E. O’Marra

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted after finding the accused impaired while seated in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with the engine running, relying on the statutory presumption of care or control.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge failed to analyze whether the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) had been rebutted by the accused’s evidence that he did not intend to drive.

The trial judge also failed to conduct a proper risk-of-danger analysis required where the Crown seeks to establish actual care or control.

Because the reasons did not reveal the necessary analytical steps, appellate review was impossible and the conviction could not stand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The Crown brought two applications to admit similar fact evidence in a prosecution for multiple commercial break and enter offences.

The first application sought admission of the accused’s prior convictions for numerous break and enters committed several years earlier.

The second sought to permit count‑to‑count similar fact reasoning among the charged offences.

The court held that the alleged similarities—such as targeting commercial food premises, nighttime entries, use of dark clothing, and removal of door glass—were generic and did not amount to a distinctive signature or sufficiently striking pattern.

The Crown also failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary link connecting the accused to the charged offences.

Both applications were therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for a declaration that the offence of trafficking a person under 18 under s. 279.011 of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that it was overly broad, impermissibly vague, and allowed conviction with insufficient mens rea.

The court held that the statutory requirement that the acts be done “for the purpose of exploiting or facilitating exploitation” imports a high subjective mens rea consistent with the serious stigma and penalties of the offence.

Interpreted purposively, the concepts of exploitation and the reasonable person standard provide sufficient precision and do not create unconstitutional overbreadth or vagueness.

The applicant failed to establish a Charter breach.