Kennedy Mohochi v. CIBC Mortgages Inc. and Nia Garron, 2009 HRTO 1532

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Kennedy Mohochi

Applicant

-and-

CIBC Mortgages Inc. and Nia Garron

Respondents

interiM DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: September 23, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 1532

Indexed as: Mohochi v. CIBC Mortgages

1This Interim Decision concerns whether the Tribunal should defer an Application filed under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19 as amended (the "Code"). The applicant filed the Application on June 12, 2009 and alleges discrimination in employment on the ground of family status. The applicant alleges that his employment was terminated on November 25, 2008, the same day that he requested to take parental leave commencing in February 2009. He also alleges discrimination on the basis of disability and references a medical condition from which he suffered in 2007. The applicant identified that he also filed a claim under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, as amended (the "ESA claim"). He provided a letter from the Ministry of Labour, dated April 30, 2009, confirming his ESA claim had been received and would be assigned to an employment standards officer for investigation.

2The Response was filed on August 26, 2009 and also references the ESA claim. The respondents request that the Application be deferred until the ESA claim has been completed. The applicant did not file a Reply and the time for doing so has now passed.

3The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1).

4Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. However, deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other proceedings.

5Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the types of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.

6In the circumstances of this case, I find that deferral is appropriate. While there are some distinct differences in the nature of the ESA claim and the Application, most notably the allegation of discrimination on the basis of disability contained in the Application, both the ESA claim and the Application overlap in that they both focus on a specific action – the respondents' decision to terminate the applicant's employment. I find that it would not be constructive to have two proceedings concurrently consider the facts surrounding this action. I note that the ESA claim, which was initiated before the filing of this Application, is already proceeding. Consequently, the Application will be deferred pending the outcome of the applicant's ESA claim.

7The Tribunal directs the parties' attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the process by which the Application may be brought back on after the applicant's claim under the ESA has been concluded.

8I am not seized of this matter.