Date: 20260316

Docket: IMM-20902-24

Citation: 2026 FC 350

Ottawa, Ontario, March 16, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ahmed

BETWEEN:

EDUARDO ISRAEL CUEVAS GARCIA

VANESSA MIRANDA CUEVAS CUPICHE

Applicants

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicants, Eduardo Israel Cuevas Garcia and Vanessa Miranda Cuevas Cupiche, seek judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”), dated October 24, 2024, confirming the determination made by the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the “IRPA”). The determinative issue was the existence of a viable internal flight alternative (“IFA”) in Merida, Mexico.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I find that the RAD’s decision is reasonable. This application for judicial review is dismissed.

II. Background

[3] The Applicants are both citizens of Mexico. The Principal Applicant is a 46-year-old father of two daughters. The Associate Applicant is his 12-year-old daughter. The Principal Applicant’s other daughter is a Canadian citizen.

[4] The Principal Applicant is a semi-professional soccer player who has operated a soccer academy in Mexico City since approximately 2009.

[5] The Principal Applicant described in his Basis of Claim narrative that, in May 2022, he began to receive threats that if he did not pay money to a local gang, the Cancholas, they would harm his students’ families. The Principal Applicant believes the Cancholas gang is supplied by the Unión Tepito (“Unión”) and affiliated with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (“CJNG”).

[6] In November 2022, the Principal Applicant describes that these threats shifted from concerning only money to threats against his daughters.

[7] The Applicants state that, in February 2023, they fled to Canada and, shortly after, filed a refugee claim based on their perception that the Cancholas gang could pursue them anywhere in Mexico through its affiliates.

[8] In a decision dated July 23, 2024, the RPD refused the Applicants’ refugee claim. The RPD determination was based primarily on credibility concerns. The Applicants appealed this decision to the RAD.

[9] In a letter dated October 7, 2024, the RAD notified the Applicants that it would also consider the issues of state protection and an IFA in Merida. In response, on October 14, 2024, the Applicants submitted a supplemental Memorandum of Law and Argument addressing these issues.

[10] In a decision dated October 24, 2024, the RAD affirmed the RPD’s determination that the Applicants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. The determinative issue was the existence of an IFA in Merida.

[11] The RAD relied on the two-pronged IFA analysis to determine that (1) the Applicants do not face a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention Ground under section 96 of the IRPA or, on a balance of probabilities, a risk described in section 97 of the IRPA in the IFA location, and (2) it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the Applicants to seek refuge in the IFA location (Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1991 CanLII 13517 (FCA) at p 709).

[12] On the first prong of the analysis, although the RAD accepted the Applicants’ submissions that the Principal Applicant was recognizable across Mexico, the panel determined that the agents of persecution did not have the means to pursue the Applicants in Merida. It found that the National Documentation Package (“NDP”) described the Cancholas gang as small and based only in Mexico City. It further found that the Unión was a regional gang with limited capacity beyond Mexico City. Although it accepted that the Unión and Cancholas likely worked together, the panel determined that the objective evidence from the NDP contradicted the Applicants’ belief that the Unión worked with the CJNG. Indeed, the RAD found that the Unión and CJNG were in a turf war and, consequently, the CJNG would not assist the Unión in pursuing the Applicants.

[13] Regarding the second prong of the IFA analysis, the RAD concluded that it was reasonable for the Applicants to relocate to Merida considering all of the circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, the RAD noted that conditions in the city are generally positive, based on the low crime and unemployment rate. The RAD also considered the personal circumstances of the Principal Applicant, who is relatively young and has experience travelling and conducting successful business activities.

[14] This is the decision presently under review.

III. Issue and Standard of Review

[15] The sole issue in this judicial review is whether the RAD’s decision is reasonable.

[16] The parties submit that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”). I agree.

[17] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review (Vavilovat paras 12-13). The reviewing court must determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible, and justified (Vavilovat para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision-maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences (Vavilov at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135).

[18] For a decision to be unreasonable, the applicant must establish the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision-maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep” (Vavilov at para 100).

IV. Analysis

[19] The Applicants submit that the RAD failed to grapple with evidence on the record that contradicted its finding that the Unión lacked the means to pursue the Applicants. Specifically, the Applicants maintain that it was unreasonable for the RAD to prefer information from the NDP showing the Unión and CJNG were in conflict, compared to more recent documents that suggest the Unión has formed a new alliance with the CJNG. Additionally, the Applicants maintain that the RAD did not consider the personal circumstances of the Principal Applicant, including his job prospects and mental health, when addressing the second prong of the IFA analysis.

[20] The Respondent submits that the RAD considered all of the evidence before it to conclude that Merida is a safe IFA. Its position is that the RAD did not need to consider the more recent publications because this was not one of the arguments that the Applicants submitted to the RAD. The Respondent further submits that the RAD based its finding that it would be reasonable for the Applicants to relocate to Merida on logical inferences from the evidence before it.

[21] In my view, the Applicants’ submissions before this Court attempt to circumvent the role of the RAD by raising arguments that were not before the decision maker.

