Vancouver, British Columbia, January 30, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Duchesne
BETWEEN:
SAVINDER SINGH SANDHU
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
ORDER
UPON THE MOTION by the Applicant Savinder Singh Sandhu [the Applicant], for an Order staying his removal from Canada to India, scheduled for February 9, 2026;
AND UPON READING and CONSIDERING the materials filed by the parties in support of their respective positions on the Applicant’s motion;
AND UPON HEARING and CONSIDERING the oral submissions made by the parties by videoconference on January 27, 2026;
AND CONSIDERING that an order staying a removal is a form of extraordinary equitable relief requiring the exercise of the Court’s discretion having regard to all of the relevant circumstances, that the applicable test is highly contextual and fact dependent, and that “Ultimately, the question is whether granting the injunction would be just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case
” (Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 at para 1);
AND CONSIDERING that to be successful on this motion the Applicant must satisfy the conjunctive tripartite test described in Toth v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1988 CanLII 1420 (FCA), 86 NR 302 [Toth] and in RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311 [RJR-MacDonald].
AND CONSIDERING that this legal test requires that the Applicant demonstrate that, 1) their application raises a serious issue to be tried; 2) they would suffer irreparable harm if their removal is not stayed; and 3) the balance of convenience favours staying their removal. The test is conjunctive (Janssen Inc v Abbvie Corporation, 2014 FCA 112 at para 14) in that the “failure of any of the three elements of the test is fatal
” (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Ishaq, 2015 FCA 212 at para 15), even though the three parts of the test are not “watertight compartments
” (Pak v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1898, at para 24, and the jurisprudence cited therein [Pak]);
AND CONSIDERING that the threshold for establishing a serious question to be determined is generally low, and that the judge on the stay motion must make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the case to ascertain whether the application is neither vexatious nor frivolous and, if satisfied that the proceeding is neither vexatious of frivolous, then proceed to consider the second and third prongs of the test, even if of the opinion that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the merits (RJR-MacDonald, at page 337);
AND CONSIDERING that, in the absence of serious grounds to challenge an administrative decision, a stay pending judicial review amounts to no more than a free-standing request for delay which is not justified in light of subsection 48(2) of the IRPA, which requires a removal order to be enforced “as soon as possible
” (Ogunkoya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 679 at para 6);
AND CONSIDERING that the second prong of the test requires that the moving party establish that irreparable harm would be suffered between the date of removal and the hearing of their proceeding on the merits without the stay being granted;
AND CONSIDERING that the prejudice to be established must be more than the harm or prejudice that is inherent in the removal process, and that the moving party has the onus to present clear and non‑speculative evidence at a convincing level of particularity demonstrating a real probability that unavoidable irreparable harm will result in the absence of the extraordinary remedy of a stay (Glooscap Heritage Society v Canada (National Revenue), 2012 FCA 255 at para 31 [Glooscap]; Erhire v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 941 at para 65);
AND CONSIDERING that the harm alleged and proven must constitute more than a series of possibilities and may not be based on mere assumptions, speculation or hypotheticals and contingencies, or assertions (Atwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 427 at paras 14-15);
AND CONSIDERING that the last prong of the test requires balancing the prejudice the applicant would suffer if removed against the prejudice suffered by the Respondent who would be prevented for enforcing the law, and determining who would suffer the greatest harm from the granting or refusal of the stay (Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd v Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers, Local 832, 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 110 at para 36; Universal Ostrich Farms Inc v Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 164 at para 50);
AND CONSIDERING that the public interest favours having removal orders promptly enforced as scheduled and in the Respondent Minister exercising his statutory duty to apply the IRPA (Pak, at para 71). Section 48 of the IRPA requires the enforcement of removal orders as soon as possible, not simply a “question of administrative convenience, but as a matter that implicates the integrity and fairness of, and public confidence in, Canada’s system of immigration control” (Ghanaseharan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 261 at para 22);
THE COURT CONCLUDES that the Applicant’s motion ought to be dismissed for the reasons that follow:
1The Applicant has advanced three arguments to establish that his proceeding discloses a serious issue that is neither frivolous nor vexatious. For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes without determining that the three arguments advanced on this motion would be the arguments the Applicant would develop and argue at the hearing of his application for judicial review should leave be granted and that there are no other arguments suggested by the Applicant against the decision sought to be reviewed.
I have considered the Applicant’s three arguments and at least one of them raises an issue that is neither frivolous nor vexatious. Accordingly, I find that the Applicant has satisfied the threshold of showing that his proceeding raises a serious issue.
The Applicant argues that he would suffer irreparable harm if removed to India. He argues first that removal would create a significant risk of suicidal behaviours, that these risks are well documented in the evidence led on this motion, and that these risks constitute irreparable harm. The evidence led is not as persuasive as the Applicant’s representatives argue and does not establish irreparable harm.
