Jennifer Peekhaus v. Second Street Daycare Inc., 2009 HRTO 1095

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Jennifer Peekhaus

Applicant

-and-

Second Street Daycare Inc.

Respondent

INTERM DECISION

Adjudicator: Sheri D. Price

Date: July 22, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 1095

Indexed as: Peekhaus v. Second Street Daycare

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code") alleging that the respondent discriminated against the applicant on the basis of sex in respect of employment. The applicant alleges that the respondent terminated her employment while she was on maternity leave, in contravention of her rights under the Code.

2This Interim Decision addresses the respondent's Request that the Tribunal defer consideration of this Application pending the conclusion of a civil proceeding in respect of the same facts and issues in the Application which has been "threatened" but not commenced by the applicant.

3The respondent submits that the applicant threatened to bring an action for wrongful dismissal against the respondent and that the applicant has not abandoned her right to bring such an action in the future. The applicant opposes the Request to Defer. She states that she decided to pursue her rights against the respondent by bringing an Application under the Code.

4Deferral of an Application seeks to ensure that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. Some of the factors that may be relevant in deciding whether to defer consideration of an application before the Tribunal are the subject matter of the other proceeding, the nature of the other proceeding, the type of remedies available in the other proceeding, and whether it would be fair overall to the parties to defer, having regard to the status of each proceeding and the steps that have been taken to pursue them.

5In this case, there is no other legal proceeding to which the Tribunal could defer, even if it were inclined to do so. None of the reasons for deferring an Application exist in these circumstances. Accordingly, the Request to Defer is denied.

6I am not seized of this matter.