C.S. Nelson

The parties separated after a short marriage.

Prior to marriage, they signed a contract excluding the applicant's significant corporate assets from net family property but requiring him to pay child support for the respondent's two children from a previous relationship.

The applicant sought to set aside the child support provision, arguing he no longer stood in the place of a parent.

The court upheld the marriage contract, finding the applicant stood in loco parentis and that setting aside the provision would be unconscionable.

The court determined the applicant's income based on his spending habits rather than corporate profits, ordering child support for all three children and spousal support for five years.

The respondent brought a motion to stay a family law proceeding, arguing that minutes of settlement constituted a binding arbitration agreement for child and spousal support issues.

The applicant opposed the motion, asserting that the minutes of settlement did not meet the mandatory formal requirements for family arbitration agreements under O. Reg. 134/07 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the minutes of settlement lacked the necessary formalities and that the parties' subsequent conduct indicated an understanding that a secondary, formal arbitration agreement was a condition precedent.

Following the withdrawal of a spousal support application, the estate trustees of the deceased respondent sought a costs order jointly and severally against the applicant and her former lawyer.

The trustees alleged the proceeding was frivolous and vexatious and argued the lawyer had acted in conflict of interest and improperly initiated litigation despite knowing the claim had no chance of success.

The court considered Rules 12(3) and 24(9) of the Family Law Rules and the principles governing personal costs orders against counsel.

The court held the support claim was not clearly devoid of merit because statutory provisions permit setting aside domestic contracts in cases of unconscionability or lack of disclosure.

As the lawyer had acted on instructions and did not run up costs or abuse the court’s process, no personal costs order was warranted.