Lawson v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2009 HRTO 1594

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

David Lawson Applicant

-and-

Workplace Safety and Insurance Board Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Brian Eyolfson Date: September 29, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 1594 Indexed as: Lawson v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board

1This is an Application filed on March 30, 2009 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination on the grounds of disability, age, record of offences and reprisal, in the areas of employment, contracts and goods, services and facilities. The style of cause has been amended to reflect the correct name of the respondent as set out in the respondent’s Response.

2In its Response, the respondent submits that it has neither an employment nor a contractual relationship with the respondent. The respondent submits that the applicant, in essence, seeks to challenge decisions made by the respondent respecting the applicant’s entitlement to benefits and, to the extent the Application challenges decisions of the respondent, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The respondent submits that the balance of the Application conveys dissatisfaction about how the applicant believes he was treated by the respondent and, on the face of the Application there is no factual basis to establish that this alleged treatment amounts to discrimination on any enumerated ground. Accordingly, the respondent also requests that this aspect of the Application be dismissed as failing to disclose discrimination contrary to the Code.

3The respondent also filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”), that the Application be dismissed because it is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The respondent referred to Tribunal jurisprudence, including Baird v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2009 HRTO 99, wherein the Tribunal held that the content, reasons and result contained in a decision of a statutory decision-maker are not “services” under the Code.

4The applicant subsequently filed both a Response to the respondent’s RFOP and a RFOP to amend his Application to clarify facts and with respect to remedy. In his Response to the respondent’s RFOP, the applicant takes no position on the respondent’s argument that the Application includes allegations relating to decisions made in accordance with the respondent’s adjudicative processes and, accordingly, these allegations are outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The applicant submits that there is still an important issue raised in the Application that is properly within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, namely, the refusal of the respondent, despite the applicant’s numerous requests, to directly deposit monies into his bank account rather than send cheques in the mail. It is the applicant’s position that, as pleaded in his Application, this is a service, and not part of the adjudicative function of the respondent.

5In his RFOP to amend his Application for the purposes of clarification, as referred to in his Application, the applicant states that he was denied a service in that the respondent on numerous occasions, and up to the present time, has refused his request to have his benefits directly deposited into his bank account. It is the applicant’s position that the failure to directly deposit his cheques is a denial of a service and a failure to accommodate his disability. The applicant also seeks an amendment with respect to the financial, specific and public interest remedies sought in his Application. The respondent does not appear to have provided a Response to the applicant’s RFOP.

6With respect to the respondent’s RFOP, the Tribunal has held in a number of decisions that the adjudicative decisions of statutory tribunals and agencies are not a “service” pursuant to the Code and challenges to the decision-making of other statutory tribunals and agencies are not, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see, for example: Baird, supra, and Christianson v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009 HRTO 203, reconsideration denied 2009 HRTO 424). It appears that the Application may contain allegations that fall within that category and may not, therefore, be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; however, the Application also appears to contain allegations that relate to “services” within the meaning of the Code and are, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine. Consequently, the respondent’s RFOP to dismiss the Application as being outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is denied.

7With respect to the applicant’s RFOP, the amendments sought by the applicant do not involve new allegations. Rather, one proposed amendment appears to clarify an existing allegation in the Application, while the other proposed amendments relate to the remedy sought. In view of the stage at which the RFOP to amend is made, the nature of the amendments and the absence of any apparent prejudice, I see no reason to deny the applicant’s RFOP. I order that the Application be amended accordingly.

8The respondent may file an amended Response within 20 days of the date of this Interim Decision.

9I am not seized of this matter.