Ottawa, Ontario, June 15, 2021
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Pentney
BETWEEN:
DALE RICHARDSON
Plaintiff
and
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH, CIVILIAN REVIEW AND COMPLAINTS COMMISSION, GRAND LODGE OF SASKATCHEWAN, COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN, J.A CALDWELL, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CORECIVIC, DEREK ALLCHURCH, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, CONSTABLE BURTON ROY, BATTLEFORDS SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH, JAMES KWON, MAZEL HOLM, GARY LUND, DAWN LUND, CIPRIAN BOLAH, JEANNIE JOHNSON, MANITOBA-SASKATCHEWAN CONFERENCE, MICHAEL COLLINS, MATRIX LAW GROUP, CLIFFORD HOLM, PATRICIA J. MEIKLEJOHN, CHANTELLE THOMPSON, JENNIFER SCHMIDT, MARK CLEMENTS, CHAD GARTNER, BRAD APPEL, IAN MCARTHUR, BRYCE BOHUN, KATHY IRWIN, JASON PANCHYSHYN, CARY RANSOME, SASKATCHEWAN HEALTH AUTHORITY, DR. ALABI, RIKKI MORRISSON, CORA SWERID, DR. ELEKWEM, DR. SUNDAY, COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN, JILL COOK, GLEN METIVER, JUSTICE R.W. ELSON, JUSTICE CROOKS, OWZW LAWYERS LLP, VIRGIL A. THOMSON, PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN, HONOURABLE JUDGE M. PELLETIER, RAYMOND HEBERT, LINDA HEBERT, EMI HOLM, CHAR BLAIR, COMMUNITY FUTURES, LISA CIMMER and KIMBERLEY RICHARDSON
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Introduction
[1] As you know, I have had the benefit of reviewing the written material filed by all of the parties, and so some of this is based on my notes from that. I am also familiar with the law on interlocutory injunctions. I have also taken into account the oral submissions made on Thursday, June 10, 2021. Although some of the Plaintiff’s submissions were difficult to hear because of the quality of the phone connection, I was able to hear his main points and answers to my questions, and I had the benefit of the parties’ written representations, which all parties relied upon.
[2] The following written Order and Reasons are based on the verbal Order given at the conclusion of the hearing on June 10, 2021. These reasons have been edited for style and grammar.
II. Background
[3] Dale Richardson, the Plaintiff in this matter, filed a Statement of Claim on November 18, 2020, naming 57 parties as Defendants, and seeking a variety of relief.
[4] On March 29, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion seeking an interlocutory injunction against a subset of these Defendants, namely: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Saskatchewan Health Authority, Matrix Law Group, Cary Ransome, Chad Gartner, Mark Clements, Ian McArthur, Kathy Irwin, Brad Appel, Chantelle Thompson, Jennifer Schmidt; Virgil A. Thomson, OWZW Lawyers LLP, Bryce Bohun, Jason Panchyshyn, Clifford Holm, Patricia J. Meiklejohn, and Kimberley Richardson.
[5] The Plaintiff’s Motion was further to the procedure set out in the Order of Prothonotary Mireille Tabib dated March 24, 2021, following a case management conference held on March 23, 2021.
[6] The Plaintiff has brought the interlocutory motion against these Defendants because he asserts that they are “using their authority, position and numbers to unlawfully interfere with justice, to torture and terrori[ze]”
the Plaintiff and his daughters (Plaintiff’s Written Representations at para 1 [emphasis in original]).
[7] This is the motion that is before the Court.
III. The Plaintiff’s allegations and claims
[8] In seeking interlocutory relief, the Plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, which he sets out in paragraph 63 of his Written Representations. The allegations in respect of the relief sought are set out in a detailed Motion Record of 5,028 pages. These claims for relief provide a helpful way of categorizing his claims, which can be summarized in the following way.
[9] The Plaintiff makes allegations of harassment, torture, and interference against a number of the Defendants and seeks to restrain such behaviour. Arguments and narrative relating to this are found throughout the Plaintiff’s Written Representations.
[10] The Plaintiff also makes claims against a number of individuals regarding his membership and accounts at the Innovation Credit Union. Some of the details for these are found at paragraphs 6, 8, 11, and 37-42 of the Plaintiff’s Written Representations.
