[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, May 8, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Saint-Fleur
BETWEEN:
OSCAR FERNANDO TIZON PURIZACA
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The applicant, Oscar Fernando Tizon Purizaca, was granted leave for judicial review, pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], of the decision of senior decision maker NB158080, under Application Number J000003928, rendered on October 20, 2023, and sent on October 31, 2023. The decision rejected the application for a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA] because the officer determined that Mr. Tizon Purizaca was inadmissible under subsection 36(1) of the IRPA.
[2] Mr. Tizon Purizaca is a citizen of Peru. After being found inadmissible to Canada on grounds of serious criminality, he applied for a PRRA on the basis of his fear of extortion in Peru.
[3] Mr. Tizon Purizaca argues, among other things, that the decision does not meet the requirements of reasonableness and that the decision maker did not observe the principles of procedural fairness. As a remedy, he asks that the Court refer the matter back to a new officer.
[4] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Facts
[5] The applicant is visiting Canada for the second time.
A. First visit to Canada
[6] On January 5, 2004, the applicant came to Canada via the Saint-Armand border crossing in Quebec and claimed refugee protection under the name of Juan Carlos Hernando Nunez. On March 9, 2004, the Refugee Protection Division determined that Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s refugee protection claim had been abandoned.
[7] On December 5, 2005, the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] issued an arrest warrant for the applicant.
[8] On September 21, 2009, nearly four years later, Cornwall police arrested the applicant for possession of break-in instruments. On arrest, the applicant identified himself as Ricardo Moya Estudillo.
[9] On September 22, 2009, the CBSA prepared an inadmissibility report against “Mr. Moya Estudillo” because he had remained in Canada illegally. On September 28, 2009, the applicant declared his true identity, and he was arrested pending his removal from Canada to Peru.
[10] On October 5, 2009, the applicant was convicted of possession of break-in instruments, and on October 7, 2009, a report on inadmissibility on grounds of serious criminality was issued against him. On October 20, 2009, a deportation order was issued.
[11] On October 23, 2009, Mr. Tizon Purizaca stated that he did not intend to submit a PRRA application. On October 28, 2009, the applicant was deported from Canada to Peru.
[12] Mr. Tizon Purizaca alleges that between December 2014 and May 2015, he and his wife owned a business and that, because of this, he received threats from the criminal group Los Malditos de Talualpac. The threat was that if he refused to comply with the extortion demands, the group would kidnap the couple’s Canadian child and force the Canadian government to pay a ransom. The criminal group put a price on his head and on that of his spouse: US$40,000.00 in total.
B. Second stay: the applicant’s return to Canada
[13] Around May 2015, Mr. Tizon Purizaca returned to Canada without prior authorization from Canadian authorities. On August 14, 2015, he went to a CBSA office in Montréal to claim refugee status for himself and his spouse. On August 17, 2015, Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s refugee protection claim was deemed ineligible because of the abandoned first claim in 2004.
[14] On August 24, 2015, Mr. Tizon Purizaca was offered the opportunity to submit a PRRA application, and his application was received by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] on September 8, 2015.
[15] On January 8, 2016, in performing the PRRA, the senior immigration officer found that there were substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Tizon Purizaca would face a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment were he returned to Peru and issued a favourable opinion. The officer stated that he did not have the delegation to allow the PRRA application because of Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s criminal record and that this decision must be made by the appropriate Minister’s delegate. On November 24, 2016, IRCC’s Case Management Branch received the positive PRRA opinion for assessment.
[16] After the positive PRRA opinion rendered in January 2016, Mr. Tizon Purizaca committed other crimes in Canada. On January 16, 2023, he was convicted of theft and fraud.
[17] IRCC sent the results of Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s PRRA on October 20, 2023.
[18] On October 11, 2023, the senior decision maker of IRCC’s Case Management Branch rejected Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s PRRA application. The senior decision maker concluded that the applicant had not established that there was a serious risk of persecution on any of the Convention grounds or that, on a balance of probabilities, he would be subjected to a risk to his life, a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture should he return to Peru. The senior decision maker therefore concluded that the removal order against Mr. Tizon Purizaca must be enforced. That decision is the subject of this application for judicial review.
III. Issues
(1) Did the senior decision maker breach procedural fairness by rejecting the PRRA application?
(2) Was the senior decision maker’s decision to reject the applicant’s PRRA application reasonable?
IV. Standard of review
A. Procedural fairness
[19] The Court reviews alleged breaches of procedural fairness in a manner akin to applying the correctness standard of review (Mohamed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1297 at para 19).
[20] The reviewing court must conduct its own analysis to determine whether the process followed by the decision maker was fair, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, including those described in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at paras 21–28; Canadian Pacific Railway v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54.
