CHRR Doc. 87-033
Board of Inquiry Decision under the ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
Patricia Whitehead Complainant
v.
Servodyne Canada Ltd. and Kevin Dooling Respondents
Date of Complaint: October 13, 1983 Date of Decision: August 29, 1986 Place: Trenton, Ontario Before: D. A. Soberman
Appearances by: Kim Twohig, Counsel for Patricia Whitehead, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission Paul F. O'Neil, Counsel for Servodyne Canada Ltd.
SEX DISCRIMINATION — employment terminated for manager — LIABILITY — employer/corporate liability for employee — joint liability — DAMAGES — policy of awarding damages at common law compared to human rights legislation — determining quantum by establishing duration of award — determining quantum using wrongful dismissal standard
Summary: The Board of Inquiry finds that Patricia Whitehead was discriminated against when she was dismissed from her employment because of her sex.
Ms. Whitehead was employed by Servodyne Canada in Trenton Ontario as supervisor of their plant for eight years. She was summarily dismissed in April 1983 by Kevin Dooling.
The Board of Inquiry accepts the testimony of Frank Scotti that he was hired by Kevin Dooling as Plant Manager, told to learn his job from Patricia Whitehead, and then fire her. The Board of Inquiry finds that the fact that she was a woman was one of the reasons for the animosity which Mr. Dooling felt towards Ms. Whitehead, and the fact that she was a woman contributed to his decision to fire her.
The Board orders Servodyne Canada Ltd. to pay Patricia Whitehead $24,240 in compensation for lost wages, $2500 in general damages, and $7642 in interest on the awards.
Jurisdiction
1The complainant, Patricia Whitehead, was dismissed from her job with the respondent, Servodyne Canada Ltd., on April 12, 1983. That dismissal is the subject matter of her complaint. Mrs. Whitehead, who lives in Trenton, first contacted the office of the Human Rights Commission in Kingston by telephone on September 22, 1983. The Commission mailed a questionnaire to her in Trenton on the same day. On September 29, she filled it out and mailed it to Kingston, where it was received October 4. On October 7, the human rights officer in Kingston spoke to Mrs. Whitehead by telephone concerning the content of the complaint form. He completed and mailed it to Trenton on that day. The complaint form was signed by Mrs. Whitehead on October 13, 1983, that is, six months and a day after the dismissal occurred.
2Section 31(1) of the Act states "Where a person believes that a right . . . has been infringed, the person may file with the Commission a complaint in a form approved by the Commission." Although no evidence was adduced before me with respect to an "approved" form, I find that the form signed on October 13, 1983, is the form referred to by the Act. Section 33(1) states:
Where it appears to the Commission that . . .
(d) the facts upon which the complaint is based occurred more than six months before the complaint was filed, unless the Commission is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by delay,
the Commission may, in its discretion, decide not to deal with the complaint.
3Counsel for the respondent, in a letter dated July 19, 1984, asked that section 33(1)(d) be applied to this complaint, and that the Commission should not deal with it because it was filed more than six months after the dismissal had occurred. After a further exchange of letters, in a reply dated August 27, 1984, the human rights officer stated that, "This matter will be considered at a meeting of the full commission . . ." Notwithstanding the delay, the Commission decided to request the appointment of a board of inquiry.
4At the opening of the hearing, counsel for the respondent raised an objection to the jurisdiction of this Board. He stated that his client had been prejudiced by delay, and that he had not been given an opportunity to appear before the Commission to argue that the Commission should exercise its discretion not to deal with the complaint.
5Counsel for the Commission submitted that section 33(1)(d) does not create a limitation period; rather it is an administrative tool designed to encourage expeditious handling of complaints. It merely creates a discretion not to deal with a complaint if the facts on which it is based occurred more than six months earlier. Here, the delay beyond the six-month period had been merely a day or two, and the Commission was satisfied both with respect to good faith and no resulting substantial prejudice.
6Accordingly, counsel submitted that the provisions of section 33(1)(d) had been complied with and that a reasonable interpretation of the section does not create any expection of the right to a hearing by a potential respondent with respect to the Commission's exercise of discretion not to proceed. Further, she submitted that this Board, having been appointed by the Minister of Labour, has no jurisdiction to review the discretion exercised by the Ontario Human Rights Commission under section 33(1)(d), in requesting that a board of inquiry be appointed. I agreed with these submissions of counsel for the Commission, with one reservation: if there should be cogent evidence of an egregious error that substantially prejudiced the respondent, this Board could still refer the matter back to the Minister of Labour for review, before proceeding with the hearing. No such evidence was introduced by the respondent, and I ruled that the hearing should proceed.
