Harry Doan

The accused was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a young child relative.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and an inculpatory statement made by the accused during a police interview.

Although the court ruled the statement voluntary on a voir dire, it found the admission vague, lacking detail, and potentially influenced by the officer’s minimization of the alleged conduct.

The court also found the complainant’s evidence unreliable due to significant gaps in memory and a lack of detail regarding the alleged events.

Applying the principles in R. v. W. (D), the court concluded that the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt and that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal trial for sexual interference and sexual assault, the Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement made by the accused shortly after arrest.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused lacked an operating mind due to fatigue, stress, and an allegedly oppressive interview environment.

The court applied the confessions rule, assessing threats or promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

Finding no threats, inducements, or oppressive circumstances and concluding the accused understood the caution and the consequences of speaking, the court held the operating mind requirement was met.

The accused’s admissions were also found relevant to the allegations.

The statement was therefore ruled voluntary and admissible at trial.

During a voir dire on the voluntariness of a police statement in a prosecution for sexual offences against a child, the accused sought to adduce expert psychological opinion evidence to support a claim that he lacked an operating mind due to depression when he made the statement.

The Crown opposed the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence.

Applying the criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, the court focused on the necessity requirement.

The proposed expert could not provide a formal diagnosis and largely repeated the accused’s own description of his emotional state.

The court held that the opinion evidence was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining voluntariness and excluded the expert evidence.