HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Shaun St. Amand
Applicant
-and-
Thames Valley District School Board
Respondent
-and-
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4222
Intervenor
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Judith Hinchman
Indexed as: St. Amand v. Thames Valley District School Board
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY
Shaun St. Amand, Applicant ) On his own behalf
Thames Valley District School Board, ) Peter J. Thorup, Counsel Respondent )
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4222, ) Sue Lott, Counsel
Intervenor )
[1] This is an Application filed under section 53(3) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The underlying human rights complaint was filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on March 26, 2008 and abandoned upon filing this Application with the Tribunal.
[2] This Application alleges discrimination on the basis of sex against the respondent in the area of contracts. The respondent, Thames Valley District School Board and the intervenor, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4222 (“CUPE”) were required to negotiate a pay equity plan in accordance with the Pay Equity Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.7, as amended (the “PEA”). The PEA is intended to “redress systemic gender discrimination in compensation for work performed by employees in female job classes” (s.4(1), PEA). In carrying out their statutory obligation to achieve pay equity, the respondent and CUPE identified certain female dominated job classes in the workplace requiring a pay equity adjustment. The applicant was not employed in one of those job classes and, therefore, did not receive a pay equity adjustment. The applicant alleges this amounts to discrimination in contracts based on his gender.
3The respondent and the intervenor request the Application be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision
4The Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the Application.
[5] The purpose of the PEA is to redress gender discrimination. The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that the PEA clearly assigns responsibility to the Pay Equity Commission and the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal for when, whether, and how pay equity is achieved. Ontario Nurses’ Association and Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal et al. (1995), 1995 CanLII 1488 (ON CA), 23 O.R. (3d) 43 (Ont. C.A.).
[6] The PEA establishes a comprehensive complaint system consisting of the Pay Equity Commission and the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal. Section 30(1) of the PEA provides that the Hearings Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over matters before it. The Supreme Court has recognized that “where there is a comprehensive administrative scheme that gives a specialized administrative body … alone the jurisdiction to apply and interpret that scheme, the administrative body does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction simply because a case raises a human rights issue.” Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal), 2004 SCC 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223.
[7] Although the applicant characterizes his allegation as a human rights issue, it is essentially a complaint about the negotiated pay equity plan implemented in September 2003 pursuant to the requirements of the PEA. The applicant is dissatisfied that whereas certain female dominated job classes received a pay equity adjustment, his male dominated class did not. He has not alleged any discrimination in how the job classes were valued or in the negotiation process leading to that adjustment. He just asserts that the resulting pay raise for female job classes is unfair to him. As such the applicant has not raised a Code breach. Consequently, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear his complaint.
[8] The respondent distinguishes Nishimura v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1989), 1989 CanLII 4317 (ON HCJ), 70 O.R. (2d) 347 (Ont. Div. Ct.), the only case in Ontario that found the Human Rights Commission had jurisdiction over a complaint alleging gender discrimination in compensation due to an employer’s compensation practices, as inapplicable to this case because there was no pay equity legislation in Ontario when the complaints in that case were filed. I agree with the respondent that this case differs from Nishimura in that regard, but more importantly in this case the applicant has not raised a Code breach and as such this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear this Application.
ORDER
9The Tribunal orders that the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 16th day of July, 2009.
“Signed by”
Judith Hinchman
Member