7As neither party was prepared to continue with evidence on that day, the hearing was adjourned to a later day, with the full knowledge of counsel for the respondent.
Failure of Respondents to Appear
8Counsel for the respondent telephoned counsel for the Commission four days before the hearing date and stated that he had received instructions from his client not to attend or represent the company further in this matter. When the hearing was reconvened nineteen days later, neither counsel nor any other representative of the respondent corporation appeared.
9Evidence was also introduced to show that the second respondent, Kevin Dooling, had been given notice of the reconvened hearing by registered mail to an address in Virginia in the United States. In an earlier telephone conversation with counsel for the Commission, Mr. Dooling, calling from the Virginia address, had stated that he did not intend to appear. The hearing continued without any representation on behalf of either respondent. While this Board did not have the benefit of cross-examination of witnesses nor of argument on the merits on behalf of the respondent, it took special care to question witnesses and to consider the defences of the respondents.
The Facts
10The complainant, Patricia Whitehead, began working at the Servodyne plant in April 1975, and continued to work there for eight years, until she was dismissed on April 12, 1983. She was not given any reasons for her dismissal but received four weeks' salary as termination pay. Servodyne Canada Ltd. laid off its remaining employees and closed its operations on October 19, 1984.
11There was no evidence before the Board suggesting that the complainant was dismissed for cause. On the contrary: the only evidence available, reviewed below, suggests that she was a competent, hard-working and loyal employee who was dismissed as a result of the arbitrary decision of Kevin Dooling. The reasonable conclusion to the evidence presented is that the complainant was wrongfully dismissed.
12The question for this Board is whether there was a contravention of section 4(1) and section 8 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, that is, whether the fact that the complainant is a woman was a material element in that dismissal and accordingly there was a denial of equal treatment with respect to employment.
13Patricia Whitehead was hired in April 1975, as one of three employees. In October of that year she was appointed supervisor of the plant. The company eventually hired twenty-odd employees in the plant, but it appears that the number varied from time to time over the years between the upper limit and just a small handful, according to the demand for its products. Until the spring of 1981, the general manager, the person to whom the complainant was responsible, was a Mr. Art Helps. That spring he was replaced by Kevin Dooling.
14Shortly after arriving, Mr. Dooling asked the complainant whether she would be interested in promotion to a new position of plant manager in order to free him from inside duties. She replied that she would like the position. However, he never again mentioned the subject and Mrs. Whitehead did not ask him about it. The evidence of other employees suggests that over time Mr. Dooling developed a dislike amounting to hostility toward Mrs. Whitehead, but no reasons based on specific instances of conflict were put forward. In January 1983, she heard from another employee that Mr. Dooling "wanted to get rid" of her. The employee reported that he would not be satisfied until she was out of the plant. The following morning Mrs. Whitehead confronted Mr. Dooling with this information and he denied it.
15The complainant heard rumours that Mr. Dooling intended to appoint a plant manager, but there was no posting or advertising for the position. Then, in the latter part of January, she was introduced by Mr. Dooling to Frank Scotti and informed that he was plant manager and her new boss. In his evidence Mr. Scotti confirmed that Mrs. Whitehead was astonished at the time. Before being hired, Mr. Scotti had been told by Mr. Dooling to learn the job from Mrs. Whitehead and then to fire her. In these circumstances Mr. Scotti described his relations with Mrs. Whitehead as strained; he was aware of her animosity and also that she had wanted the job that had been given to him.
16Despite this unpleasant situation, within a few weeks, certainly by the beginning of his third month with the respondent company, Mr. Scotti concluded that:
[Mrs. Whitehead] was an exemplary employee for Servodyne. She was very loyal. She opened up the plant . . . the first one there in the morning and one of the last to leave at night. She knew right where everything was, knew everything that had to be done. If there were any modifications out of the norm it was her expertise that was called upon to do so.
