Christopher Statham

The defendants sought costs following a successful summary judgment motion that dismissed the plaintiff's action based on a prior settlement and release.

The release stipulated that any party breaching it would be liable for costs on a 'solicitor and his own client scale.' The court held that this phrase is synonymous with full indemnity costs, distinguishing prior case law that equated it with substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs, fixing them at $70,235.52 for one defendant and $110,000 for the other two defendants, reducing the latter's claim due to overstaffing.

The applicant sought an order directing the release of funds held in trust following the settlement of two professional negligence actions against KPMG.

The parties disputed the interpretation of an Assignment Agreement and a Mutual Release regarding the distribution of the settlement funds and the return of monies paid into court as security for costs.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, finding that the Release did not bar the application, the respondent was not entitled to reimbursement of litigation expenses in the absence of a costs award, and the security for costs funds were not 'net amounts recovered' from the litigation.

The court ordered the funds distributed according to its interpretation of the agreements, apportioning the remaining settlement funds equally between the two actions.

The defendant general contractor moved to have a subcontractor's construction lien declared expired for failure to preserve it in a timely manner under the Construction Act.

The moving party argued the last bona fide supply of services occurred in December 2019, while the responding party provided uncontradicted affidavit evidence that work continued until February 2020 due to delays.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the date of the last bona fide supply, as the conflicting evidence and final invoices needed to be tested through cross-examination.

The applicant sought to quash a resolution adopted by the City of Toronto directing negotiations for a Voluntary Recognition Agreement with a specific union.

The applicant argued the resolution was discriminatory and created an unlawful monopoly.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the City has the authority under the City of Toronto Act, 2006 to manage its labour relations and pass bylaws respecting its construction projects.

The court noted that the validity of any resulting agreement would be a matter for the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

In a fraud action, the defendant volunteered to have the proceeds of the sale of her home held in trust pending trial, resulting in a consent order.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to use a portion of the frozen funds to pay for her living and legal expenses.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to vary the consent order.

The court held that the consent order was equivalent to a Mareva injunction and that it had the jurisdiction to permit the defendant to use the frozen assets for reasonable expenses.

The motion was granted, allowing the defendant to use up to $175,000 from the proceeds.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance to purchase a property based on a right of first refusal agreement signed by her late husband and his brothers.

The defendant purchaser brought a cross-motion to dismiss the claim.

The court found that the agreement unambiguously granted the right of first refusal only to the 'parties' (the brothers), not to 'family members' like the plaintiff.

The court declined to admit parol evidence of intention and held that the doctrine of privity of contract precluded the plaintiff from enforcing the agreement.

The defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ pleadings for failure to comply with a production order requiring an accounting of revenues and supporting documents relating to the exploitation of certain patented shoe insole technology.

The plaintiffs had initially failed to meet the deadline and their early attempts at compliance were deficient, but they later produced extensive supplementary disclosure and accounting materials.

The court held that although the plaintiffs’ record‑keeping was poor, they had made earnest efforts and had achieved substantial compliance with the production order.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to strike the pleadings, emphasizing the preference for deciding civil disputes on their merits and the absence of wilful non‑compliance.

The plaintiffs’ cross‑motion seeking leave to revive a previously adjourned summary judgment motion was also dismissed because the action was imminently scheduled for trial and the motion could disrupt the trial schedule.