Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Rebekah Roach Applicant
-and-
Children’s Aid Society of Windsor-Essex and Family Respite Services Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Judith Keene Date: August 10, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 1240 Indexed as: Roach v. Children’s Aid Society of Windsor-Essex
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY
Rebekah Roach, Applicant ) On Her Own Behalf Children’s Aid Society of Windsor-Essex, Respondent ) Keri Wilson, Counsel Family Respite Services, Respondent ) Jean Leslie Marentette, Counsel
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment on the basis of disability. In her Application, the applicant alleges that the respondent Children’s Aid Society of Windsor-Essex (“CAS”) improperly disclosed information regarding a disability or perceived disability to the respondent Family Respite Services, and that the respondent Family Respite Services’ refusal to hire her was based on that information.
2In its Response, the CAS states that it was authorized by the applicant to disclose information to the respondent Family Respite Services. The Children’s Aid Society also states that the applicant filed a complaint to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in October of 2008, and requests that the Application be deferred until that complaint is dealt with.
3This Interim Decision deals solely with the request to defer.
4Section 45 of the Code confirms the Tribunal’s authority to defer consideration of an application. Under Rule 14 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may, on its own initiative, defer consideration of an application after providing notice of its intention to do so to all parties and giving them an opportunity to make submissions.
5The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1).
6Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. However, deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings.
7Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the nature and status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.
8I am of the opinion that a deferral is not appropriate in this case. The issue of whether the disclosure of information was in accordance with information and privacy legislation is at best peripheral to whether there has been a breach of the Code. While the privacy complaint focuses on one event alleged in the Application, the two matters deal with different legal issues. Potential remedies are very different. In addition, the respondents confirm that they have not been contacted by anyone from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, and have no information as to the progress of the complaint.
9In light of the foregoing, I find it is not appropriate to defer this Application. In the particular circumstances of this case, the most fair, just and expeditious outcome is to proceed with this Application.
10I note that the respondents have raised various other issues. These will be dealt with later in the Tribunal’s process or at the hearing.
11I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 10th day of August, 2009.
“Signed by”
Judith Keene Vice-chair