[11] Next, the Plaintiff’s materials contain a series of claims relating to actions and orders made in the context of his family dispute with his spouse, Kimberley Richardson, including:
- surface parcel No. 153874659 located at 1292 95th St., North Battleford, SK, which he seeks to have returned to him;
- access to his daughter and information regarding her whereabouts; and
- return of his work materials, reference materials, and other possessions.
[12] He also seeks to reverse an order in relation to the matrimonial home that was the subject of the family dispute between him and Ms. Richardson. Some of the details relating to the claims arising from the Plaintiff’s matrimonial dispute are found at paragraphs 13-16, 24, 26, 28, 29, 35, and 44 of the Plaintiff’s Written Representations.
[13] Finally, the Plaintiff makes allegations against the Saskatchewan Health Authority and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in relation to steps taken under provincial health legislation. He says that they had no basis to justify the mental health warrant that was used to apprehend him. In respect of the RCMP, the Plaintiff also asserts that he was barred entry to the RCMP detachment at Battleford, Saskatchewan, and that the RCMP refused to continue receiving further information and evidence from him. He seeks the contact information of an individual constable with the RCMP, which he says he needs for the purposes of conducting investigations. Some of the details for these claims are found at paragraphs 10, 12, 34, 46, and 48-51 of the Plaintiff’s Written Representations.
[14] In addition to the various forms of interlocutory relief sought, the Plaintiff seeks an order for legal and incidental costs in the range of $6,000,000. These are set out in paragraph 63 of the Plaintiff’s Written Representations.
IV. Issue
[15] The only issue is whether the Plaintiff has met the test to obtain an interlocutory injunction. This involves consideration of whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction to grant him the relief he seeks, and also whether he has met the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction.
V. Analysis
[16] The analysis is organized into three parts:
- The question of jurisdiction;
- The law on interlocutory injunctions; and
- The application of the facts to the three-part test.
A. The question of jurisdiction
[17] The jurisdiction of this Court to grant injunctive relief is set out in the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Act]. There are two references to injunctions in the Act. First, paragraph 18(1)(a) provides that the Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to “issue an injunction… against any federal board, commission or other tribunal”.
[18] This obviously does not apply here, because the Plaintiff does not seek an injunction against any federal board, commission, or other tribunal.
[19] The second possible source of jurisdiction is set out in section 44 of the Act, and the relevant portion of that states: “In addition to any other relief that the… Federal Court may grant or award… an injunction… in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so. The order may be made unconditionally or on any terms and conditions that the court considers just.”
[20] Section 44 does not serve to grant this Court some overarching or stand-alone jurisdiction, akin to that which is said to exist for provincial superior courts of inherent jurisdiction; there must still be some federal “hook” before section 44 can apply.
[21] Several Defendants argue that this Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the Plaintiff’s claims because they involve matters falling within provincial jurisdiction, including family law, matrimonial property, and the administration of the provincial health legislation.
[22] The RCMP also argues that this Court should not restrain its officers from carrying out their lawful duties, but this is better dealt with in the discussion below.
[23] The Plaintiff argues that the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1987, 1465 UNTS 85 [UN Torture Convention] is the applicable law and the source of the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate in this matter. He says that under the UN Torture Convention, jurisdiction is not relegated to a specific court and therefore the Federal Court has the jurisdiction.
[24] I find that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the Plaintiff’s claims. To the extent that his claims relate to the conduct of counsel in representing Ms. Richardson in the family law dispute, this is not a “federal” matter; The regulation of professions is dealt with by provincial law, and the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that family law disputes are within provincial jurisdiction: Strickland v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37.
[25] To the extent that his claims relate to the administration of provincial health legislation, or its enforcement, this is also a matter that falls within provincial jurisdiction.
[26] To the extent his claims relate to allegations of torture, the claims cannot stand for several reasons, however, at this stage it is sufficient to note that the administration of criminal justice is a matter that falls within provincial jurisdiction under the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5, and it is not for this Court to issue orders interfering with that. There is no other basis on which to base jurisdiction in this Court to restrain the actions of provincial Superior Courts or Courts of Appeal, the RCMP, provincial health authorities, or lawyers and others employed by provincially-regulated entities.
[27] For all of these reasons, I conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the claims advanced by the Plaintiff.
[28] Although this is sufficient to deal with this matter, I will continue and address the issue of whether the Plaintiff has satisfied the test for an interlocutory injunction.
