Elli Cohen

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a separation agreement reached via email correspondence.

The responding party argued that the moving party had repudiated the agreement by changing counsel and failing to sign a formal settlement agreement before the offer's expiry.

The court found no evidence of repudiation, noting that the moving party's retention of new counsel to review the agreement did not constitute resiling from it.

The court concluded that a binding agreement had been reached and granted the motion, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the moving party.

The respondent mother sought leave to appeal a temporary custody order granting the father temporary custody and specified access.

The motion judge considered the test under r. 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring either a conflicting decision or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order coupled with issues of broader importance.

The court found no conflict with existing jurisprudence concerning maintaining the status quo in interim custody matters and concluded the motion judge properly applied the best interests of the child test under the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The court held the decision to alter the status quo was supported by compelling reasons related to the mother’s conduct in obtaining ex parte relief in another jurisdiction.

Leave to appeal was refused.

Following a lengthy family law trial in which the wife was largely successful, the court addressed remaining issues concerning security for various payments ordered against the husband.

The court confirmed its authority under s. 34(1)(k) of the Family Law Act to secure child and spousal support, as well as prejudgment interest related to the equalization payment, by way of a charge on the husband's property.

However, it declined to secure payment of land rent and the prejudgment interest associated with that rent, finding that ss. 10 and 12 of the Family Law Act did not apply to those obligations.

The court also refused to secure costs through the property charge, concluding that the relevant rule applies only where a costs order remains unpaid after default.