The Applicant’s evidence of suicidal behaviours consists of his own affidavit and three letters from his family doctor. The doctor’s letters are dated November 24, 2021, July 4, 2023, and November 25, 2025. These letters report information conveyed to the family doctor by another person(s), set out some of the Applicant’s personal history up to the date of each letter, contain some limited observations and opinions by the doctor himself, and set out the treatment recommendations for the Applicant along with prescribed mediations. The treatments followed by the Applicant are community based non-pharmacological treatments that include counselling every one to two weeks, family doctor appointments one to three times per month, and physical activity, among others. The Applicant was also to attend addiction treatment at dedicated facilities. The evidence in the record is that the Applicant has participated and continues to participate in addiction treatment support programs. The medications prescribed to the Applicant are indicated for use in connection with depression and to improve low mood, enhancing sleep and coping with anxiety and stress from adjustment disorder, for coping with alcohol and stimulant use disorders, and for controlling diabetes mellitus. None of the treatments or medications prescribed to the Applicant are indicated for suicidal behaviours in the evidence led.
The Applicant’s affidavit filed in support of this motion post-dates his last family doctor’s last letter by almost 60 days. While the Applicant’s family doctor writes on November 25, 2025, that the Applicant had engaged in 4 previous suicide attempts (a May 2021 intentional ingesting of fentanyl requirement hospitalization, running in front of cars in 2021, October 2022 co-ingestions of alcohol and methamphetamines, and a June 2024 attempt with a self-inflicted stab wound requiring hospitalization), the Applicant deposes on January 21, 2026, to one attempt at suicide (the June 2024 self-inflicted stabbing incident) and one instance of “feeling suicidal about being remove[d] to India” in 2023 when he learned of his removal. These inconsistencies in the evidence combined with the described course of treatment that fails to mention suicidal behaviours in any manner appreciably reduce the Applicant’s family doctor’s letters’ probative value as to suicidal behaviours.
The Applicant had previously stated in evidence that he engaged in suicidal ideation when he in fact did. Exhibit E to the Applicant’s affidavit filed in support of this motion reflects that the Applicant felt at liberty to describe his suicidal thoughts when confronted with the prospect of removal to India in 2023. A review of the Applicant’s words and statements in that document reveals in stark contrast with the evidence on this motion that the Applicant is not now in the same situation as he was then. Whereas the Applicant was clear in 2023 that he would rather have ended in his life in Canada than return to India, the Applicant is equally clear in January 2026 that he has been taking steps such as applying for employment and connecting with rehabilitation and health support to succeed in India should this motion fail.
As was held in Bastien v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 926 at para 23 and in many decisions since (Triana Orozco v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 CanLII 62474; Achola v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 33858; Chikezie v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 CanLII 56951; Black v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 563, at paras 27 and 28; Melay v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2022 FC 1406, at para 22; Sanders v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 79122, at paras 39 to 41) clear evidence of a serious and imminent risk of suicide must be provided to support the argument that an applicant’s suicidal behaviours are a basis to stay removal. The evidence led does not indicate that the Applicant requires urgent or emergent treatment or that there are impediments to removal due to his mental health, or that the Applicant is currently engaging in suicidal ideation. The evidence on this motion falls well short of setting out clear evidence of an imminent risk of suicide. The Applicant’s evidence of irreparable harm based on his mental health and suicidal behaviours does not meet the threshold required by the jurisprudence for irreparable harm to be established.
The Applicant also argues that his removal will cause him irreparable harm by depriving him of a meaningful remedy if he is eventually successful on judicial review. The Applicant relies on Kambasaya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 664, at paragraph 36 [Kambasaya] and Jamal v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 CanLII 117818 [Jamal] in support of his argument. These two decisions are distinguishable and find no application here.
The Court found in Kambasayathat the applicants had very arguable grounds of review and that finding drove the determination of irreparable harm. Much like in the case of Sotunde v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 CanLII 12286, the Applicant here has not shown sufficiently clear or apparent merit in his Application for leave and for judicial review that could support a finding of irreparable harm as had been successfully argued in Kambasaya.
In Jamal, the Court considered a situation where the applicant had become a changed man and that his life circumstances had evolved significantly between the first date of his potential removal and its enforcement 15 years later due to no fault of his own. The situation here is quite different, if only for the fact that the Applicant has continued to be engaged in criminality between 2014 and 2026. The Court’s holding in Jamaldoes not apply in the circumstances of this matter.
While the Court is sympathetic to the Applicant and his efforts with respect to his mental health and addiction struggles, the evidence led does not establish that the Applicant will suffer disruptions, prejudice or harm that exceed the inherent consequences of removal if he is removed as scheduled (Melo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 2000 CanLII 15140 (FC), 188 FTR 39 at para 21).
The Applicant has not established that he would suffer irreparable harm between the date of his removal and the date of the determination of his Application for leave and for judicial review.
I see no basis for the Applicant’s removal to be stayed given that the Applicant’s motion fails on the basis of irreparable harm. The public interest and the balance of convenience therefore lie with the Minister and with the enforcement of the Applicant’s removal as scheduled.
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
- The Applicant’s motion for a stay of removal is dismissed.
“Benoit M. Duchesne”
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET:
IMM-26111-25
STYLE OF CAUSE:
SAVINDER SINGH SANDHU v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING:
videoconference
DATE OF HEARING:
january 27, 2026
ORDER:
duchesne, j.
DATED:
january 30, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Yanni Nicolidakis-Mustafa
Erica Olmstead
For The Applicant
Courtenay Landsiedel
For The Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Edelmann & Co.
Vancouver, BC
For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada
Vancouver, BC
For The Respondent