Ontario Board of Inquiry
ONTARIO
CHRR Doc. 82-062
Josephine McPherson, Vanessa Ambo, and Laurie Morton Complainants
v.
"Mary's Donuts" and Hachik Doshoian Respondents
Place: Toronto, Ontario
Before: Ontario Board of Inquiry, Peter A. Cumming
Appearances by: Janet Minor, Counsel for Josephine McPherson, Vanessa Ambo, Laurie Morton, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission A. Douglas Burns, Counsel for Hachik Doshoian
SEXUAL HARASSMENT — sexual advances by employer
Summary: The Board of Inquiry rules that Complainants McPherson and Ambo were sexually harassed and constructively dismissed by Hachik Doshoian who was their employer while they worked for "Mary's Donuts".
In the case of Vanessa Ambo, the Board awards $2,500 in general damages to compensate her for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered. Ms. Ambo worked for "Mary's Donuts" while she was on a temporary absence from jail. A condition of her remaining out of jail was that she retain her employment. The Board finds that Hachik Doshoian knew the requirement on Ms. Ambo that she remain employed and sexually harassed her and embarrassed her in front of customers at a time when she was particularly vulnerable.
In addition, the Board awards $75 to Vanessa Ambo and $500 to Josephine McPherson in compensation for lost wages, and $1,000 in general damages to McPherson.
Preliminary Points
1At the commencement of the hearing, the description of the Respondents was amended, so that the individual Respondent is Hachik Doshoian (also known as "Steve" Doshoian) and the business entity Respondent is 408720 Ontario Limited, carrying on business as "Mary's Donuts". During the hearing, when it was determined that one Complainant, Vanessa Marshall had married, her description as Complainant was changed to Vanessa Ambo.
2Finally, the Complainant Laurie Morton is reportedly now in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, and she did not appear for the hearing.
3With the consent of Mr. Doshoian's counsel, the hearing in respect of Ms. Morton's Complaint was adjourned sine die, on the condition, agreed to by both counsel, that Ms. Morton must either seek to have the hearing of her Complaint take place before August 31, 1982, or it is considered dismissed on the basis that she is not available to, or does not wish to, pursue her Complaint.
The Evidence
4During 1979 and 1981, Mr. Doshoian managed two donut and coffee shops (one of which is hereafter called the "Stoney Creek shop" and the other, the "Century 21 shop") in the greater Hamilton area in each of which a business known as "Mary's Donuts" was operated. The business was owned by the corporate Respondent, of which Mr. Doshoian was a director, and as obvious from all the evidence, the sole or at least main decision-maker in the corporation. He was the "directing mind" of the corporation, such that his acts in the course of carrying on the corporation's business became the acts of the corporation itself. If he is in breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code, (hereafter called the Code) in the course of operating the corporate Respondent's business, then the corporation is itself vicariously liable for a breach of the Code.
5Since the period of time material to this Inquiry, 1979 to 1980, "Mary's Donuts" has ceased to be an operating business. Each shop consisted of about 350 square feet of floor space, with tables and chairs in front for customers, with an enclosed kitchen room in the back.
6Vanessa Ambo commenced work at the Stoney Creek shop September 17, 1979, on a part-time basis, going full-time as of September 24, and earning about $3.25 per hour. Ms. Ambo obtained the job through the initiative of her sister, Roxanne Harview, who had worked for "Mary's Donuts" for four months at the Century 21 shop.
7However, Ms. Ambo had been charged with trafficing in drugs some time previously, and was convicted September 28, 1979. Anticipating this possibility, she said she asked Mr. Doshoian in advance of September 28 if he would continue to employ her if she were sentenced, and he agreed. She was sentenced to two months imprisonment, spent six days immediately in jail and then received the privilege under a Temporary Absence Program whereby she was allowed to reside in the Elizabeth Fry group home in Hamilton, subject to restrictions upon her movements, and provided she continued to be employed. She testified as to what then happened at work, confirming her Complaint (Exhibit No. 6) which reads in part:
On October 5. I returned to work. I finished my work early. Mr. Doshoian asked if I was happy to be back and I said, "Yes". He started hugging me. I told him, "Don't, I don't like it. I appreciate being back, but I'm, not like that." He kissed me and I became upset and told him, "When I tell my fiancé, he'll be very angry." He said, "That's what all the girls say ..." He kept trying to make sexual advances. I threatened to tell his wife, and went out to the front of the store trying to keep busy. I was worried he'd fire me if I got angry and then I'd have to return to jail. I thought I'd just have to put up with it and try to dodge his advances.
