Christina Elizabeth Fretz v. Crossroads Co-operative Homes and Raymond James Taylor, 2009 HRTO 1267

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Christina Elizabeth Fretz

Applicant

-and-

Crossroads Co-operative Homes and Raymond James Taylor

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend

Date: August 14, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 1267

Indexed as: Fretz v. Crossroads Co-operative Homes

INTRODUCTION

1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) on March 7, 2009, alleging that the respondent discriminated against her in respect of housing on the basis of family status, receipt of public assistance and reprisal. The applicant advises that the last event about which she is complaining occurred on February 25, 2007. This decision concerns whether the two-year delay in filing deprives the Tribunal of jurisdiction over this Application.

2The respondents raised the issue of delay in paragraphs 9-12 of Schedule A to their Response. The applicant was provided with the Response and advised that she could file a Reply to it by June 15, 2009. Her attention was not specifically drawn to the delay issue, however, and when she did not file a Reply, a follow-up letter, dated July 16, 2009, was sent to the applicant advising her of the respondent’s request to dismiss on the basis of delay. The applicant filed a Reply on July 29, 2009

3For the reasons that follow, and based on the information that the applicant has provided to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must dismiss the Application as the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the matters raised by the applicant because of the delay in filing the Application.

DECISION AND ANALYSIS

4Subsection 34(1) of the Code provides that a person may file an application alleging that his or her rights under the Code have been infringed within one year of the incident (or last incident) to which the application relates. It also gives the Tribunal discretion to accept late applications in certain circumstances:

34 (2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

5Pursuant to s. 34 of the Code, where an application is filed more than a year after the incident to which the Application relates (or after the last incident in a series of incidents), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the Application unless it is satisfied that the delay in filing the Application was incurred in good faith. As stated by the Tribunal in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, “the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.” It is incumbent upon the applicant to provide the Tribunal with an explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner.

6The applicant advises she was among a group of four single mothers who experienced related problems with the respondents. This group collectively filed a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, which upheld a portion of their complaint relating to the safeguarding of tenant information on March 31, 2009.

7In her Application, the applicant states that she was told by some unspecified person to await the Privacy Commissioner’s report before filing with the Human Rights Tribunal. In the end, she did not wait for the Privacy Commissioner’s report before filing her Application (apparently, unlike the other members of the group, who the applicant said chose to wait) because it took too long to come out.

8Despite the fact that the respondents challenged her explanation in their Response, the applicant provides no further information in her Reply concerning the issue of delay, but instead simply reiterates the position she articulated in her Application.

9It is clear that the applicant was cognizant of the human rights issues, but consciously made a decision to not file what would have then been a complaint to the Human Rights Commission. Parenthetically, in 2007, the legislative regime was different, and it actually provided aggrieved individuals with only six months to bring their complaint. She appears not to have made any inquiries about when her complaint/application under the Code was required to filed

10On the face of it, there is no reason for the applicant to await the Privacy Commissioner’s report, since that report could in no way address allegations of discrimination and reprisal contained within her Application. Without any further details about who provided the advice to await the report, and why, and what, if any, inquiries the applicant made about limitation periods under the Code, it is not possible to conclude that the delay was incurred in good faith.

11Accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the Application and the Application is therefore dismissed.