HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Santiago Quimado
Applicant
-and-
S.A. Armstrong Can. Ltd. and Jim Armstrong
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Michelle Flaherty
Indexed as: Quimado v. S.A. Armstrong
Written Submissions By
Santiago Quimado, applicant ) on his own behalf
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) on July 2, 2009, in which he alleges discrimination on the basis of disability in the context of employment.
2On August 14, 2009, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application because:
a. the last event in the Application is alleged to have occurred on May 22, 1997, and is outside the one-year limitation period contained in s. 34 of the Code; and
b. the Application appears to be based on the same facts and issues raised in a previous application filed by the applicant in Tribunal file number 2008-00537-I (the “First Application”), which was dismissed for delay. See 2008 HRTO 110.
3On September 11, 2009, the applicant provided written submissions and medical documentation in response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
4The essence of the allegations contained in the current Application is that the applicant was treated unfairly by the corporate respondent, his former employer. He alleges that he was constantly criticised, bullied, and monitored excessively. He complains that the corporate respondent’s lawyers and managers were authoritarian, intolerant and that they discriminated against him by using fraudulent means to deny him his rights.
5The Application does not contain any specific allegations against the individual respondent.
6In his reply to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the applicant states that he was “under incapacity” for an unspecified period of time. He also argues that the Application should not be dismissed because the respondents’ behaviour was intentional and fraudulent.
ANALYSIS
7Section 45.1 of the Code states:
The Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.
8I have reviewed the First Application as well as the Tribunal’s Decision in 2008 HRTO 110 dismissing the First Application for delay.
9While there are some differences between the current Application and the First Application, the substance of the two are the same. In each case, the allegations relate to issues that arose on or before May 22, 1997, in the context of the applicant’s employment with the corporate respondent. In each the substance of the allegations is the same and relates to alleged authoritarian and intolerant behaviour on the part of the respondents and allegations that the applicant was forced to enter into an agreement through fraudulent means. In both the applicant argued that the delay in filing an application was as a result of a mental health issue.
10I am satisfied that the Tribunal has already dealt with the substance of the current Application, including the issue of the applicant’s delay.
11Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 25th day of September, 2009.
“Signed by”
Michelle Flaherty
Vice-chair

