C. Letman

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for failing a roadside screening device test.

A police officer found a bag containing 42.5 grams of cocaine on the ground near the passenger side of the accused's vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove possession.

The court found that the evidence, including the dampness of the bag and the fact that the area was a busy intersection, did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the only person who could have possessed the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 1.568 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the established sentencing range for cocaine importation of roughly three to five years for quantities around one kilogram, noting the seriousness of the offence and the societal harm caused by cocaine trafficking.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and personal circumstances.

After considering the quantity of cocaine and the early guilty plea, the court determined that a fit sentence before credit would be just under 39 months.

Applying enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio for 176 days served, the effective sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment, along with a weapons prohibition order and a DNA order.

The accused were charged with importing cocaine after returning from Panama with new suitcases containing the drug.

At the close of evidence in their jury trial, the Crown requested that the jury be instructed on wilful blindness as a substitute for actual knowledge.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence, including the accused's interactions with a suspicious individual who helped them buy the luggage, and their failure to inspect the bags.

The court concluded there was no air of reality to the doctrine of wilful blindness on the facts, as the circumstances were not so inherently suspicious as to suggest deliberate ignorance.

The Crown's request was denied, and the jury was to be instructed only on actual knowledge.

During a pre-charge conference in a trial for importing cocaine, the moving party requested a jury instruction based on the Schell principle.

The requested instruction would direct the jury to acquit both co-accused if they were satisfied one committed the offence but could not determine which one.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the Schell principle only applies where there is no evidence the accused acted together.

Because there was ample evidence of joint participation and the accused were alleged to be joint principals, the instruction had no air of reality.

The accused was arrested at Pearson International Airport after returning from Panama when customs officers discovered approximately two pounds of cocaine hidden in four health care product bottles in her checked luggage.

The accused claimed she was an innocent courier who had been tricked by her travelling companion into carrying the bottles.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and inconsistent, finding that her demeanour and actions at the airport, including attempting to abandon her suitcase and hiding baggage tags in her bra, demonstrated guilty knowledge.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly imported the cocaine and found her guilty.