I put up with it for several more days, and then in desperation asked my sister, Roxanne Harview, who worked in his Century 21 donut shop, to intercede on my behalf. It was she who initially got me the job. She did speak to him and in strong language told him to leave me alone. After that his attitude towards me was belligerent and fault-finding.
His wife, Mary, who bakes the donuts, told me he wanted to fire me, but she disagreed with him and said I was a good worker. She said she would speak to him and things would be all right. She also confided to me that he bothered all the girls and that was why they quit.
I was very upset at the prospect of losing my job. I had tried to do an extra good job and had even agreed to work ten hours a day without overtime pay when I came back from jail. He seemed determined, however, to find an excuse to fire me.
I decided to try and reason with him and tried to talk to him. But he started yelling and followed me out front and before customers was screaming about me being in jail and I could go back there. I was so upset and humiliated I couldn't serve the customers. I quit and left.
8Mr. Doshoian testified that Ms. Ambo was "stupid" and that he complained because she was incompetent, and that she quit because he criticized her. He denied any sexual advances.
9I found Ms. Ambo to be an honest witness and I accept her evidence. I did not believe Mr. Doshoian's testimony and where it is in conflict with the other witnesses, I reject his testimony entirely.
10Ms. Ambo's account was corroborated by Mrs. Margaret Mary McAulay, a senior employee of the Elizabeth Fry Society. In the recorded minutes (Exhibit No. 8) of a staff meeting of October 9, 1979, at the group home, there is included the paragraph:
Vanessa – will be looking for another job, her employer is making advances. She will be working overtime to make up for lost hours while she was in HWDC. She realizes the importance of keeping her job, otherwise she must return to HWDC. Mary will talk to her boss about the advances.
11Ms. Ambo's sister, Roxanne Harview, who worked at the other "Mary's Donuts" shop, known as the "Century 21 shop", also testified, corroborating Ms. Ambo's evidence. Ms. Harview did not herself have problems with Mr. Doshoian, but she was never in the vulnerable, dependent position with respect to her employer that her sister found herself in as of September 28.
12I agree with the conclusion Ms. Ambo made as to the reason for the forceful advances of Mr. Doshoian upon her return to work from jail October 5. While Mr. Doshoian had only bothered her with mild touching and suggestions that made her uncomfortable before September 28, he was now aggressive, with hugging and trying to kiss her neck, and touching her. It is clear that the short, simple message of his behaviour toward her was that she was to either accede to his sexual advances or she could go back to jail.
13Ms. Ambo had her sister, Roxanne Harview, speak to Mrs. Doshoian in an effort to get Mr. Doshoian to cease his sexual advances, and Ms. Harview testified that she did. Mrs. McAulay also testified that the senior social worker from the Elizabeth Fry home had told Mrs. McAulay that she had spoken to Mr. Doshoian on Ms. Ambo's behalf.
14When Ms. Ambo resisted his advances and it became obvious to Mr. Doshoian that she would not submit to his advances, he unjustifiably complained about her work, and made her life miserable, insulting and embarrassing her in front of customers, and suggested he might fire her, ostensibly because she was incompetent, but in reality because she was reacting negatively to his sexual advances. During a barrage of criticism from Mr. Doshoian in front of customers, Ms. Ambo quit her employment, left the shop, returned to the Elizabeth Fry home, and having quit her employment, had to return to jail. She remained in jail for three days until she was able to obtain employment from a previous employer.
15I find on the evidence that Mr. Doshoian upset and humiliated Ms. Ambo at her place of employment, to the point where he constructively terminated her employment by making it impossible for her to continue working, simply because she refused to submit to his sexual advances. Mr. Doshoian knew that he had a young, attractive female employee who was dependent upon him in order to remain out of jail. Ms. Ambo was in an extremely vulnerable position, Mr. Doshoian knew it, and he sought to exploit it.
16Josephine McPherson, now 22 years old and a hair stylist, also testified. She had started working for Mr. Doshoian October 16, 1979, and testified that shortly thereafter he would touch her hands and bottom, and attempt to touch her breasts on occasion, when he would be in the shop. On one occasion as she took her jacket off in the back room, she said he tried to put his hand down her blouse. She said his behaviour got worse as time went on, and that finally she quit May 17, 1980. Ms. McPherson testified that she did not quit earlier because she was very dependent upon the job. She was not living at home, and with only a grade nine education, her employment prospects were bleak. Some time after leaving "Mary's Donuts", Ms. McPherson went to hairdressing school.
