George Frank James

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to suspend his driver's licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The suspension was based on a Medical Condition Report indicating the appellant suffered from alcohol use disorder.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that while the appellant does suffer from mild alcohol use disorder, the Registrar failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the condition is likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely.

The Tribunal noted the appellant's lifestyle changes, abstinence from alcohol, and support from his family doctor.

The appeal was allowed and the licence suspension was set aside.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought non-earner benefits.

The Insurer terminated the benefits and argued the Applicant was statute-barred from proceeding to arbitration because the two-year limitation period had expired.

The Arbitrator found that the Insurer's termination letter was confusing and did not constitute a clear and unequivocal refusal to pay benefits, as it simultaneously requested an election form and provided a right to dispute.

Therefore, the limitation period was not triggered, and the Applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment, alleging breaches of procedural fairness due to the Deputy Judge's failure to hear oral submissions and provide adequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had notice and an opportunity to respond in writing, and that the inadequacy of reasons does not constitute a breach of procedural fairness.

The court concluded that the application was essentially a disguised appeal of an interlocutory order, for which no right of appeal exists.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order dismissing their motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement.

The plaintiff's former lawyer had accepted a $12,500 settlement offer from the TTC, but the plaintiff later claimed she did not give instructions to settle and sued her lawyer.

The motion judge found no settlement existed and refused to enforce it.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the lawyer had ostensible authority to bind his client, the acceptance was clear and unambiguous, and there was no basis for the TTC to know of any lack of instructions.

The settlement was enforced.

Following dismissal of a motion to enforce an alleged settlement of a personal injury action, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable personally by the plaintiff’s former lawyer whose misleading communications had precipitated the motion.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including fairness, reasonableness, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of unsuccessful parties.

Although the successful parties sought higher amounts on a substantial indemnity scale, the court examined comparable settlement‑enforcement motions and determined that the reasonable range was significantly lower.

Costs were fixed at $11,127.20 payable to the plaintiff and $7,781.66 payable to the TTC.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 20.04 and 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking judgment enforcing a purported settlement allegedly accepted by the plaintiff’s solicitor.

The court found that the solicitor falsely represented that he had instructions to accept the settlement offer and acted without authority from the plaintiff.

The evidence established that the plaintiff had never agreed to the settlement and had not provided instructions directly or indirectly to accept it.

The court further held that it was not reasonable for the defendants to assume that the solicitor had authority to settle without explicit client instructions in light of prior communications.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed, and the plaintiff’s former solicitor was ordered personally to pay the costs of the motion on a substantial indemnity scale under Rule 57.07.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in housing.

The Tribunal scheduled a teleconference hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code because the Landlord and Tenant Board had already dealt with the substance of the matter.

The applicant failed to comply with a previous Tribunal order to provide correspondence to the respondents and failed to attend the teleconference hearing.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.