17Mr. Scotti was dismissed within three months. To the question "When you left Servodyne did you make any recommendations as to your replacement . . .?", Mr. Scotti replied:
Yes. I was fired by Kevin Dooling . . . because according to him I hadn't learned the business well enough and I think one of the other things was that I hadn't fired Pat Whitehead. I had refused to fire her. As far as I was concerned she was a valuable employee and there was no reason to fire her. In fact, the company would have been at a loss if she had gone. He fired me and at that time I told him, in fact, that he didn't need me in the beginning, that he should have hired Pat Whitehead as the plant manager and at that time he said, no, he would never hire her.
18Toward the end of March, the morning after Mr. Scotti was dismissed, Mr. Dooling called Mrs. Whitehead into his office and asked her whether she still wanted more authority and she replied, yes. They then discussed who might replace her in her current position. Mr. Dooling said that the complainant could divide her time between Mr. Scotti's former desk in the office and her own desk in the plant. Mrs. Whitehead testified that Mr. Dooling then said, "we'll take it from there and see what happens." Her rate of pay was raised at that time from $5.35 to $6.00 per hour, but her title of supervisor remained unchanged.
19About two weeks later, on either April 11 or 12, 1983, Mrs. Whitehead heard from an employee in the office that Roger Sabo had been hired as plant manager to take office a week or two later. On April 12, 1983, she was dismissed.
20Mr. Dooling's conduct with respect to the complainant's dismissal appeared arbitrary, and consistent with his having a personal and unwarranted dislike of the complainant. That conduct might be grounds for a civil action for wrongful dismissal without being a breach of the Human Rights Code. There would have to be evidence that the complainant's being a woman influenced his decision, at least to some degree. Mrs. Whitehead stated she suspected that perhaps she did not get the plant manager position because she was a woman. However, none of her discussions with Mr. Dooling indicated that he would not offer the position to a woman. Accordingly, her own evidence on this point is negligible.
21Betty Poole was an office employer [sic] of the respondent company from 1979 to 1984. She stated in her testimony that, "when Mr. Dooling first started [to work for Servodyne] he depended on Mrs. Whitehead a great deal and then I could see that he was starting to treat her badly as time went on." Mrs. Poole also stated that, "he always seemed to want a male manager but I don't really know why he thought it had to be a man." To the question, "to your knowledge the only new people he was interested in was other men, is that correct?" Mrs. Poole replied, "Yes, he never interviewed a woman, another woman for that position."
22At most, the above evidence might show some bias against woman generally as well as a dislike of Mrs. Whitehead, but it is insufficient to establish Mr. Dooling's bias as a material element in Mrs. Whitehead's dismissal.
23Mr. Scotti gave more cogent evidence on this point. He stated that in his discussion with Mr. Dooling he was told that " one of his first jobs . . . would be to fire Mrs. Whitehead". According to Mr. Scotti:
[Mr. Dooling said] there was no way he was giving her the job [of plant manager]. He felt that she was a big woman, she wasn't right for the job, she wasn't proper for the job of plant manager, that she was rude and because of her weight — she was a little over weight — she just wouldn't belong there at all.
At another point in his testimony, Mr. Scotti stated:
[Mr. Dooling] dwelled upon the fact that she was fat, she was a woman. As far as he was concerned women were for bearing children and not much else. He didn't give them any credit for having any intelligence at all.
24As there was no one to cross-examine on behalf of the respondent, nor any testimony by Mr. Dooling himself, I asked Mr. Scotti several questions. I asked whether Mr. Dooling had made the above comments only once. Mr. Scotti replied:
Oh, I heard them more than once. He always made off-handed comments about Mrs. Whitehead. Many times she was the topic of conversation.
To the question, "Were these [remarks] referring to her conduct or her physical state of being a woman?", he responded:
Primarily to her physical state and the fact that she was a woman and even on occasions I've known that he nudged me when perhaps Mrs. Whitehead had gone by and said, ”˜How would you like to wake up in bed to something like that?' . . .
I asked Mr. Scotti whether he felt that the fact that the complainant was a woman was a significant aspect of Mr. Dooling's attitude toward her with respect to the plant manager's job. Mr. Scotti replied:
Oh, yes, yes, and I strongly feel he felt that her knowledge, which was obviously superior to his, was a threat to him. He was afraid of it.
