F. Brennan

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay in his trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court had to determine whether the delay calculation began on the date of arrest or the date the information was sworn, and whether the 'end of trial' included the time taken to hear the post-verdict s. 11(b) application.

The court held that the delay calculation begins when the information is sworn and ends when the verdict is rendered.

As the total delay was 29 months and 24 days, falling below the 30-month ceiling, and the accused conceded he could not establish unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found cocaine, scales, dime bags, weapons, and ammunition.

The accused pleaded guilty to simple possession but denied the purpose of trafficking, testifying that the drugs and paraphernalia belonged to a guest who had left them behind.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's exculpatory testimony as incredible and illogical.

Relying on the expert evidence of a police detective regarding indicia of trafficking, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 8 rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant was drafted hastily and lacked sufficient grounds, and that police caused unreasonable damage to his property during the search.

The court found the ITO contained sufficient reliable evidence to justify the warrant and that the applicant failed to prove police caused unreasonable damage.

The application was dismissed, with the court noting that even if a breach had occurred, a Grant analysis would favour admitting the evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine after police, acting on a tip from a confidential informant, arrested him while he was walking his dog.

A search incident to arrest at the police station revealed 7.6 grams of methamphetamine hidden inside the dog's harness.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure under sections 8 and 9.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on the compelling, credible, and corroborated informant tip.

The subsequent search of the dog's harness was deemed a valid search incident to lawful arrest.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of possession.

The accused were charged with multiple offences including aggravated assault, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement against their roommate, a vulnerable individual with cognitive limitations.

The complainant suffered severe burn injuries from boiling water, which she initially claimed were self-inflicted but later testified were caused by the accused.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the sexual assault, confinement, and assault with weapons to be inconsistent and unreliable, resulting in acquittals on those charges.

However, relying on expert medical evidence that the extensive burn patterns were inconsistent with self-harm, the court found both accused guilty of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault simplicitor under s. 266 of the Criminal Code and the resulting sentence of four months’ imprisonment and probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework in evaluating defence evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not misapprehend the evidence, and did not shift the burden of proof, and therefore dismissed the conviction appeal.

However, the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by improperly discounting rehabilitation and effectively treating the accused’s decision to proceed to trial as indicative of a lack of remorse.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the custodial term was reduced to 75 days to be served intermittently.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, criminal negligence, and possession of stolen property after crashing a stolen vehicle into a house.

The accused suffered severe, life-altering injuries requiring constant medical care.

The court considered Gladue factors, though finding a tenuous link, and the accused's dire medical situation as mitigating factors.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 21 months net after credit for pre-trial custody, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and restitution.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code arising from sexual activity with a complainant who had been sleeping in another man’s bedroom after drinking alcohol.

The central issue was whether the complainant consented or whether the accused reasonably believed she was consenting, including the possibility that she mistakenly believed the accused was another individual.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and reviewed evidence from the complainant, the accused, an eyewitness, and forensic experts.

While the judge rejected much of the accused’s testimony and had concerns about aspects of the complainant’s evidence, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown therefore failed to establish the offence on the criminal standard.