B. Reasonableness
[21] The applicable standard of review to determine whether the decision was reasonable is reasonableness.
[22] The Supreme Court has confirmed that the reasonableness standard applies to judicial review of an administrative decision (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 25 [Vavilov]). None of the situations for rebutting that presumption arise in this judicial review (Vavilov at paras 25, 33, 53; Canada Post Corp v Canadian Union of Postal Workers, 2019 SCC 67 at para 27). The Court must assess whether the decision is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and . . . is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at para 85).
[23] It is not the role of this Court on judicial review to determine whether or not the applicant was eligible for benefits. The role of this Court is simply to determine whether the senior decision maker’s decision is reasonable, in light of the evidence and arguments before the senior decision maker (Paquin v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 1430 at para 3).
[24] The burden is on Mr. Tizon Purizaca to show that the decision is unreasonable and to satisfy the Court that there were “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” (Vavilov at para 100). Moreover, when the standard of reasonableness applies on judicial review, the Court must refrain from reweighing and reassessing the evidence to arrive at another decision (Vavilov at para 125).
V. Legislative framework
[25] The applicant is a person described in paragraph 112(3)(b) of the IRPA and is therefore inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality. Given that the applicant has not served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years within the meaning of paragraph 113(e) of the IRPA, his PRRA application may be assessed on the basis of sections 96 to 98 of the IRPA; the analysis is not restricted to section 97, as is generally the case for persons described in section 113 of the IRPA.
DIVISION 3
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment
Protection
Application for protection
112 (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).
Restriction
112(3) Refugee protection may not be conferred on an applicant who
(a) is determined to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights or organized criminality;
(b) is determined to be inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality with respect to a conviction in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years or with respect to a conviction outside Canada for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years;
(c) made a claim to refugee protection that was rejected on the basis of section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention; or
(d) is named in a certificate referred to in subsection 77(1).
SECTION 3
Examen des risques avant renvoi
Protection
Demande de protection
112(1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
Restriction
112(3) L’asile ne peut être conféré au demandeur dans les cas suivants :
a) il est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux ou criminalité organisée;
b) il est interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité pour déclaration de culpabilité au Canada pour une infraction prévue sous le régime d’une loi fédérale punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou pour toute déclaration de culpabilité à l’extérieur du Canada pour une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction sous le régime d’une loi fédérale punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans;
c) il a été débouté de sa demande d’asile au titre de la section F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés;
d) il est nommé au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
Consideration of application
113 Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows:
(d) in the case of an applicant described in subsection 112(3) — other than one described in subparagraph (e)(i) or (ii) — consideration shall be on the basis of the factors set out in section 97 and
(i) in the case of an applicant for protection who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality, whether they are a danger to the public in Canada, or
(ii) in the case of any other applicant, whether the application should be refused because of the nature and severity of acts committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the applicant constitutes to the security of Canada; and
Examen de la demande
113 Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit :
d) s’agissant du demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3) — sauf celui visé au sous-alinéa e)(i) ou (ii) —, sur la base des éléments mentionnés à l’article 97 et, d’autre part :
(i) soit du fait que le demandeur interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité constitue un danger pour le public au Canada,
(ii) soit, dans le cas de tout autre demandeur, du fait que la demande devrait être rejetée en raison de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes passés ou du danger qu’il constitue pour la sécurité du Canada;
Effect of decision
114 (1) A decision to allow the application for protection has
(a) in the case of an applicant not described in subsection 112(3), the effect of conferring refugee protection; and
(b) in the case of an applicant described in subsection 112(3), the effect of staying the removal order with respect to a country or place in respect of which the applicant was determined to be in need of protection.
Effet de la décision
114 (1) La décision accordant la demande de protection a pour effet de conférer l’asile au demandeur; toutefois, elle a pour effet, s’agissant de celui visé au paragraphe 112(3), de surseoir, pour le pays ou le lieu en cause, à la mesure de renvoi le visant.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (LC 2001, ch 27)
Convention refugee
Définition de réfugié
96 A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
96 A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Person in need of protection
Personne à protéger
97(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
97 (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
[26] The senior decision maker also considered the two assessments referred to in paragraphs 172(2)(a) and (b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].
Applicant described in s. 112(3) of the Act
172 (1) Before making a decision to allow or reject the application of an applicant described in subsection 112(3) of the Act, the Minister shall consider the assessments referred to in subsection (2) and any written response of the applicant to the assessments that is received within 15 days after the applicant is given the assessments.