17About January, 1980, in investigating Ms. Ambo's Complaint, letters were written by the Ontario Human Rights Commission to other female employees, including Ms. McPherson, asking them to relate as to whether they had any problems. Ms. McPherson had a discussion with Mr. Doshoian about this, and wrote a letter to the Ontario Human Rights Commission January 14, 1980, (Exhibit No. 9) which said that she had "no trouble" with Mr. Doshoian. Ms. McPherson testified that this letter was "a lie", written under the implicit pressure of wanting to keep her job which she needed. I found Ms. McPherson to be a truthful witness and I accept her evidence. She admitted her errors and explained the apparent inconsistencies, and impressed me as an honest witness.
18Ms. Joelle Cacciato, also about 22 years old, testified that she worked part-time for "Mary's Donuts" at the Century 21 shop in 1979, starting at 4:00 p.m., after she finished school, relieving Ms. McPherson. Ms. Cacciato testified that during the pertinent 1979–1980 time period, Ms. McPherson often was upset about Mr. Doshoian's behaviour and sexual advances. She also corroborated Ms. McPherson's evidence that Ms. McPherson was under a lot of pressure in 1979 because she was living apart from her family.
19Ms. Cacciato testified that she herself experienced the same problems with Mr. Doshoian, and finally told his wife, moving out to work in the Stoney Creek shop with Mrs. Doshoian after Ms. McPherson quit, where she did not experience any further problems with Mr. Doshoian because he was seldom there.
20Both Complainants are young people who had faced difficult circumstances, and are trying to find some security in a difficult world. Both suffered a good deal from the sexual harassment of Mr. Doshoian. The psychological impact of his behaviour towards them was quite evident in their demeanour as witnesses. Both were candid and honest in their testimony and neither exaggerated the circumstances of their relationship with Mr. Doshoian.
The Law
21I have recently reviewed at length the law with respect to the Code and sexual harassment in Teresa Faye Cox and Debbie Cowell v. Jagbritte, Inc. and Gadhoke1 and Rosanna Torres v. Royalty Kitchenware Limited and Francesco Guercio.2 As set forth in that review, sexual harassment can be a form of sex discrimination prohibited by section 4 of the Code.
22The individual Respondent verbally and physically abused the Complainants through his continuing sexual harassment during their respective periods of employment.
23Moreover, there was a definite connection between the sexual harassment of the Complainants and the termination of their employment. The Complainants have met the onus of showing that compliance with Mr. Doshoian's sexual advances was, in effect, a term or condition of employment. They were able to halt his advances in the sense that he did not proceed further when rebuffed. There was no danger of physical coercion. However, even though he knew they objected to his sexual advances, he persisted in his attempts and made their subjection to such conduct on his part a term or condition of employment.
24There is causal connection in the instant situation between the sexual harassment and adverse employment consequences. The Complainants could only continue to be employed if they subjected themselves to sexual harassment, a condition of employment forced upon each because she was a female employee. The sexual advances, in effect, were the cause of termination of the Complainants' employment. Ms. Ambo was subjected to verbal abuse, insults and embarrassment which made continued employment unbearable. She chose jail rather than continued employment under Mr. Doshoian. Ms. McPherson finally got fed up with Mr. Doshoian's continuing conduct and decided to quit rather than continue to submit herself to his harassment.
25The individual Respondent, Hachik Doshoian, was in breach of paragraphs 4(1)(b) and (g) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, in his sexual harassment of the Complainants. He discriminated against them because of their sex within the meaning of those provisions.
26The prohibition against sexual harassment in the Code can be traced to the decision of the Board of Inquiry in Cherie Bell v. Ernest Lades and Flaming Steer Steak House Tavern, Inc.3 The Board stated there that sexual harassment in the workplace could constitute a breach of paragraph 4(1)(g) of the Code and that prohibited conduct included everything from verbal solicitations to unwelcomed physical contact.
27The governing provision of the Code states:
4(1) No person shall ...
(g) discriminate against any employee with regard to any term or condition of employment, because of ... sex ... of such employee.
Thus, in the Cherie Bell case, the Board found that sexual harassment came within the general prohibition against sexual discrimination in relation to terms or conditions of employment. However, in the result, the Board went on the find that on the facts of the case, the Complaint had not been established.