[22] A reviewing Court generally does not consider issues or arguments that were not raised before the administrative decision maker. Rather, its role is to review the decision actually made given the legal and factual constraints on the decision maker at the time of their decision (Vavilovat paras 83, 86, 94). Where issues are raised only before a reviewing Court, the Court loses the benefit of the views and expertise of the specialized tribunals that Parliament entrusted to consider the merits of the decision (Oleynik v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 5 at para 71; Starr v BMO Financial Group, 2025 FC 697 at paras 46-47). The reason for this general aversion against new arguments in a judicial review was explained in Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 875 (“Singh 2023”). In that case, the applicant argued that the RAD’s IFA analysis was unreasonable because he would need to hide his whereabouts from his family (Singh 2023 at paras 23-24). Despite the possibility that the RAD could have made such an inference based on the record before it, Justice Roy determined that this argument was not explicitly before the RAD and thus the RAD could not, and did not, provide reasons that could be reviewed by the Court (Singh 2023 at paras 50, 59).

[23] I have reviewed the Applicants’ arguments before both the RPD and the RAD, and I cannot find that they provided any arguments to support that the Unión and CJNG worked together based on the country condition articles they submitted. Therefore, I find no fault in the RAD’s decision not to mention these other articles.

[24] In any event, the RAD did analyze and weigh the articles within the NDP holistically. Although the articles in the NDP show that the relationship between the Unión and CJNG is not clear-cut, in my view, the RAD provided reasons for its preferred interpretation. The RAD specified that the evidence it relied on was preferable because it was from multiple sources, objective and independent. The RAD acknowledged that some articles within the NDP support the Applicants’ assertions that the Unión and CJNG worked together in the past, but the RAD ultimately considered them insufficient to show that the Cancholas or Unión could pursue the Applicants in Merida through the CJNG’s resources. The RAD’s conclusion goes to the weight it allocated to various country condition articles. As such, I agree with the Respondent that it is not the reviewing Court’s role to reweigh this evidence (Vavilovat para 125).

[25] For a similar reason, I find that the Applicants have not met the high threshold required to raise a reviewable error with the RAD’s analysis of the reasonableness of the IFA (Bakare v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 967 (“Bakare”) at para 35).

[26] The Applicants did not submit any arguments before the RAD that the IFA would be unreasonable due to the Principal Applicant’s ability to find work or to receive psychological support. In the absence of such arguments, the RAD considered generally the employment opportunities and personal characteristics of the Principal Applicant, including his past business success and his previous ability to relocate.

[27] The Applicants now submit that the Principal Applicant would face difficulty securing employment because he has only been employed in roles related to soccer. The Applicants further submit that the Principal Applicant suffers from mental health issues and that the NDP shows these services may not be readily available everywhere in Mexico.

[28] Like the Applicants’ other submissions, these arguments were not brought before the RAD and thus I cannot fault the RAD for failing to specifically consider them (Shirzad v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 89 at para 11; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1161 (“Singh 2024”) at para 10).

[29] I further do not find it is an appropriate case to exercise this Court’s discretion to hear these new issues (Singh 2024 at para 11). It is well-established in this Court’s jurisprudence that applicants must raise more than the possibility of losing their employment upon relocation in order to show that an IFA would be unreasonable (Bakareat para 41; Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 at p 598 (FCA)). While I recognize the Applicants’ submission that this rule is not absolute, the Applicants have not described any exceptional circumstances that would prevent the Principal Applicant from continuing to pursue his profession as it relates to soccer (Ambroise v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 62 at paras 36-37).

[30] Further, the psychotherapist report relied upon by the Applicants was only brought to the RAD’s attention to support that the Principal Applicant may have faced difficulty with his memory during the RPD hearing. The report does not address the type of ongoing treatment that may be required if the Principal Applicant were relocated to the IFA. Additionally, it is not the RAD’s duty to comb through the NDP looking for evidence that shows a lack of available resources in a particular IFA to address needs that were not raised before it (Singh 2024 at para 9).

[31] Accordingly, I find that the Applicants have not raised any issues that warrant this Court’s intervention.

V. Conclusion

[32] For these reasons, I find that the RAD’s decision reflects the applicable factual and legal constraints (Vavilovat para 85). The RAD weighed the evidence before it and determined that Merida is both a safe and reasonable city to which the Applicants could relocate. I consequently dismiss this application. The parties did not raise any question for certification, and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-20902-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. There is no question for certification.

“Shirzad A.”

Judge

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:

IMM-20902-24

STYLE OF CAUSE:

EDUARDO ISRAEL CUEVAS GARCIA AND VANESSA MIRANDA CUEVAS CUPICHE v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING:

Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:

March 5, 2026

JUDGMENT AND REASONS:

AHMED J.

DATED:

March 16, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Debie Eze

For The Applicants

Fraser Caldwell

For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

D Eze Law

Barrister and Solicitor

Toronto, Ontario

For The Applicants

Attorney General of Canada

Toronto, Ontario

For The Respondent