Assessments
(2) The following assessments shall be given to the applicant:
(a) a written assessment on the basis of the factors set out in section 97 of the Act; and
(b) a written assessment on the basis of the factors set out in subparagraph 113(d)(i) or (ii) of the Act, as the case may be.
Demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3) de la Loi
172 (1) Avant de prendre sa décision accueillant ou rejetant la demande de protection du demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3) de la Loi, le ministre tient compte des évaluations visées au paragraphe (2) et de toute réplique écrite du demandeur à l’égard de ces évaluations, reçue dans les quinze jours suivant la réception de celles-ci.
Évaluations
(2) Les évaluations suivantes sont fournies au demandeur :
a) une évaluation écrite au regard des éléments mentionnés à l’article 97 de la Loi;
b) une évaluation écrite au regard des éléments mentionnés aux sous-alinéas 113d)(i) ou (ii) de la Loi, selon le cas
[27] Section 167 of theIRPR sets out the circumstances in which a hearing is required in the context of a PRRA.
Hearing — prescribed factors
167 For the purpose of determining whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b) of the Act, the factors are the following:
(a) whether there is evidence that raises a serious issue of the applicant’s credibility and is related to the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act;
(b) whether the evidence is central to the decision with respect to the application for protection; and
(c) whether the evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing the application for protection.
Facteurs pour la tenue d’une audience
167 Pour l’application de l’alinéa 113b) de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à décider si la tenue d’une audience est requise :
a) l’existence d’éléments de preuve relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux articles 96 et 97 de la Loi qui soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité du demandeur;
b) l’importance de ces éléments de preuve pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande de protection;
c) la question de savoir si ces éléments de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que soit accordée la protection.
VI. Parties’ submissions
A. Applicant’s submissions
[28] Mr. Tizon Purizaca submits that the senior decision maker did not act fairly towards him because he did not accept the positive opinion issued by the senior immigration officer on January 16, 2016, and at no time did he tell him that he did not agree with that opinion.
[29] Mr. Tizon Purizaca also argues that the senior decision maker breached procedural fairness by failing to invite him to an interview to allow him to submit different evidence and to argue other points of law.
[30] Mr. Tizon Purizaca argues that the senior decision maker did not consider all of the evidence, which renders the decision unreasonable.
[31] Mr. Tizon Purizaca submits that the senior decision maker failed to take into account certain humanitarian and compassionate considerations, namely, the best interests of his minor child.
B. Respondent’s submissions
[32] The respondent submits that Mr. Tizon Purizaca does not state why an interview with the senior decision maker was required considering the factors for holding a hearing set out in section 167 of the IRPR. The respondent adds that without any arguments, there is no basis for the Court to intervene.
[33] The respondent states that Mr. Tizon Purizaca criticizes the senior decision maker for failing to consider evidence.
[34] The respondent also states that Mr. Tizon Purizaca does not specifically challenge the senior decision maker’s findings regarding his situation in Peru in 2023.
[35] According to the respondent, Mr. Tizon Purizaca did not submit any serious issues in the application for leave for judicial review.
[36] The respondent argues that humanitarian and compassionate considerations should not be taken into consideration in a PRRA, which must consider the factors cited in sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.
VII. Analysis
A. The senior decision maker did not breach procedural fairness
[37] I find the applicant’s argument that the senior decision maker breached procedural fairness because he did not accept the senior immigration officer’s positive opinion, issued on January 16, 2016, and did not express his disagreement with that opinion to be without merit in this case.
[38] I am of the view that, by not following the officer’s positive opinion, the senior decision maker did not create a legitimate expectation for Mr. Tizon Purizaca. Many years had elapsed between the officer’s positive opinion in 2016 and the PRRA decision in 2023.
[39] In his 2016 opinion, the officer explained that, even if he considered that the applicant had demonstrated the existence of grounds that show he would face a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if he were to return to Peru, he could not allow the PRRA application. The officer wrote the following: [translation] “However, as I do not have the delegation, I cannot allow the application.As procedure dictates, this positive opinion is referred to the Minister’s delegate for a decision on the stay.” That is exactly what was done in this case.
[40] The senior decision maker also explained the applicable process by stating in the decision that [translation] “I was delegated by the Minister pursuant to subsection 6(2) of the IRPA, as a person with the authority to consider and allow or reject the application for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) submitted by a person who is inadmissible on the grounds of serious criminality . . .”.
[41] The senior decision maker considered the applicant’s arguments in light of recent events and explained why he departed from the officer’s positive opinion. I find no reviewable error in the senior decision maker conducting an analysis based on all the evidence before him, including the applicant’s new evidence (Sutherland v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 278).