25Mr. Scotti stated that he had never met Mrs. Whitehead before he came to Servodyne, that the only views he had heard about her were from Mr. Dooling and that he formed his own opinion of her during the three-month period he remained there. He further stated that his working relations with her were unsatisfactory, not just at the beginning; the animosity remained throughout the three months. Despite that unpleasant situation, Mr. Scotti still felt that Mrs. Whitehead "was one very fine employee and that everything revolved around her".
26I found Mr. Scotti to be an honest and credible witness. Although his relations with both the respondent, Mr. Dooling, and the complainant, Mrs., Whitehead, were ultimately unsatisfactory, he nevertheless endeavoured — successfully I believe — to be objective in his views of them. His evidence is sufficient to establish that Mr. Dooling, acting on behalf of Servodyne Canada Ltd., was materially influenced in his treatment of Mrs. Whitehead because she was a woman. In particular, the fact that she was a woman contributed to his decision to dismiss her.
27Discrimination based on sex, prohibited by section 4(1) of the Human Rights Code, need not be the sole nor even the dominant factor in the treatment of a complainant. It is enough that sexual discrimination was a material element in the decision to dismiss (for a full discussion of this subject, see Mears et al. v. Ontario Hydro et al. (1984), 1983 CanLII 4713 (ON HRT), 5 C.H.R.R. D/1927 (Zemans)) and the evidence here establishes that it was.
The Respondent's Liability
28The decision was taken by the respondent, Kevin Dooling, and accordingly he is personally liable for the consequences of contravening the Human Rights Code.
29Mr. Dooling was described by all the witnesses as the "general manager" of Servodyne Canada Ltd. The respondent company agreed with this description: counsel for the company, in his opening statement at the first hearing, referred to Mr. Dooling as the general manager and "the king of the company up here". He also stated that, "the sole presence [from the parent corporation] would be once-a-year or twice-a-year visit by one representative in the U.S." This view fully accords with that of all the witnesses. Accordingly, Mr. Dooling seems clearly to have had the authority to act on behalf of the respondent company to dismiss employees and in particular, to dismiss the complainant, Patricia Whitehead. Moreover, the evidence establishes that he was "the directing mind and will" of the respondent corporation: his thoughts and acts with respect to corporate business are the thoughts and acts of the corporation itself. (Lennard's Carrying Company Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd., [1915] A.C. 705 (H.L.); R. v. St. Lawrence Corp. Ltd., 1969 CanLII 504 (ON CA), [1969] 2 O.R. 305 (C.A.).) Therefore, the respondent corporation is jointly and severally liable for the consequences of Kevin Dooling's conduct in this matter.
The Appropriate Measure of Compensation
30In recent years there has been much debate about the basis for awarding damages when an employee has been wrongfully dismissed. It has sometimes been said that an employer always has a "right" to dismiss an employee; the only "wrong" done is in not giving reasonable notice or adequate wages in lieu of that notice. I believe that such analysis is faulty. An employer has no more "right" to break an employment contract than has any other contracting party. Dismissal without cause and with inadequate notice of termination is a breach of the promise, express or implied in virtually every employment contract, to continue to employ and pay the employee until the contract is lawfully terminated.
31As an analogy, a landlord who gives inadequate notice and evicts a tenant cannot limit the tenant's recourse only to damages resulting from the inadequate notice. The tenant may obtain an injunction to restrain the eviction or specific performance to regain possession. While for reasons of policy, courts may not be willing to reinstate an employee wrongfully dismissed, in my view the damanges should be on the same basis as reinstatement — to place the employee in the same position as if the contract had not been broken by the employer. That employees are not merely compensated for inadequate notice is supported by the fact that they often recover consequential damages for such matters as expenses incurred in seeking other employment and medical expenses, and also recover general damages for pain and suffering. These losses, especially the pain and suffering, result from the wrongful nature of the dismissal, not just from the inadequacy of notice.
32At this point we may distinguish between the goals of the law of contracts and those of human rights legislation. Under the common law principles governing contracts, except where a legally recognized form of tenure attaches to an employment, employees do not have a right to continuing employment by the same employer until retirement, disability or death. Their right is simply not to be wrongfully dismissed. It follows that an employer may lawfully terminate employment by giving adequate notice according to the terms of their contract, express or implied. At common law the employer's motives are irrelevant to the exercise of this contractual power.