B. The law on interlocutory injunctions
[29] The familiar three-part test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction was recently summarized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, 2018 SCC 5 at paragraph 12 [CBC]:
… At the first stage, the application judge is to undertake a preliminary investigation of the merits to decide whether the applicant demonstrates a “serious question to be tried”, in the sense that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious. The applicant must then, at the second stage, convince the court that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is refused. Finally, the third stage of the test requires an assessment of the balance of convenience, in order to identify the party which would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits.
[Footnotes omitted.]
[30] The three elements of the test are cumulative, but strength in one factor may overcome weakness on another (see the discussion in Monsanto v Canada (Health), 2020 FC 1053 at para 50). At the end of the day, it is important to remember that an interlocutory injunction is equitable relief, and a degree of flexibility must be preserved in order to ensure that the remedy can be effective when it is needed to prevent a risk of imminent harm pending a ruling on the merits of the dispute. This was reaffirmed in Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 at paragraph 1, where the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “[u]ltimately, the question is whether granting the injunction would be just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.”
(1) Serious Issue
[31] In most interlocutory injunction cases, the “serious issue to be tried”
threshold is not a high bar – it is often summarized as merely requiring the judge to make a preliminary assessment of the case to ensure that the claim is neither “vexatious nor frivolous”
(RJR – MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311 at 337 [RJR – MacDonald]). This is particularly the case where the interlocutory injunction seeks to stop something from happening. There are exceptions, such as where the injunction will likely put an end to the litigation, but that does not apply here.
[32] The focus in most cases is on the strength of the underlying case. An interlocutory injunction is, by its nature, intended to preserve the status quo pending a determination of the underlying dispute, and this branch of the test seeks to ensure that otherwise lawful activity is not stopped where the main lawsuit is destined to fail because it is totally lacking in merit.
[33] Several Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because the Plaintiff’s case is frivolous or vexatious; they point to several considerations:
- The lack of details in the allegations;
- That many of his claims are against individuals who have been involved in his family law dispute with his wife, including the custody order and the sale of the family home – which were done pursuant to orders made by the Court of Queen’s Bench in Saskatchewan;
- That some of the relief he seeks (for example, to be reinstated as a member in the Innovation Credit Union) is not available because that organization was not named as a defendant on the motion; and
- That he makes serious, unwarranted, insulting, or disparaging allegations and remarks directed at many of the individual Defendants – namely his claims of torture, harassment, and interference. There are no facts pleaded to support such claims. In the past this Court has found that defendants or respondents should not be forced to answer scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious allegations such as these, and that claimants should not lightly make bald claims alleging serious criminal offences (Badawy v 1038482 Alberta Ltd, 2018 FC 807; Brauer v Canada, 2020 FC 828).
[34] The Plaintiff submits that there is a serious issue on account of torture and corruption, as well as that the Defendants have not brought forward evidence to show that the orders or actions were lawful, or to rebut his extensive evidence that he has been tortured.
[35] I find that:
- the Plaintiff has not established a serious issue to be tried, even applying the low threshold;
- his primary claims relate to alleged torture, but while he makes repeated claims about that, he does not provide details to support it. Furthermore, to the extent that he does provide any specifics, they relate to public officials carrying out lawful duties or orders, or they relate to individuals acting in conjunction with legal disputes that remain before the courts; and
- none of this meets the definition of torture as set out in the law.
[36] Furthermore, I agree with the comment of Justice Kalmakoff at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, that the acts the Plaintiff terms as torture “are all things that arose from were inherent in, or were incidental to measures that are authorized by law” (Richardson v Richardson (8 March 2021) Regina, CACV3745 at para 31 cited in Richardson v Richardson, 2021 SKCA 58 at para 14).
[37] The fact that the Plaintiff does not agree with these measures does not make them torture, and there are legal processes available to him to pursue his rights in relation to these matters.
(2) Irreparable Harm
[38] The term irreparable harm refers to the nature of the harm rather than its scope or reach. It is generally described as a harm that cannot adequately be compensated in damages, or cured (RJR – MacDonald at 341). It has often been stated that this harm cannot be based on mere speculation, it must be established through clear and compelling evidence: see Glooscap Heritage Society v Canada (National Revenue), 2012 FCA 255 at para 31 [Glooscap]; Gateway City Church v Canada (National Revenue), 2013 FCA 126 at paras 15-16; Newbould v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 106 at paras 28-29. In addition, the evidence must demonstrate a high likelihood that the harm will occur, not that it is merely possible. This will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case (see the discussion in Letnes v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 636 at paras 49-58).
