Charles Spettigue

During a sexual assault trial, the Crown brought an application to admit prior consistent statements made by the complainant to a friend via Snapchat on the night of the alleged offence.

The Crown argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication raised during cross-examination.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defence's theory posited the motive to fabricate arose before the Snapchat conversation occurred, specifically when the complainant's mother picked her up and she feared punishment for breaking parental rules.

Consequently, the statements lacked probative value to rebut the allegation.

During a criminal trial for sexual offences, the Crown sought to cross-examine the accused regarding an alleged attempt to contact a potential witness on social media.

The defence objected.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that the proposed cross-examination would only serve to show circumstantially bad character.

The court held that the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to infer disreputable conduct outweighed any probative value, and the evidence did not tend to prove that the sexual activity with the complainant was non-consensual.

The accused, charged with abduction and attempted abduction of two children, brought pre-trial motions to exclude oral and video statements made to police, as well as evidence seized from his apartment pursuant to search warrants.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not obtained in breach of the Charter.

However, the court found that a second search warrant, which authorized the seizure of items previously denied by a Justice of the Peace in a first warrant application, violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the items not authorized by the first warrant under s. 24(2).

The accused brought a constitutional challenge arguing that section 281 of the Criminal Code (abduction of a child under 14) is overly broad and creates an absolute liability offence that could criminalize innocent persons helping lost children.

The court dismissed the application, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Chartrand.

The court held that section 281 requires mens rea, specifically the intent to deprive a parent or guardian of possession of the child, and preserves all common law and statutory defences.

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty and by demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award costs against the Crown.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no reasonable apprehension of bias but held that the trial judge erred in reviewing the Crown's decision to file the Notice on a reasonableness standard.

Applying the correct standard, the court found the Crown's decision was not arbitrary or an abuse of process, given the aggravating factors including a prior conviction, high blood alcohol readings, and the late guilty plea.

The Crown's sentence appeal was allowed, a 30-day intermittent jail sentence was imposed, and the accused's costs appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving where the sentencing judge refused to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty for a repeat offender.

The sentencing judge had unilaterally gathered transcripts from other cases to conclude the Crown's practice was inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reviewing the reasonableness of the prosecutorial discretion and by impermissibly gathering evidence.

Applying the appellate framework, the court found no abuse of process or Charter violation in the Crown's decision to file the notice, and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days' incarceration.