33Motives are not irrelevant, however, for the purposes of the Human Rights Code. For instance, while a landlord may lawfully refuse to lease premises to a prospective tenant for an arbitrary reason, such as not liking the colour of the person's eyes, under section 2(1) of the Code the landlord may not lawfully refuse on the basis of that person's race, sex, age or any other category enumerated in the section. Similarly, under section 4(1) of the Code, an employer may not lawfully refuse to hire a prospective employee on the basis of that person's race, sex, etc. If the employer, intending to discriminate contrary to section 4(1), were nevertheless permitted lawfully to dismiss an employee simply by giving adequate notice, or compensation in lieu of notice, the employer could defeat the goals of the Human Rights Code. Moreover an absurd situation would exist: an employer by refusing to hire, let us say black people or women, would commit a breach of the Code, but by dismissing them with sufficient notice once they became employees, would not commit a breach! Accordingly, the remedy available under the Code must not be limited to recovery for wrongful dismissal at common law.
34If this reasoning is sound, then the usual measure of economic loss in contract law for wrongful dismissal — lost wages during a period of reasonable notice — is not the correct measure to compensate an aggrieved complainant under the Human Rights Code. While there may be circumstances where the quantum of damages for wrongful dismissal in contract coincide with the compensation for breach of section 4(1) of the Code, such circumstances are merely fortuitous. More often the contract measure will be inadequate to compensate the complainant and also to carry out the purposes of the Code. I propose to refer to recovery for breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code as "statutory compensation" in order to distinguish it from common law damages in contract or tort.
Statutory Compensation for Economic Loss
35Mrs. Whitehead had worked at the plant for eight years. The evidence establishes that she was a valuable and exemplary employee. Except for Kevin Dooling's arbitrary conduct, it is very likely that she would have continued to work for Servodyne Canada Ltd. for an indefinite time. At a later date, she might have decided to leave the company in order to take a position elsewhere, she might have been laid off or dismissed for reasons unrelated to the prohibitions in the Human Rights Code, or she might have become incapacitated. Thus her continued employment by Servodyne Canada Ltd. would have contained a degree of uncertainty. In addition, any award of compensation would remain subject to the complainant acting reasonably to mitigate her losses, and also to the deduction of earnings from any new employment.
36If Servodyne Canada Ltd. were still carrying on business in the Trenton area, there would arise a difficult question of deciding how far into the future the "indefinite time" she might have continued to work for the company should extend. However, in the circumstances of this case, that question need not be addressed: Servodyne Canada Ltd. closed its operations October 19, 1984, eighteen months after Mrs. Whitehead was unlawfully dismissed in breach of section 4(1) of the Human Rights Code. In these circumstances it is reasonable, indeed highly likely, that Mrs. Whitehead would have continued to work for the respondent company until it closed its doors. Accordingly, she is entitled to statutory compensation equal to the salary she would have earned until that time.
37At the time of her dismissal, the complainant received only four weeks' termination pay. For an employee with eight years of service, that sum is inadequate. Mrs. Betty Poole gave evidence that she and another woman who worked in the company's office, both with shorter periods of employment with the respondent company, received six months' termination pay. It may be inferred that the company considered six months to be a fair and reasonable period. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to award Mrs. Whitehead an additional twenty-two weeks' termination pay.
38With respect to economic compensation there remains the question of the complainant's reasonable efforts to mitigate her loss after the respondent's breach. She gave evidence that she was very upset after being fired and it took two months or so to recover her composure and begin looking for a new job. Her husband gave evidence to the same effect. The circumstances of the dismissal after eight years employment give credence to the testimony and I accept it as accurate and reasonable.
39After two months she began the search for employment in a small community during a period of severe economic recession, 1983 and 1984. Mrs. Whitehead also carried the very considerable burden of her dismissal. As she stated:
I did attempt [to find new employment] but it was very difficult. I worked there for eight plus years, and when I did go to a place and fill out an application, "where were you employed last", if I put down that I was at Servodyne and I was relieved of my duties, well then they didn't want you . . . And then I always felt if I left that off my application I was out of the working field for too long because of my age.