[39] However, equitable relief must retain its necessary flexibility, and it must be admitted that some forms of harm do not readily admit of proof, especially in interlocutory proceedings where speed is of the essence and the ability to prepare a complete evidentiary record is necessarily somewhat limited. What is required, at the end of the day, is a “sound evidentiary foundation” for the assessment of the harm; mere assertions or speculation on the part of the applicant will never be sufficient (see e.g. Vancouver Aquarium Marine Science Centre v Charbonneau, 2017 BCCA 395 at para 60; Ahousaht First Nation v Canada (Fisheries, Oceans and Coast Guard), 2019 FC 1116 at paras 87-88).
[40] The law requires that the Plaintiff prove harm to his own interests – not those of a third party.
[41] In RJR – MacDonald, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that in regard to irreparable harm, “the only issue to be decided is whether a refusal to grant relief could so adversely affect the applicants’ own interests that the harm could not be remedied” (at 341). This has recently been affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in two recent decisions: Air Passengers Rights v Canada (Transportation Agency), 2020 FCA 92 at para 30 (leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39266 (23 December 2020)); and Arctic Cat, Inc v Bombardier Recreational Products Inc, 2020 FCA 116 at para 32.
[42] Additionally, to succeed, the Plaintiff must establish an unavoidable harm, defined as “irreparable harm that will be caused by the failure to get a stay, not harm caused by its own conduct in running a clearly-known risk that it actually knew about, could have avoided, but deliberately chose to accept” (Spencer v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 361 at para 95, citing Glooscap at para 39).
[43] The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to establish irreparable harm, let alone meet the high evidentiary threshold imposed by the case law:
the fact that he has been subject to lawful orders by a competent court in the family law proceeding cannot constitute irreparable harm;
the fact that provincial health authorities, and the RCMP, took steps to enforce valid provincial law, also cannot constitute irreparable harm;
the fact that the RCMP has not investigated every claim or allegation he has made, cannot constitute irreparable harm; and
the Plaintiff is now in the United States, and so the RCMP and Saskatchewan Health Authority will not be dealing with him until he returns to Canada.
[44] The Plaintiff contends that there is ongoing harm to him and that no human being should be “forced to live like this.” He has not been able to see his daughter for more than a year and she is entitled to her parent. He says he does not trust the health and police authorities in protecting her or providing medical care to her.
[45] I find that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm, as that term is understood in Canadian law, between the date of his application and the determination of his underlying claim.
[46] First, the Plaintiff has gone to the United States and it is not certain when he will return; this gives rise to two points:
- the Defendants will not be dealing with him during this interim period, other than in relation to any ongoing court proceedings relating to his action, or the family law matter; and
- a party cannot obtain an interlocutory injunction to forestall any harm that is caused by their own voluntary actions.
[47] Second, the law requires proof that irreparable harm will occur, not that it has occurred – and the Plaintiff’s allegations of torture and abuse are all backward looking.
[48] Third, the law requires proof at a high level of specificity, as described earlier. The Plaintiff has failed to provide such proof here.
(3) Balance of Convenience
[49] The third stage of the test “requires an assessment of the balance of convenience, in order to identify the party which would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits” (CBC at para 12). The expression often used is “balance of inconvenience”. The factors that must be considered in assessing this element of the test are numerous and will vary with the circumstances of each case.
[50] The Defendants submit that taking into account the Court’s lack of jurisdiction, the nature of the relief sought by the Plaintiff, the harm alleged, and the public interest, the balance of convenience favours dismissing the motion.
[51] The Plaintiff submits that the balance of convenience favours his interests. He says that he is looking for a court to protect his personal, individual interests as a person and as a father, and that he wants the torture to stop.
[52] I find that in view of my conclusions on the first two grounds, and the jurisdiction question, the balance of convenience strongly favours the Defendants.
VI. Costs
[53] As noted earlier, the Plaintiff seeks costs from various parties in the range of $6,000,000.
[54] The Defendants each seek their costs on this motion. They submit that if they are successful in this, and given the nature of the claims advanced by the Plaintiff despite his repeated lack of success in other courts, including this Court, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, they should be awarded costs. They seek a lump sum amount set in accordance with the Court’s discretion. The Defendants Kimberley Richardson and Matrix Law Group seek solicitor-client costs to reflect their efforts in responding to the voluminous materials filed by the Plaintiff.