[42] A PRRA is a document-based process, although a hearing may be necessary in certain circumstances. Paragraph 113(b) of the IRPA and section 167 of the IRPR provide for discretionary hearings where the decision maker is of the opinion that a hearing is necessary for the following reasons: (1) the evidence raises a serious issue of credibility; (2) the evidence is central to the decision to be made; (3) the evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing the application for protection.
[43] In this case, Mr. Tizon Purizaca also did not state why an interview before the senior decision maker would have been required, considering the provisions of the IRPA and the IRPR. There is no reason for the Court to intervene.
B. The senior decision maker’s decision is reasonable
[44] I am of the view, for the reasons that follow, that the senior decision maker’s decision is reasonable and that it is sufficiently justified, intelligible and transparent.
[45] Mr. Tizon Purizaca argues that the senior decision maker unreasonably disregarded relevant documentary evidence showing the risks he would face in Peru without specifying exactly what evidence was disregarded. As noted above, the senior decision maker analyzed all of the evidence available to him, including the applicant’s new evidence and all of the submissions he had made, and referred to this evidence several times in his decision.
[46] The senior decision maker acknowledged the documents the applicant had provided in June 2023. This was documentary evidence relating to two criminal groups in Peru, Los Maladitos de Bayovar and Tren de Aragua, and their mode of operation. However, while the evidence explained their mode of operation, the applicant did not establish links between these two groups and the group that had targeted him.
[47] The senior decision maker took into account the fact that the evidence shows that the applicant’s parents and one of his brothers lived in Lima (his father died in May 2021) and that throughout that period, no agents of harm contacted the family to find the applicant. This means that the applicant has not heard from Los Malditos de Talualpac for eight years. The senior decision maker also considered the evidence which shows that the group does not appear to have been active in 2023. The decision took into account the fact that the applicant no longer owns his business, that his children are now in Canada and that he did not explain why the criminal group, should it have remained active, would still be motivated to look for him or to attack him if he returned to Peru.
[48] I note that, after analyzing all of the evidence, the senior decision maker concluded, regarding the risks of returning to Peru, that Mr. Tizon Purizaca failed to establish a serious possibility of persecution on one of the Convention grounds or that, on the balance of probabilities, he would be personally subjected to a danger of torture, to a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if he were to return to his country. The senior decision maker also found that Mr. Tizon Purizaca had not established that he would personally face a section 97 risk or a risk to his life not faced generally by other Peruvians, and that consequently, the applicant does not meet the requirement of subparagraph 97(1)(b)(ii) of the IRPA.
[49] All in all, I am of the view that the senior decision maker’s reasons enable the Court to understand the basis of his determination that the applicant’s new evidence was insufficient.
[50] Essentially, the applicant is asking this Court to reassess the evidence in his favour. This is not the purpose of judicial review (Vavilov at para 125). In other words, I find that the PRRA officer’s reasoning, when read holistically and contextually, demonstrates an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that allows the Court to connect the dots (Vavilov, at paras 85 and 97 (citing Komolafe v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 431 at para 11)).
[51] Mr. Tizon Purizaca’s allegation that the senior decision maker failed to take into account humanitarian and compassionate considerations such as the best interests of his minor child, the fact that his family would be separated if he were to return to Peru, his establishment in Canada and, according to his submissions at the hearing, the fact that he is well-regarded by the Peruvian community in Montréal, is without merit. This is not an element that the senior decision maker must consider in a PRRA application.
[52] Humanitarian and compassionate considerations are not among the factors that an officer must consider under section 96 or section 97 of the IRPA (Ammar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1041 at para 15; Lewis v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 130 at para 61; Azimi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1177 at para 21; Tapambwa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 34, [2020] 1 FCR 700, at para 53).
VIII. Conclusion
[53] For the reasons set out above, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
[54] The evidence does not allow me to conclude that the senior decision maker breached his duty of procedural fairness, and Mr. Tizon Purizaca has not demonstrated that the decision is unreasonable.
[55] The parties have not proposed any certified questions, and I agree that none arise.
JUDGMENT in IMM-14293-23
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is as follows:
The application for judicial review is dismissed.
There are no questions for certification.
“L. Saint-Fleur”
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET:
IMM-14293-23
STYLE OF CAUSE:
OSCAR FERNANDO TIZON PURIZACA v MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP
PLACE OF HEARING:
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING:
JANUARY 21, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:
SAINT-FLEUR J.
DATED:
MAY 8, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Robin Dejardin
FOR THE APPLICANT
Margarita Tzavelakos
FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Robin Dejardin Cabinet d’avocats
Montréal, Quebec
FOR THE APPLICANT
Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec
FOR THE RESPONDENT