Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Harold Parris Applicant
-and-
City of Toronto Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: David A. Wright Date: July 27, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 1147 Indexed as: Parris v. Toronto (City)
1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability. The Application alleges that the respondent has failed to accommodate the applicant’s disability.
2The applicant is a member of the Toronto Civic Employees’ Union, Local 416. There are ongoing grievances relating to the same issues as are set out in the Application. The respondent asks that the Application be deferred pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal’s Rules, pending the completion of the grievance and arbitration procedure. The applicant objects to deferral, based on what he alleges are deficiencies in the union’s representation of him. The union, apparently, disputes these allegations.
3The Tribunal will generally defer applications pending the completion of grievance and arbitration proceedings under a collective agreement that raise the same issues as those in the Application. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case that justify a departure from this approach, even accepting the applicant’s allegations about the union’s representation as true. As the Tribunal stated in Parsons v. York (Regional Municipality), 2009 HRTO 1031:
The Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and human rights issues. In explaining this approach, the Tribunal has referred to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement (Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42).
The Supreme Court thus confirmed that human rights tribunals are not the only decision-makers that can decide human rights claims. Where the parties are already engaged in a concurrent legal proceeding in which they are raising the same human rights issues before a decision-making body with the authority to make determinations about those issues, the orderly administration of justice favours deferral to the other proceeding. In such a scenario, the Tribunal’s normal approach is to defer to the other proceeding.
In this case, it is apparent that there is substantial overlap between the facts and human rights issues covered by the Application and those referred to in the grievance. I am satisfied that the concerns the applicant raises about the Union’s position on his grievance do not justify a departure from the Tribunal’s normal approach. The matter is still live and the grievance process has not concluded. It is not yet apparent whether or not the applicant’s grievance will be referred to arbitration. But if the applicant believes, on conclusion of the process, that his human rights issues have not been adequately addressed, he may ask to have his Application brought back on before the Tribunal.
4Accordingly, the Application will be deferred pending the completion of the grievance and arbitration process. The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which a party may request that the Application proceed. The Union’s Request to Intervene will be dealt with by the Tribunal if there is a request to proceed.
5I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 27th day of July, 2009.
“Signed By”
David A. Wright Vice-chair

