Dr. Ariel Shafro

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2014 motor vehicle accident, claiming catastrophic impairment due to psychological and physical injuries, as well as attendant care benefits.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accident was a necessary cause of her psychological impairments, noting significant pre-existing conditions and surveillance evidence contradicting her reported limitations.

The Tribunal also found the applicant did not meet the whole person impairment threshold for physical and psychological impairments combined.

Claims for attendant care benefits were denied as the applicant was not catastrophically impaired and failed to prove the expenses were incurred.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission under s. 20(5) of the Mental Health Act and a finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court held that the Board’s finding of involuntary status was unreasonable because it relied on unreliable hearsay evidence and insufficient medical evidence to establish a likelihood of serious bodily harm or serious physical impairment.

However, the court upheld the Board’s determination that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, finding clear, cogent, and compelling evidence that he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment due to his mental condition.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part.

The involuntary status finding was set aside, but the incapacity determination was confirmed.

This is a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving an amended protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto regarding a child (A.L.) born in 2010.

The child was apprehended on December 17, 2010, due to the mother's mental health crisis, suicidal ideation, domestic conflict within the parental relationship, and concerns about parental capacity.

The Society sought a Crown wardship order with no access to facilitate adoption.

The parents opposed the application and sought the child's return to their care.

The court found the child was in need of protection but determined that return to the parents with a supervision order was in the child's best interests, rejecting the Society's adoption plan.

The court applied section 70(4) of the CFSA to extend the time for Society wardship to facilitate a gradual transition home over four months.