[55] The Plaintiff argues that he seeks these costs to persuade these Defendants, and public authorities, to obey the rule of law and to stop the torture, abuse, and mistreatment that he and his daughter have been subjected to.
[56] I find that there is no basis to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the cause.
[57] While I have considered the arguments of Ms. Richardson and Matrix Law Group, I am not persuaded that this is a case in which solicitor-client costs are appropriate.
[58] In exercise of the Court’s discretion, and taking into account (i) the nature of the claims advanced by the Plaintiff, the length of his written record, and the fact that he recently filed supplementary materials; (ii) the result in the matter, namely that the Defendants were entirely successful on all grounds; and (iii) the fact that the Plaintiff has litigated somewhat similar matters previously, as reflected in the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, I award costs in the lump sum amount of $1,000, payable forthwith, to each of the Defendant groups represented by counsel at the hearing.
VII. Conclusion
[59] For these reasons, I am dismissing this motion for an interlocutory injunction.
[60] On costs, the Plaintiff will pay a lump-sum, all-inclusive amount of $1,000, payable forthwith, to each of the following Defendants, or groups of Defendants:
- the Attorney General of Canada ($1,000);
- the Saskatchewan Health Authority ($1,000);
- OWZW Lawyers LLP, Cary Ransome, Chad Gartner, Mark Clements, Ian McArthur, Kathy Irwin, Brad Appel, Chantelle Thompson, Jennifer Schmidt, Virgil A. Thomson, Bryce Bohun and Jason Panchyshyn, ($1,000); and
- Matrix Law Group, Clifford Holm, Patricia J. Meiklejohn and Kimberly Richardson ($1,000).
ORDER in T-1404-20
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
- The motion for an interlocutory injunction is dismissed.
- The Plaintiff shall pay lump sum costs in the amount of $1,000 to each of the Defendants or groups of Defendants, as follows:
- The Attorney General of Canada ($1,000);
- the Saskatchewan Health Authority ($1,000);
- OWZW Lawyers LLP, Cary Ransome, Chad Gartner, Mark Clements, Ian McArthur, Kathy Irwin, Brad Appel, Chantelle Thompson, Jennifer Schmidt, Virgil A. Thomson, Bryce Bohun and Jason Panchyshyn, ($1,000); and
- Matrix Law Group, Clifford Holm, Patricia J. Meiklejohn and Kimberly Richardson ($1,000).
“William F. Pentney”
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET:
T-1404-20
STYLE OF CAUSE:
DALE RICHARDSON v SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH ET AL.
PLACE OF HEARING:
HEARD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE
DATE OF HEARING:
June 10, 2021
ORDER AND REASONS:
PENTNEY J.
DATED:
June 15, 2021
APPEARANCES:
Dale Richardson
For The Plaintiff (ON HIS OWN BEHALF)
Virgil Thomson
For The Defendants VIRGIL A. THOMSON, CHANTELLE THOMPSON, JENNIFER SCHMIDT, MARK CLEMENTS, CHAD GARTNER, BRAD APPEL, IAN MCARTHUR, BRYCE BOHUN, KATHY IRWIN, JASON PANCHYSHYN, CARY RANSOME,AND OWZW LAWYERS LLP
Cheryl Giesbrecht
FOR THE DEFENDANTS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Chantelle Eisner
FOR THE DEFENDANTS SASKATCHEWAN HEALTH AUTHORITY
Annie M. Alport
FOR THE DEFENDANTS MATRIX LAW GROUP, CLIFFORD HOLM, PATRICIA MEIKLEJOHN, AND KIMBERLEY RICHARDSON
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
OWZW Lawyers LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Regina, Saskatchewan
For The Defendants VIRGIL A. THOMSON, CHANTELLE THOMPSON, JENNIFER SCHMIDT, MARK CLEMENTS, CHAD GARTNER, BRAD APPEL, IAN MCARTHUR, BRYCE BOHUN, KATHY IRWIN, JASON PANCHYSHYN, CARY RANSOME,AND OWZW LAWYERS LLP
Attorney General of Canada
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
FOR THE DEFENDANTS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
McDougall Gauley LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
FOR THE DEFENDANTS SASKATCHEWAN HEALTH AUTHORITY
Miller Thomson LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Calgary, Alberta
FOR THE DEFENDANTS MATRIX LAW GROUP, CLIFFORD HOLM, PATRICIA MEIKLEJOHN, AND KIMBERLEY RICHARDSON