In answer to the question, ". . . did you look fairly constantly for work?" she replied:
For a while, yes, I did and then I was kind of getting discouraged because I had been to pretty well every place in town at that time . . . I finally did find employment at Bata just this year [1985] at June.
40The complainant made reasonable attempts to find other employment in the Trenton area where she lives and thus fulfilled the duty to mitigate her losses. Thus the complainant's conduct gives no reason to deduct any sum from compensation during the period that the respondent company continued in business nor for six-month termination pay period that followed.
41At the time of her dismissal the complainant was paid $6.00 per hour — $240 for a forty hour week. There were seventy-nine weeks between her dismissal April 12, 1983 and the closure of the respondent company's operations October 19, 1984. The total salary that would have been earned during that period was $18,960. A further twenty-two weeks wages in lieu of termination notice would add another $5280, for a total statutory compensation sum of $24,240.
General Damages
42In my opinion, the dismissal of the complainant by the respondent, Kevin Dooling, was a wilful act within the meaning of section 40(1)(b) of the Code, and she is entitled to monetary compensation for mental anguish. the complainant had worked for eight years in the respondent company's plant, she had assumed substantial responsibilities, and had been given some reason to believe that she would be seriously considered for promotion only two weeks or so before termination. She was then dismissed abruptly with inadequate termination allowance and consequently suffered foreseeable mental anguish and loss of self-confidence. Because of her emotional state, she was unable to seek other employment for a two-month period following her dismissal. While Mrs. Whitehead did not know at the time that she was dismissed because she was a woman, she at least suspected that motive, and it must have contributed to her distress. The complainant's long service to the respondent company no doubt added to the shock of the dismissal and the severity of her mental anguish.
43Each case of mental anguish turns on its own facts and it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible to obtain precise guidance from other awards. Nevertheless after considering a number of other recent decisions, I find that an appropriate sum in general damages is $2,500. [Mears et al. v. Ontario Hydro et al., supra; Bruton and McInnis v. M.G.H. International Limited and William Colborne (1983), 1982 CanLII 4885 (ON HRT), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1173 (Hunter); Olarte et al. v. Commodore Business Machines et al. (1983), 1983 CanLII 4716 (ON HRT), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1705 (Cumming); Cameron v. Nel-Gor Nursing Home et al. (1984), 1984 CanLII 5045 (ON HRT), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2170 (Cumming); Scott v. Foster Wheeler LImited (1985), 1985 CanLII 5249 (ON HRT), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3193 (Hunter).]
Interest
44Counsel for the Commission submitted that interest should accrue on any amount awarded from the date on which the respondent was served with the complaint. However, on that date only twenty-eight weeks (of the seventy-nine weeks for which the complainant should receive compensation) had passed since the dismissal, and only $6720 of wages had accrued. The sum of $12,240 in wages were yet to be earned over the following year — with the final $5280, representing the termination pay, to be received at the end of the year. I do not believe that interest should accrue in advance of the time wages would have been paid had Mrs. Whitehead remained in her job. A detailed calculation of interest taking into account the various stages in payment would be complex. However, since about one half the sum would have accrued by the mid-point of the following year, a fair approximation would be to take half the interest on the full sum of $24,240 calculated at an average rate of 11.5 per cent for the first year, to October 24, 1984.
45Interest is as follows:
Oct. 25/83 to Oct. 24/84
statutory compensation
($24,240 × 11.5%) / 2
= $ 1394
mental anguish
2500 × 11.5%
= 287
Oct. 25/84 to Oct. 24/85
both heads of compensation
26,740 × 12%
= 3209
Oct. 25/85 to Sept. 2/86
both heads of compensation
26,740 × 12% × 313/365
= 2752
TOTAL INTEREST
$ 7642
Order
46This Board of Inquiry, having found the respondents Servodyne Canada Ltd. and Kevin Dooling to be in breach of section 4(1) and section 8 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53, as amended, in respect of the complainant, Patricia Whitehead, for the reasons given, this Board of Inquiry order the following:
The respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay forthwith to the complainant, as follows:
(a) as statutory compensation for lost wages, the sum of twenty-four thousand, two hundred and forty ($24,240) dollars;
(b) as general damages, the sum of twenty-five hundred ($2500) dollars;
(c) as interest in respect of the awards of compensation and damages, the sum of seventy-six hundred and forty-two ($7642) dollars.