Dr. D. Schmidt

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that found she did not sustain a catastrophic impairment.

The applicant argued the adjudicator breached procedural fairness by demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias against her psychiatric assessor and by failing to consider all expert reports.

She also alleged errors of law and fact regarding the assessment of her pain and adaptation to work-like settings under the AMA Guides.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the request, finding no evidence of bias, noting the adjudicator properly weighed the evidence, and concluding there were no errors in the application of the catastrophic impairment criteria.

The applicant sought a determination of catastrophic impairment following a motor vehicle accident, claiming a class 5 extreme mental and behavioural impairment.

The applicant moved to exclude the respondent's insurer's examination report by a psychologist, which the Tribunal denied, finding that the restrictions in section 45(2) of the Schedule apply to insured persons, not insurers.

On the merits, the Tribunal found the applicant did not sustain a catastrophic impairment, giving no weight to her psychiatric expert's report due to methodological deficiencies, lack of an occupational therapy assessment, and over-reliance on the applicant's inconsistent self-reporting.

The application for benefits and an award was dismissed.

The applicant sought various medical and rehabilitation benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that only the physiotherapy treatment plan was reasonable and necessary, relying on the recommendation of the applicant's family physician.

The remaining claims for massage therapy, chiropractic treatment, occupational therapy, a qEEG assessment, and various other expenses were denied due to insufficient medical evidence or because they were incurred prior to the submission of a treatment plan.

The Tribunal also awarded the applicant 10% of the amounts withheld for two psychological treatment plans, finding that the respondent unreasonably delayed funding despite having sufficient evidence to approve them.