisfied that the applicant has proven any lost opportunity for overtime, as a result of working indoors rather than outdoors. I note that in 2006, the first year following the discrimination, the applicant earned almost $10,000 more than in 2005.
48Similarly, the applicant claimed that he lost opportunities to solicit business as a fitness trainer in HK's neighbourhood as a result of the caution. For the reasons indicated above, the applicant's self-imposed decision not to solicit business in that area is not related to the act of discrimination in 2005.
49The applicant asserted that he experienced a host of health issues following the discrimination which he believed were related to the discrimination. He became accident prone and experienced various work-related injuries, he developed back and hip pain, and he took sleep medication which led to the development of glaucoma. I find that the applicant has not established a sufficient causal relationship between the physical ailments and the act of discrimination on March 9, 2005.
50The applicant testified that he wished to begin treatment with a psychologist to deal with his anger over the incident and sought damages to pay for this treatment. The applicant did not submit any evidence of expenses to date and this request is denied.
Monetary Compensation
51The applicant testified about the impact the events of March 9, 2005, had on him. These included the above-mentioned deterioration in his physical health, stress caused by teasing by co-workers, and ongoing feelings of anger and humiliation. For the reasons described above, I do not accept that the deterioration in the applicant's health is related to the discrimination.
52However, I accept the applicant's evidence he was deeply traumatized and angered by the events of March 9, 2005. That upset must be understood in the context of the applicant's evidence of his personal history, as a Black male who immigrated to Canada at the age of 10 and experienced what he perceived as continuous acts of racism throughout the course of his life.
53In addition, the applicant testified to what he perceived to be numerous acts of racial profiling by police since March 9, 2005.
54While I accept that the remedy I award should relate to the damage inflicted upon the applicant on March 9, 2005, and not based on subsequent unproven events, I find that it is appropriate to consider the applicant's heightened sensitivity to police interactions.
55The award of damages must also take [into] account the facts as I found them in my earlier decision, and be consistent with the awards of other decisions in similar circumstances.
56In my earlier decision, I found that that applicant had been followed and stopped by Michael Shaw, at least in part, because of the colour of his skin and that the officer continued to ask questions about the applicant after the brief interaction. However, I also declined to find that the officer had been rude or intimidating or threatened the applicant with his car, as alleged.
57In a previous case of racial discrimination involving a police officer, I awarded $20,000 to the applicant: Nassiah v Peel Regional Police Services Board, 2007 HRTO 14 [reported 61 C.H.R.R. D/88]. On the facts of that case, there were highly offensive comments made and the interaction last[ed] a couple of hours.
58In light of the brief nature and quality of the interaction between the applicant and the respondent Shaw and the evidence of the applicant, I find that an award of $10,000 is appropriate to compensate the applicant for the injury to his dignity, feelings and self-respect, the breach of his Code rights and the impact of the incident.
Remedies to Ensure Future Compliance
59The applicant sought a remedy requiring the TPS to implement a practice of partnering White officers with Racialized officers to improve racial sensitivity and prevent a recurrence of the type of racial discrimination he experienced.
60While I accept that the form of racial discrimination that I found occurred in this case is likely not an isolated incident, I find that the remedy requested by the applicant or any remedy to ensure future compliance, is not warranted in this case. Since 2005, the TPS, through the TPSB and the Chief of Police have initiated a series of actions to reduce the occurrence of racial discrimination in policing. Their uncontested efforts are set out in Schedule A attached to this decision [not reproduced here]. In light of these initiatives, I find that no remedy to ensure future compliance is required.
ORDER
61The respondents are ordered to pay to the applicant:
(a) the sum of $10,000 as monetary compensation for the loss arising out of the infringement of the Code, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect; and
(b) post-judgment interest on all of the above at the applicable rate under the Courts of Justice Act commencing 30 days from the date of this Order.