28Based on the broad interpretation given by the Board in Bell to the words "term or condition of employment" in paragraph 4(1)(g) of the Code, several Complainants in Ontario, have subsequently brought successful Complaints of sexual harassment against their employers.
29In Meri Coutroubis and Irene Kekatos v. Sklavos,4 the Board held that sexual harassment was prohibited under paragraph 4(1)(g) of the Code. The Board was also of the view that where Complainants are forced to quit their job because of sexual harassment, a Complaint may be brought under paragraph 4(1)(b). Where Complainants choose to leave their employment rather than endure unwelcomed sexual advances, the Complainants may be deemed to have been dismissed and the prohibition against discriminatory dismissal in paragraph 4(1)(b) may be invoked.
30The Complainant, in that case, Meri Coutroubis, had been embraced and kissed by her employer while working alone in the employer's dark room. She screamed, her employer released her, and she immediately left for home. The Complainant, Irene Kekatos, was subjected to a similar assault a few days after the incident involving Ms. Coutroubis. The two Complainants decided to leave their employment.
31The Board found that there had been "flagrant violations of section 4(1)(g) of the Code by the Respondent in relation to both Complainants",5 and awarded special damages for lost wages and general damages for the psychological injuries suffered by the Complainants.
32In Allison Hughes and Lorry White v. Deiter Jeckel6 the Complainants testified that they had been victims of the Respondent's sexual advances, and the Board found that their refusal to submit to the employer's sexual advances had resulted in the dismissal of both Complainants from their employment.
33Chairman Kerr adopted the reasoning of the Board of Inquiry in the Bell case:
In my view, harassment based on a factor in respect of which discrimination is unlawful is inherently in violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code since it singles out the victim for treatment on the basis of that factor.7
34That is, harassment itself, based upon prohibited grounds under the Code, is proscribed, just as are other forms of discrimination upon such grounds. The Board in Hughes referred to its previous decision in Singh v. Domglas8 where it had adopted that reasoning in the context of racially motivated harassment. I took a similar approach in Dhillon v. F. W Woolworth Limited9 in holding that verbal abuse based upon race could give rise to a complaint under the Code.
35The Board in Hughes awarded the Complainants compensation for lost wages and general damages for the embarrassment and humiliation that they suffered.
36in Teresa Faye Cox and Debbie Cowell v. Jagbritte, Inc., and Gadhoke, I traced the development of the jurisprudence in the United States on sexual harassment and found that the approach there has been similar to that set forth in the Bell decision. That is, tangible employment consequences of refusal to comply with sexual advances need not be shown in order for a Complaint to be successful. A Complainant need only show that the work environment was "poisoned" by the harassment.
37In the Cox case, the two Complainants chose to leave their employment because of sexual harassment. The employer persistently urged his sexual desires on the Complainants and other female employees. The Respondent employer was acting under the sexist impression that the female employees, despite their obvious resistance to his sexual advances, actually enjoyed such behaviour. I awarded the Complainants damages for lost wages and substantial general damages for the intimidating, hostile and offensive work environment suffered by the Complainants.
38Another case, heard by the same Board as in Hughes was decided soon after Cox: Lynda Mitchell v. Traveller In (Sudbury) Ltd.10 The Complainant had received an offer of employment from the Respondent and she then spoke to the manager of the motel who made certain remarks that she took to be sexually suggestive and that indicated that sexual compliance was to be a condition of her employment. The Board stated in considering whether there had been a breach of the Code:
There was nothing explicitly sexual about Mr. Czakowski's remarks, making it at least conceivable that this was simply a case of misunderstanding. On the other hand, harassment does not have to be explicit to be contrary to the Human Rights Code. Harassment can be affected by implication. Stereotyping, the very thing which human rights laws are designed to combat, is actually a facilitator of insult by mere implication. It would be strange if the law allowed harassment to escape its application because, through stereotyping the harassment was implicit, rather than explicit.11
The Complainant did not accept the offer of employment. The Board awarded only general damages for the insult to the Complainant's dignity, as she did not present evidence of any loss of employment income.
39The Ontario cases just discussed demonstrate that the prohibition in the Code, that applies to the Complaint before me, against sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, is a far-reaching one. The Code proscribes conduct as blatant and offensive as might constitute a trespass to the person (Hughes; Cox; Coutroubis) and as subtle as implicitly suggestive remarks (Bell; Mitchell). A Complaint could be brought under paragraph 4(1)(b) if an employer dismissed or refused to hire a Complainant for her failure to comply with sexual advances (Hughes; Mitchell) or under paragraph 4(1)(g) if an employer, by sexually harassing employees, imposed discriminatory terms or conditions of employment (Bell; Coutroubis; Hughes; Cox).
40Boards of Inquiry, by their interpretations of the Human Rights Code, have made a substantial penetration into the workplace in order to eradicate an insidious form of discrimination. As the Board of Inquiry said in Bell:
There is no reason why the law, which reaches into the workplace so as to protect the work environment from physical or chemical pollution or extremes of temperature, ought not to protect employees as well from negative, psychological and mental effects where adverse and gender directed conduct emanating from a management hierarchy may reasonably be construed to be a condition of employment.12
41The Ontario Human Rights Code, Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1980, Chapter 340, applicable to the Complaint before this Board of Inquiry, has been repealed as of June 15, 1982 and An Act to revise and extend Protection of Human Rights in Ontario (hereafter, the "new Code") has been proclaimed in force as of that date. The new Code (the proper short title is the "Human Rights Code, 1981") has specific provisions proscribing sexual harassment in the workplace:
6(2) Every person who is an employee has a right to freedom from harassment in the workplace because of sex by his or her employer or agent of the employer or by another employee.
(3) Every person has a right to be free from,
(a) a sexual solicitation or advance made by a person in a position to confer, grant or deny a benefit or advancement to the person where the person making the solicitation or advance knows or ought reasonably to know that it is unwelcome; or
(b) a reprisal or a threat of reprisal for the rejection of a sexual solicitation or advance where the reprisal is made or threatened by a person in a position to confer, grant or deny a benefit or advancement to the person.
9(f) "harassment" means engaging in a course of vexatious comment or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.
42Thus, residents of Ontario now have a much clearer statement of their right to be free from harassment of any sort in the workplace.
43At all times material to the Complaints and the Inquiry, Mr. Doshoian was a Director of the corporate Respondent and supervising employee on behalf of the corporate Respondent with respect to the Complainants, and in my opinion, the corporate Respondent, in reality, was the alter ego of the individual Respondent. As Mr. Doshoian was the directing mind of the corporate Respondent, it is clear that as a matter of corporate law, the corporation is responsible to the Complainants for the unlawful conduct of its "directing mind".
44There remains the question of damages. In the Guercio case, I stated:
To summarize then, the following factors have been considered in the awarding of general damages in cases of sexual harassment.
(i) The nature of the harassment, that is, was it simply verbal or was it physical as well;
(ii) The degree of aggressiveness and physical contact in the harassment;
(iii) The ongoing nature, that is, the time period of the harassment.
(iv) The frequency of the harassment;
(v) The age of the victim;
(vi) The vulnerability of the victim; and
(vii) The psychological impact of the harassment upon the victim.13
45As for general damages, given the circumstances of the sexual harassment, I think general damages should be awarded for the intimidating, hostile and offensive work environment suffered by the Complainants because of the discrimination toward them.
46There was both verbal and physical harassment in the instant situations. There was considerable psychological aggressiveness and some physical contact in the harassment. The time period of harassment in respect of Ms. Ambo was short (a matter of only days) but extremely intensive, while in respect of Ms. McPherson the time period was about seven months, but not as intensive, except for an occasion toward the end of her employment when Mr. Doshoian was intoxicated. In each case the harassment was regular in its frequency and pervasive in the employment relationship. Both victims were young, Ms. McPherson about 19, and Ms. Ambo, about 24. Both victims were vulnerable, being very dependent upon the employer for their livelihood and, in Ms. Ambo's case, the limited freedom she was allowed from jail under the Temporary Absence Program. In both cases, the psychological impact of the harassment was significantly adverse upon the victims, as was evident from their demeanour in giving their evidence.
47Considering all the circumstances, I think an award of $1,000.00 for general damages is appropriate in respect of the injured feelings of the Complainant, Josephine McPherson, and the pain and suffering she endured by reason of the sexual harassment of the individual Respondent at her place of employment, and in the constructive termination of her employment because she resisted his sexual advances.
48Considering all the circumstances, I think an award of $2,500.00 for general damages is appropriate in respect of the injured feelings of the Complainant, Vanessa Ambo, and the pain and suffering she endured by reason of the sexual harassment of the individual Respondent at her place of employment, and in the constructive termination of her employment because she resisted his sexual advances.
49This award of $2,500.00 for general damages in compensation for injury to dignity and feelings is considerably higher than previous awards in sexual harassment cases, referred to above. However, the harassment of Ms. Ambo was a flagrant case of harassment and a correspondingly flagrant breach of the Code. Her employer, the individual Respondent, gave her the choice of submitting to his sexual advances, or being humiliated by his comments about her in front of customers, or returning to jail. She was under considerable mental anguish and suffering at the time because of her conviction and sentencing. She is, of course, solely responsible for her own actions in this regard and the consequential mental suffering to herself. However, the individual Respondent is solely responsible for the additional, considerable, anxiety, anguish, and suffering that he inflicted upon her by his sexual harassment and given her unique, relatively defenceless circumstances, she suffered greatly. This would be obvious to the individual Respondent, although his demeanour at the hearing would indicate total indifference on his part to the feelings of the young, female employees under his supervision. Mr. Doshoian did not regard Ms. Ambo, as a person, rather as a trapped object of his own lust. He has no respect for the fundamental rights of individuals in our society, specifically the inherent rights of the Complainants Ambo and McPherson, as sanctified and protected by the Code. He discriminated against them simply because of their sex, insulting and injuring their persons.
50Some comment was made at the hearing about the unfortunate personal circumstances in the background of Ms. Ambo and it was suggested that she would be sufficiently tough to handle the problem she confronted in Mr. Doshoian's advances, and that in any event, given her worldly background, she could not have suffered from his advances all that much. It must be remembered that, whatever a person's personal background, she is entitled as a basic human right to the respect and dignity of her person, and the Code protects this right in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Whatever mistakes Ms. Ambo made in the past, she too is a person and the Code fully protects her. Incidentally, I might add as an aside that I was quite impressed by her character, as indicated in the giving of her evidence. She has made mistakes, but all humans do. In contrast to the individual Respondent, she has sufficient character to be honest and truthful. I have no doubt that Ms. Ambo suffered greatly from Mr. Doshoian's sexual harassment and I have no doubt that Mr. Doshoian consciously tried to take sexual advantage of his employee because of the very vulnerable position she was in, as known to him. This was a situation of a most offensive and extraordinary sexual harassment.
51As well, I am awarding special damages to the Complainant, Josephine McPherson, for loss of income for a period of approximately one month. I think this amount to be reasonable in all the circumstances. An employer in breach of the Code should only be liable for loss of wages for a reasonable period of time.
52I am awarding special damages to the Complainant, Vanessa Ambo, for loss of wages in the amount of $75.00 representing her loss of income for a period of three days, being the period of time she was unemployed following her return to jail rather than submit to his sexual advances.
ORDER
8587
- The Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay forthwith to the Complainant, Vanessa Ambo, the following:
(a) As damages for lost wages, the sum of seventy-five ($75.00) dollars.
(b) As general damages, the sum of two thousand, five hundred ($2,500.00) dollars.
- The Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay forthwith to the Complainant, Josephine McPherson, the following:
(a) As damages for lost wages, the sum of five hundred ($500.00) dollars.
(b) As general damages, the sum of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars.
The Respondent, Hachik Doshoian, shall cease and desist in the sexual harassment of employees who may work under his supervision in the future.
The Respondent, 408720 Ontario Limited, shall do whatever is necessary to ensure that the Respondent, Hachik Doshoian, ceases and desists forthwith in the sexual harassment of its employees, should the Respondent Hachik Doshoian again work for it in the future.
NOTES
Footnotes
- September 28, 1981 (1981 CanLII 4327 (ON HRT), 3 C.H.R.R. D/609).
- April 8, 1982 (1982 CanLII 4886 (ON HRT), 3 C.H.R.R. D/858).
- (1980), 1980 CanLII 3899 (ON HRT), 1 C.H.R.R. D/155, (Mr. O.B. Shime, Q.C.)
- (Prof. E. J. Ratushny, June 16, 1981), 1981 CanLII 4303 (ON HRT), 2 C.H.R.R. D/457.
- p. D/458.
- (Robert W. Kerr, August 20, 1981), 1981 CanLII 4304 (ON HRT), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1014.
- p. D/1015.
- (Robert W. Kerr, 1980), 1980 CanLII 3929 (ON HRT), 2 C.H.R.R. D/285.
- Feb. 12, 1982 (1982 CanLII 4884 (ON HRT), 3 C.H.R.R. D/743).
- (Robert W. Kerr, October 7, 1981), 1981 CanLII 4313 (ON HRT), 2 C.H.R.R. D/590.
- p. D/592.
- p. D/156.
- 3 C.H.R.R. D/873.